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"'One feels that you're almost in a bit of a twilight zone ... I
mean, we're talking about a copyright treaty. And it's being treated as
akin to nuclear secrets."'
-Michael Geist'
"Drafting treaties in secret, especially when they concern new crack-
downs on intellectual property violations, is a bit like rolling around in
red meat, stuffing your pockets with raw hamburger, and jumping into
a shark tank; reaction in both cases is likely to be swift and violent."
-Nate Anderson 2
"What's in ACTA? Well, it kind of doesn't matter. If it were good
stuff, they'd be negotiating it in public where we could all see it."
-Cory Doctorow3
1. Joel Rose, Secrecy Around Trade Agreement Causes Stir, NPR (Mar. 17, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=124780647&ft=l&f=1003 (quoting
Michael Geist, Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-Commerce Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Ottawa).
2. Nate Anderson, The Real ACTA Threat (It's Not iPod-Scanning Border Guards),
ARS TECHNICA (June 2, 2008, 7:05 AM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/06/the-
real-acta-threat-its-not-ipod-scanning-border-guards.ars.
3. Cory Doctorow, Big Entertainment Wants to Party Like It's 1996, INTERNET
EVOLUTION (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.internetevolution.com/document.asp?doc-id=
175415.
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"If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas,
what would they look like? This is pretty close."
-David Fewer 4
INTRODUCTION
HE Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 5 (ACTA) is a once-se-
cret plurilateral agreement negotiated by Japan, the United States,
the European Union, Switzerland, and other like-minded coun-
tries in an effort to strengthen the global protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights.6 It represents the latest attempt by key
ACTA negotiating parties to consolidate the different protections that
have already been developed through bilateral, plurilateral, and regional
trade and investment agreements. 7
Originated more than five years ago, ACTA built on pre-existing anti-
piracy and anti-counterfeiting efforts, such as the Global Congress on
Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy8 (Global Congress), Japan's propo-
sal for an anti-counterfeiting treaty,9 the United States' STOP! (Strategy
Targeting Organized Piracy) Initiative, 10 and the European Commission's
Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third
4. Proposed Secret Copyright Deal Takes Aim at iPods, Providers, OTrAWA CITIZEN
(May 24, 2008), http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/story.html?id=bbbaf436-e632-44a7-
8f58-7d2c8Of3fldb (quoting David Fewer, Staff Counsel, Canadian Internet Policy and
Public Interest Clinic, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa).
5. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, available
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf [hereinafter ACTA].
6. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. [USTR], Ambassador Schwab
Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter USTR Press Release], available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-
us-will-seek-new-trade-agreement-fight-fakes.
7. As a report by the Congressional Research Service noted:
U.S. FTAs may lend themselves as models for the ACTA. The United States
has stated that it seeks to model the ACTA on the IPR enforcement provi-
sions found in the U.S. FTAs with Australia, Morocco, and Singapore and
the proposed FTA with South Korea. These agreements include provisions
on "criminal penalties and procedures in cases of willful trademark counter-
feiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale; border measures in cases
involving trademarks and copyrights; and civil remedies for all intellectual
property rights (e.g., patent, trademark, copyright), with appropriate limita-
tions that ensure consistency with U.S. law." These four FTAs arguably have
the most stringent IPR provisions of all U.S. FTAs to date. For the United
States, the ACTA represents an opportunity to expand the stronger IPR
commitments found in these bilateral agreements to a broader set of coun-
tries. The proposed U.S. FTA with South Korea, in particular, may serve as a
"gold standard" for the ACTA.
SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41107, THE PROPOSED ANTI-COUNTERFEIT-
ING TRADE AGREEMENT: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 6 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
8. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
9. See id.
10. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
2011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Countries (EU IPR Enforcement Strategy).' After eleven rounds of ne-
gotiations in more than three years, ACTA was finally adopted on April
15, 2011.12 Beginning on May 1, 2011, the agreement is opened for signa-
ture for two years.1 3
From the standpoint of international intellectual property develop-
ment, ACTA is rather important, as it is likely to lock in or raise the
international standards for intellectual property protection and enforce-
ment in both developed and less-developed countries. 14 By using a
"country club" approach to international norm-setting, the agreement
also threatens to undermine the multilateral intellectual property and
trading systems.' 5 Notwithstanding these considerable ramifications,
most of the public discussions, thus far, have primarily focused on the
lack of transparency and accountability in the negotiation process.' 6 Such
a focus is understandable; without the needed information, it is virtually
impossible to assess the impact of this new plurilateral agreement. The
provision of such information is, therefore, the logical first step in criti-
cally examining ACTA's strengths and weaknesses.
During the early stages, the treaty negotiations were kept mostly se-
cret.1 7 In the wake of the eighth round of negotiations in April 2010, the
ACTA negotiating parties reversed their secretive position by releasing a
joint consolidated draft of the proposed agreement (consolidated draft). 18
The reluctant release of this document was precipitated by the leaks of
many highly informative and revealing documents, the most important of
which listed not only the provisions in the consolidated draft but also the
various parties that were allegedly responsible for the bracketed texts in
that draft or for other language that has since been left out.1 9
While the release of the consolidated draft allayed some of the fears
concerning the secretive negotiations and the attendant worry that the
new agreement would ratchet up the already very high protections in ex-
isting international intellectual property systems in developed countries, 20
11. European Comm'n, Directorate General for Trade, Strategy for the Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries, 2005 O.J. (C 129) 3 [hereinafter EU IPR
Enforcement Strategy].
12. See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jp., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) (Opening for Signature) (May 1, 2011) [hereinafter MOFA Press Re-
lease], available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2011/5/0501_01.html.
13. ACTA, supra note 5, art. 39.
14. See discussion infra Parts III, IV, and V.
15. See discussion infra Part VI.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
18. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011 (Apr.
2010 draft) [hereinafter Consolidated Draft], available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/
1883.
19. See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011(Jan. 18, 2010 draft) [hereinafter Leaked Draft], available at http://www.laquadrature.net/
files/201001_acta.pdf (providing an unofficial, leaked draft of ACTA).
20. See Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev. [ICTSD], Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Pact '99 Percent' Complete, BRIDGE'S WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Oct. 7, 2010, at 34, availa-
ble at http//ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/86164/.
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the rest of the negotiation process was still far from transparent, and pub-
lic, non-industry participation remained very limited. 21 There were also
questions about whether the full implementation of the agreement would
require the introduction of higher or new standards for protection.
22
In its final text, ACTA includes six different chapters: (1) initial provi-
sions and definitions; (2) legal framework for enforcement of intellectual
property rights; (3) international cooperation; (4) enforcement practices;
(5) institutional arrangements; and (6) final provisions.23 Chapter II,
which is the most controversial and longest part of the agreement, is sub-
divided into five different sections: (a) general obligations; (b) civil en-
forcement; (c) border measures; (d) criminal enforcement; and (e)
enforcement of intellectual property rights in the digital environment.
24
Although many of the provisions in these chapters were rather contro-
versial at the negotiation stage, the final text contains more moderate
versions of these provisions, thereby creating what commentators have
referred to as "ACTA Lite." 25 Nevertheless, this Article argues that
ACTA is still highly problematic. It identifies six specific fears that arose
during the negotiation of the agreement. Although these various fears
emerged in the early days of the ACTA negotiations, many of them, by
and large, have proven to be rational and justified, thanks to the official
release or leak of negotiating documents and the multiple draft texts.
This Article was written with U.S. laws in mind. However, many of its
arguments are equally applicable to other ACTA negotiating parties, in-
cluding members of the European Union. The Article also pays special
attention to the vastly different social, economic, and technological condi-
tions in less-developed countries-which include, in the parlance of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), both developing and least-developed
countries. It is the goal of this Article to examine ACTA in relation to
the larger global intellectual property regime.
Part I traces the development of ACTA from its origin in the Second
Global Congress to the final round of negotiations in Tokyo, Japan. Part
II highlights the concerns over the procedural defects of the ACTA nego-
tiation process (Fear #1). Part III explores the potential for ACTA to
ratchet up the already very high intellectual property standards within the
United States (Fear #2). Part IV discusses how ACTA could lead to
greater protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights abroad
(Fear #3), especially in less-developed countries where stronger standards
are unlikely to be beneficial. Part V shows how ACTA could backfire on
U.S. consumers and businesses, even if no legislative changes are re-
quired to meet the new treaty obligations (Fear #4). Part VI explains
21. See discussion infra Part II.B.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. See Consolidated Draft, supra note 18.
24. Id. ch. 2.
25. Monika Ermert, Treaty Negotiators Turn to "ACTA Lite" in Hopes of Closure,




how ACTA has resulted in the development of a new, freestanding, self-
reinforcing infrastructure for facilitating future efforts to ratchet up inter-
national intellectual property standards (Fear #5). Part VII concludes by
noting that ACTA is unlikely to be as effective as policymakers and rights
holders have anticipated. It points out the sad reality that the agreement
will create a new set of unnecessary international obligations and adverse
side-effects without providing meaningful protection to even the intellec-
tual property industries (Fear #6). Given the relatively limited benefits of
ACTA, one cannot help but question why countries negotiated this agree-
ment in the first place.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACTA
A. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS
1. Japan
The idea of an anti-counterfeiting trade agreement was first introduced
by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to other members of the
Group of Eight (G8) at the June 2005 meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland. 26
Since 2003, Japan has actively pushed for stronger intellectual property
protection at both the national and international levels. In January 2003,
Prime Minister Koizumi, in a speech to the Japanese diet, announced a
plan to make Japan "a nation built on the platform of intellectual prop-
erty."'2 7 Subsequently, Japan developed an intellectual property strategy
program, which has since been updated every year.28
In November 2005, Japan officially presented the proposal for an anti-
counterfeiting treaty in the Second Global Congress in Lyon, France, an
event jointly organized by the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol), the World Customs Organization (WCO),2 9 and the World In-
26. See Japan Proposes New IP Enforcement Treaty, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 15,
2005), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2005/11/15/japan-proposes-new-ip-enforcement-
treaty/.
27. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Jp., General Policy Speech by Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi to the 156th Session of the Diet (Jan. 31, 2003), available at http://www.
mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/speech030l3l.html; see also PETER DRAHOS, THE
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 163 (2010)
(discussing Prime Minister Koizumi's speech).
28. See generally Intellectual Property Strategic Program, SECRETARIAT OF JP. INTELL.
PROP. STRATEGY HEADQUARTERS, http://www.ipr.go.jp/e-materials.html (last visited Nov.
6, 2010) (listing links to the annual updates of the strategic plans).
29. For discussions of the World Customs Organization's recent problems in setting
new intellectual property enforcement standards, known as SECURE (Standards to be
Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement), see generally Henrique C.
Moraes, Dealing with Forum Shopping: Some Lessons from the Negotiation on SECURE at
the World Customs Organization, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES 159 (Li Xuan & Carlos Correa eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT]; Li Xuan, WCO SECURE: Legal and Economic
Assessments of the TRIPS-plus-plus IP Enforcement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EN-
FORCEMENT, supra, at 62; Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 465, 539-40 (2009); Viviana Mufioz Tellez, The World Customs Organisation:
Setting New Standards of Intellectual Property Enforcement Through the Back Door?, S.
BULL., Apr. 16, 2008, at 6; William New, World Customs Organization to Replace Contro-
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tellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in partnership with the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce and its new Business Action to Stop
Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) initiative, the International Trade-
mark Association (INTA), and the International Security Management
Association. 30
Titled "Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Counterfeits and Pirated
Goods," the proposed agreement sought to target worldwide counterfeit-
ing and piracy, while addressing concerns over "'safety and security of
consumers." 31 While many developed countries and intellectual prop-
erty rights holders consider the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights32 (TRIPS Agreement) inadequate and out-
dated, 33 the proposed treaty did not seek to replace either the TRIPS
Agreement or other international intellectual property treaties. 34 At the
end of the congress, the participants adopted the Lyon Declaration, which
recommended the further consideration of "Japan's proposal for a new
international treaty."' 35 Although some participants supported the propo-
sal, others expressed skepticism, citing the "lukewarm welcome" the pro-
posal had received at the G8 meeting in Gleneagles. 36
Since the Second Global Congress, the treaty proposal had been resub-
mitted in various international fora. For example, Japan reintroduced the
agreement in January 2007 in the Third Global Congress hosted by WIPO
versial IP Standards Body; Doubts Remain, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 8, 2009), http://
www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/01/08/world-customs-organization-to-replace-controversial-
ip-standards-body-doubts-remainl.
30. Second Global Congress (Lyon), GLOBAL CONGRESS COMBATING COUNTERFEIT-
ING & PIRACY, http://www.ccapcongress.net/Lyon.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). To date,
congresses have been held in Brussels (May 2004), Lyon (November 2005), Geneva (Janu-
ary 2007), Dubai (February 2008), Canctin (December 2009), and Paris (February 2011).
Congress Archives, GLOBAL CONGRESS COMBATING COUNTERFEITING & PIRACY, http://
www.ccapcongress.net/archives.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
31. Japan Proposes New IP Enforcement Treaty, supra note 26 (quoting Hisamitsu
Arai, Secretary General, Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters of Japan).
32. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
33. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 483
(2011) (discussing the developed countries' frustrations over the inadequacy and ineffec-
tiveness of the TRIPS enforcement provisions).
34. See Japan Proposes New IP Enforcement Treaty, supra note 26. During the meet-
ing, both Interpol and WCO were suggested as possible organizations to be in charge of
this new treaty. Id.
35. Second Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy, Nov. 14-15, 2005,
The Lyon Declaration 4 (Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ccapcongress.net/archives/
Lyon/files/OutcomesStatement2005115.pdf (discussing recommendations for the future
roles of Interpol and WCO in combating piracy and counterfeiting).
36. Enforcement Declaration Lays Strategy for Co-operation, Legislation, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2005/11/17/enforcement-
declaration-lays-strategy-for-co-operation-legislation/. The G8 statement, Reducing IPR
Piracy and Counterfeiting Through More Effective Enforcement, for example, was vague
and did not specifically mention Japan's treaty proposal. See Group of Eight Gleneagles
Summit, July 6-8, 2005, Reducing IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting Through More Effective




in Geneva.37 It also advanced the proposal in subsequent meetings
within the G8. These efforts eventually culminated in the adoption of the
G8 Leaders' Statement on Combating IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting at
the 2006 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia. 38 That statement "reaffirm[ed
their] commitment to strengthening individual and collective efforts to
combat piracy and counterfeiting, especially trade in pirated and counter-
feit goods."'39 It also alluded to the need for increased cooperation
among the G8 members and between these members and international
organizations such as WIPO, the World Trade Organization (WTO),
WCO, Interpol, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), and the Council of Europe.40 The G8 leaders further
"instruct[ed their] experts to study the possibilities of strengthening the
international legal framework pertaining to IPR enforcement. '41
Although the G8 leaders specifically mentioned ACTA in later com-
muniqu6s,42 it is worth noting that G8 does not provide an ideal forum
for negotiating an anti-counterfeiting treaty.43 First, the forum does not
have the norm-setting capabilities found in the WTO, WIPO or other
preexisting intellectual property-related fora.44 Second, Russia, the G8's
newest member, was excluded from the discussion of this specific treaty. 45
Although Russia could still have been interested in supporting other G8
members, perhaps in the hope of earning greater support for its accession
to the WTO or for other initiatives, the country was unlikely to proac-
37. See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Japan Resurfaces Global Enforcement Framework;
EU Refers to FTAs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2007/01/31/japan-resurfaces-global-enforcement-framework-eu-refers-to-ftas/; see
also Third Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy, Jan. 30-31, 2007,
Shared Challenges, Common Goals 3 (Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Shared Challenges, Com-
mon Goals], available at http://www.ccapcongress.net/archives/Geneva/Files/Congress%20
RecommendationsGeneva%20Jan%202007.pdf (noting the need to "[ejxplore the propo-
sal by the Government of Japan to develop an international treaty on the manufacturing
and distribution of counterfeit and pirated goods, as well as consumer education").
38. Group of Eight St. Petersburg Summit, July 15-17, 2006, Combating IPR Piracy
and Counterfeiting (July 16, 2006) [hereinafter Combating IPR Piracy], available at http://
en.g8russia.ru/docs/15.html.
39. Id. $1 1; see also G8 Outcome Has IP Implications for Enforcement, Trade and
Health, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 19, 2006), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2006/07/19/
g8-outcome-has-ip-implications-for-enforcement-trade-and-health/ (discussing Combating
IPR Piracy and the G8 meeting in Gleneagles).
40. See Combating IPR Piracy, supra note 38, T 3.
41. Id. $1 6.
42. See, e.g., Group of Eight Hokkaido Summit, July 7-9, 2008, G8 Leaders' Commu-
niqug on the World Economy, 17 (July 8, 2008) [hereinafter G8 Leaders' Communiqu],
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/docO80714__en.html.
43. See Michael Geist, Japan Wanted Canada Out of Initial ACTA Group, MICHAEL
GEIST's BLOC (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5656/125/ (report-
ing about a confidential U.S. government cable recently disclosed through WikiLeaks
showing the USTR emphasizing that the G8 or OECD "might make it more difficult to
construct a high-standards agreement").
44. See Yu, supra note 29, at 521-22 (comparing WIPO's norm-setting capabilities
with those of the WTO).
45. See Monika Ermert, G8 Government Wants ACTA Finalized This Year: SPLT
Talks Accelerated, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 9, 2008), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2008/07/09/g8-governments-want-acta-finalised-this-year-spit-talks-accelerated/.
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tively push for a treaty from which it was excluded. Other G8 leaders
might also have been sensitive to the inconvenient fact that they deliber-
ately left Russia out of the negotiations, due in part to its widespread
piracy and counterfeiting problems.
2. United States
Like Japan, the United States was interested in strengthening the en-
forcement of intellectual property rights through cooperation and coordi-
nation with key trading partners in the developed world. In 2004, the
United States established the STOP! Initiative, a government-wide initia-
tive launched "to fight global piracy by systematically dismantling piracy
networks, blocking counterfeits at [U.S.] borders, helping American busi-
nesses secure and enforce their rights around the world, and collaborating
with our trading partners to ensure the fight against fakes is global. ' 46
Because the initiative called for the United States Trade Representa-
tive (USTR) to reach out to its trading partners to build international
support for combating counterfeiting and piracy, in 2005 Ambassador Su-
san Schwab "led interagency teams to meet with key trading partners to
advocate closer cooperation in fighting piracy and counterfeiting, and to
advocate sharing of 'best practices' for strong legal frameworks. '47 A
year later, the USTR "encouraged the interagency Trade Policy Staff
Committee (TPSC), a committee representing the interests of twenty
U.S. government agencies, to endorse the concept of a multi-party,
'TRIPS-plus' ACTA. ' '48 As Stanford McCoy, Assistant U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative for Intellectual Property and Innovation, recalled:
USTR proposed that a group of leading IPR-protecting nations
could work together to set a new standard for IPR enforcement that
was better suited to contemporary challenges, both in terms of
strengthening the relevant laws and in terms of strengthening various
frameworks for enforcing those laws. The interagency TPSC con-
curred with USTR's recommendation that USTR begin contacting
trading partners to join a plurilateral ACTA.49
46. USTR Press Release, supra note 6. As the now-defunct National Intellectual
Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council stated in its final report:
STOP! is built on five key objectives:
1. Empower American innovators to better protect their rights at home and
abroad
2. Increase efforts to seize counterfeit goods at our borders
3. Pursue criminal enterprises involved in piracy and counterfeiting
4. Work closely and creatively with U.S. industry
5. Aggressively engage our trading partners to join our efforts.
NAT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION COUNCIL, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON COORDINATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EN-
FORCEMENT AND PROTECTION 4 (2008).
47. Declaration of Stanford McCoy at 4-5, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, No. 1:08-cv-01599-AMC (D.D.C. May 29, 2009) [hereinafter McCoy
Declaration], available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/EFF PK-vUSTR/McCoy.pdf.




Building on this initiative as well as the many free trade agreements
(FTAs) that the United States has negotiated since the early 2000s,
ACTA began to take shape. 50
3. European Union
Although the European Union was also quite active in the negotia-
tions, many commentators and leaked documents credited Japan and the
United States for being the primary movers of this treaty.51 As the coun-
try proposing the agreement, Japan became the agreement's depositary. 52
This Part therefore focuses only on developments in Japan and the
United States.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the European Union's
important and proactive role in pushing for greater discussion of enforce-
ment issues at the international level-at both the WTO and WIPO. It is
also worth recalling the EU IPR Enforcement Strategy, which the Euro-
pean Commission's Directorate General for Trade developed in April
2005. 53 As far as criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights is
concerned, the European Union might have been even more eager than
the United States to establish an international standard, due in large part
to its continued struggle to establish a community-wide criminal enforce-
ment directive. 54
4. ACTA Negotiations
On October 23, 2007, two weeks after WIPO adopted its Development
Agenda,55 Ambassador Schwab formally announced the United States'
intent to negotiate a new anti-counterfeiting trade agreement with its key
trading partners.56 The European Union and Japan made similar but in-
dependent announcements. 57 In addition to this usual trilateral alliance
for heightened intellectual property protection, the initial negotiating
parties included Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, and Swit-
zerland.58 As the USTR press release declared:
[T]he goal [of ACTA] is to set a new, higher benchmark for enforce-
ment that countries can join on a voluntary basis.... The envisioned
ACTA will include commitments in three areas: (1) strengthening
international cooperation, (2) improving enforcement practices, and
50. See ILIAS, supra note 7, at 6.
51. See, e.g., id. at 1.
52. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 45.
53. See EU IPR Enforcement Strategy, supra note 11.
54. See discussion infra Part III.B.
55. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
56. See USTR Press Release, supra note 6.
57. See Press Release, European Comm'n, European Commission Seeks Mandate to
Negotiate Major New International Anti-Counterfeiting Pact (Oct. 23, 2007), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1573; MOFA Press Re-
lease, supra note 12.
58. USTR Press Release, supra note 6.
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(3) providing a strong legal framework for IPR enforcement.5 9
Pre-negotiation technical discussions began two weeks before the for-
mal announcement, with the first round of these negotiations held as
early as October 4, 2007, the day after the end of the 2007 WIPO General
Assembly. 6° The follow-up round occurred in January 2008.61 According
to Michael Geist, Canada received a proposal from the United States as
early as October 2006,62 and an internal discussion paper appeared three
months later.63 This chronology suggests not only a well-laid plan to
strengthen intellectual property enforcement norms but also a calculated
effort to disclose the treaty to the public at a time when the impact of its
announcement would be maximized.
The negotiation of ACTA began in earnest in June 2008. Since then,
eleven rounds of negotiations have been conducted as follows: 64
Round 1: Geneva, Switzerland (June 2008) (border measures);
Round 2: Washington, United States (July 2008) (border measures
and civil enforcement of intellectual property rights);
Round 3: Tokyo, Japan (October 2008) (civil and criminal enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights);
Round 4: Paris, France (December 2008) (criminal enforcement, in-
ternational cooperation, enforcement practices, institutional arrange-
ments, and internet distribution and information technology);
Round 5: Rabat, Morocco (July 2009) (international cooperation, en-
forcement practices, institutional arrangements, and transparency
matters);
Round 6: Seoul, South Korea (November 2009) (enforcement of
rights in the digital environment, criminal enforcement, and trans-
parency matters);
Round 7: Guadalajara, Mexico (January 2010) (civil enforcement,
border enforcement, and enforcement of rights in the digital
environment);
Round 8: Wellington, New Zealand (April 2010) (civil enforcement,
border measures, criminal enforcement, and special measures for the
digital environment);
59. Id.
60. See AUSTL. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, AN INTERNATIONAL PROPO-
SAL FOR A PLURILATERAL ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) (2007),
available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/discussion-paper.html.
61. See Press Release, Simon Crean, Member of Parliament, Austl. Minister for Trade,
Australia to Negotiate an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Feb. 1, 2008),
available at http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2008/sc_012.html.
62. See Michael Geist, The ACTA Guide, Part One: The Talks To-Date, MICHAEL
GEIST'S BLOG (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4725/125/.
63. See Michael Geist, ACTA Discussed Internally Months Before Public Announce-
ment, MICHAEL GEIST'S BLOG (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/
2859/196/.
64. The press releases for each of the following rounds are available at European




Round 9: Lucerne, Switzerland (June-July 2010) (initial provisions,
general obligations, civil enforcement, border measures, criminal en-
forcement, enforcement measures in the digital environment, inter-
national cooperation, and institutional arrangements);
Round 10: Washington, United States (August 2010) (all sections);
and
Round 11: Tokyo, Japan (September 2010) (all sections).
Although the negotiating parties once harbored the hope of completing
the agreement by the end of the Second Bush Administration, 65 the ne-
gotiations did not complete until the end of 2010.66 On April 15, 2011,
ACTA was finally adopted.67 As of this writing, it has been signed by
more than two-thirds of the negotiating parties but has yet to enter into
force.68
5. Reactions to ACTA
During the negotiations, ACTA received both support and criticisms in
various international fora. For example, paragraph 17 of the G8 Leaders'
Communiqu6 on the World Economy declared:
Effective promotion and protection of IPR are critical to the devel-
opment of creative products, technologies and economies. We will
advance existing anti-counterfeiting and piracy initiatives through,
inter alia, promoting information exchange systems amongst our au-
thorities, as well as developing non-binding Standards to be Em-
ployed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement (SECURE) at
the World Customs Organization. We encourage the acceleration of
negotiations to establish a new international legal framework, the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), and seek to complete
65. See G8 Leaders' Communiqug, supra note 42, 17 (encouraging "the acceleration
of negotiations to establish a new international legal framework, the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement .... and seek to complete the negotiation by the end of this year"); see
also James Love, The Counterfeit Treaty, HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2008, 10:32 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/the-counterfeit-treaty-b_104831.html ("There is
a huge rush to conclude this agreement before Bush leaves office."); Ermert, supra note 25
(reporting that the U.S. administration was eager to complete ACTA before the mid-term
elections in November 2010).
66. See ACTA Fact Sheet (Mar. 2010), USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-
march-2010 (last visited Nov. 5, 2010) (stating that "participants are aiming to conclude the
negotiation by the end of 2010"). But see Brett Winterford, No "Three Strikes Rule" for
Australian ISPs, IT NEWS (Feb. 4, 2010, 5:25 AM), http://www.itnews.com.au/News/166308,
no-three-strikes-rule-for-australian-isps.aspx (reporting that the Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade "expects the parties to engage in 'three to four' further rounds
of talks in 2010, 'with further discussions in 2011 possible"').
67. MOFA Press Release, supra note 12.
68. Press Release, USTR, Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement Negotiating Parties (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/
press-releases/2011/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag ("Repre-
sentatives of eight governments-Australia, Canada, Japan, Republic of Korea, Morocco,
New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States-signed the Agreement .... "). ACTA
will "enter into force thirty days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, or approval as between those Signatories that have deposited their re-
spective instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval." ACTA, supra note 5, art.
40.1.
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the negotiation by the end of this year. We will promote practical
cooperation between our countries to develop tools to combat new
techniques in counterfeiting and piracy and spread best practices.
We reaffirm our commitment on government use of software in full
compliance with the relevant international agreements and call on
other countries to follow our commitment.69
During the Fourth Global Congress in February 2008, the participants
called on the Global Congress Steering Group to "work within their orga-
nizations, with each other and with other interested parties to encourage
international governmental organizations and national governments to
develop a holistic strategy on the negotiation and revision of interna-
tional conventions and treaties related to counterfeiting and piracy."
70
As stated in the Dubai Declaration, this strategy "must . . . take into
account the project work of the G8 and initiatives aiming at higher stan-
dards in the field of IP enforcement such as the WCO SECURE Initia-
tive, and preparations for the conclusion of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement ... "71
Meanwhile, the ACTA negotiations had faced serious challenges and
criticisms in other fora. For instance, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution condemning the secretive approach taken by the European
Commission and the EU Council of Ministers while threatening to take
the issue to the Court of Justice of the European Union for resolution.
72
Through this resolution, which was adopted 633-13 (with sixteen absten-
tions), the Parliament "[e]xpresse[d] its concern over the lack of a trans-
parent process in the conduct of the ACTA negotiations. ' 73 The
European Parliament "[c]all[ed] on the Commission and the Council to
grant public and parliamentary access to ACTA negotiation texts and
summaries. '74 It further "[d]eplore[d] the calculated choice of the parties
not to negotiate through well-established international bodies, such as
WIPO and WTO, which have established frameworks for public informa-
tion and consultation. '75 The Parliament also noted the need to include
in further ACTA negotiations "a larger number of developing and emerg-
ing countries, with a view to reaching a possible multilateral level of
negotiation. "76
69. G8 Leaders' Communiqug, supra note 42, 17 (emphasis added).
70. Fourth Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy, Feb. 3-5, 2008,
Dubai Declaration 4 (Mar. 30, 2008), available at http://www.ccapcongress.net/archives/
Dubai/Files/Final%20Dubai%200utcomes%20Declaration.pdf.
71. Id.
72. See Resolution on the Transparency and State of Play of the ACTA Negotiations,
PARL. EUR. Doc. (P7 TA(2010)0058) 2 (2010) (stressing that "unless Parliament is imme-
diately and fully informed at all stages of the negotiations, it reserves its right to take








B. THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM
One of the biggest criticisms of ACTA to date is the failure of the nego-
tiating parties to develop the agreement in an international intergovern-
mental organization, like the WTO, WIPO, or even the WCO.77
Although future possibilities for greater interactions between ACTA and
these organizations still exist,78 ACTA is likely to remain a freestanding
treaty outside the multilateral framework. This Part explores why Japan,
the United States, and the European Union-and, for that matter, other
ACTA negotiating parties-chose to negotiate a new agreement outside
the WTO and WIPO.
1. WTO
In November 2001, the WTO member states launched the Doha Devel-
opment Round of Trade Negotiations (Doha Round) during the Fourth
Ministerial Meeting in Qatar.79 Amidst post-September 11 sentiments
and in the wake of the growing need for cooperation between the United
States and the less-developed world,80 this new round of negotiations led
to the adoption of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health8 l (Doha Declaration) and the unprecedented acceptance of a pro-
tocol to formally amend the TRIPS Agreement.8 2 Designated as the new
Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement, this proposed amendment seeks
to enable WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity
to import generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals. 83
77. See discussion infra Part VI.
78. See Kaitlin Mara, WIPO, WTO Requested to Advise on Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 15, 2010, 10:10 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/04/
15/european-parliamentarians-call-on-wipo-wto-for-technical-advice-on-acta/ (reporting
that several members of the European Parliament had sent letters to WIPO and the WTO
to request technical assistance with ACTA). But see Lamy Tells EU Parliament No (for
Now) on ACTA, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 13, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2010/05/13/lamy-tells-eu-parliament-no-for-now-on-acta/ (reporting about the letter from
WTO Director General Pascal Lamy stating that he and the WTO Secretariat "are in no
position to provide authoritative comments on ACTA or its negotiating process"). The
European Parliament's letter is available at http://www.erikjosefsson.eu/sites/default/files/
WTO-Ietter-from-Greens-EFA.html. Lamy's reply is available at http://keionline.org/sites/
default/files/WTO-LamyAnswer-to-MEP-letter.pdf.
79. See Yu, supra note 29, at 512-15 (discussing the Doha Round).
80. Id. at 512-13.
81. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
82. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter TRIPS Amendment], available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-.e/trips e/wt1641
_e.htm; see also Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827,
872-86 (2007) (tracing the development of proposed Article 31bis of the TRIPS
Agreement).
83. See Yu, supra note 82, at 829. Ratification of this protocol requires two-thirds of
the WTO membership. Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD
TRADE ORO. (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips.e/amendment-e.
htm. Although the initial deadline for ratification was set at December 1, 2007, it has been
extended twice to December 1, 2011. Id. As of this writing, slightly more than a third of
the 153 WTO member states, including the United States, India, Japan, China, and mem-
bers of the European Union, have ratified the proposed amendment. Id.
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Although the Doha Round began as a development round and has sub-
sequently led to greater accommodation of needs, interests, and condi-
tions in less-developed countries, developed countries have actively
pushed for heightened intellectual property protection and enforcement
in the WTO. For example, during the TRIPS Council meeting in June
2006, the European Union called for an "in-depth discussion" of enforce-
ment issues. 84 Together with two earlier proposals,85 the EU effort to
push for greater discussion of intellectual property enforcement in the
TRIPS Council represented the first attempts by a WTO member to re-
vive such discussion since 1997.86 That effort also reflected the directions
of the new EU IPR Enforcement Strategy,87 which the European Com-
mission adopted in November 2004.88
84. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights [TRIPS Council],
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: Border Measures: Communication from the Euro-
pean Communities, IP/C/W/471 (June 9, 2006).
85. TRIPS Council, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from
the European Communities, IP/C/W/468 (Mar. 10, 2006); TRIPS Council, Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the European Communities, IP/C/W/448
(June 9, 2005).
86. See TRIPS Council, Review of Legislation on Enforcement: Questions Posed by
Hong Kong, China, IP/C/W/81 (Sept. 29, 1997); TRIPS Council, Review of Legislation on
Enforcement: Questions Posed by Japan, IP/C/W/82 (Oct. 8, 1997); TRIPS Council, Review
of Legislation on Enforcement Questions Posed by New Zealand, IP/C/W/84 (Oct. 23,
1997); TRIPS Council, Review of Legislation on Enforcement: Questions Posed by the Eu-
ropean Communities and Their Member States, IP/C/W/80 (Oct. 1, 1997); TRIPS Council,
Review of Legislation on Enforcement: Questions Posed by the United States, IP/C/W/83
(Oct. 21, 1997); TRIPS Council, Review of Legislation on Enforcement: Replies from Bul-
garia to Questions Posed by Japan, IP/C/W/91 (Nov. 13, 1997); TRIPS Council, Review of
Legislation on Enforcement: Replies from Hungary to Questions from the European Com-
munities and Their Member States, Japan and the United States, IP/C/W/88 (Nov. 12, 1997);
TRIPS Council, Review of Legislation on Enforcement: Replies from Japan to Questions
from the European Communities and Their Member States, Hong Kong-China and the
United States, IP/C/W/89 (Nov. 13, 1997); TRIPS Council, Review of Legislation on En-
forcement: Replies from the European Communities and Their Member States to Questions
from Hong Kong China and Japan, IP/C/W/87 (Nov. 6, 1997); TRIPS Council, Review on
Legislation and Enforcement: Replies from the United States to Questions from the Euro-
pean Communities and Their Member States, Hong Kong-China and Japan, IP/C/W/90
(Nov. 14, 1997).
87. See EU IPR Enforcement Strategy, supra note 11. As the strategy stated in one of
the recommended specific actions:
The EU will consult other trading partners regarding the possibility of
launching an initiative in the TRIPs Council highlighting the fact that the
implementation of TRIPs requirements in national laws has proven to be
insufficient to combat piracy and counterfeiting, and that the TRIPs Agree-
ment itself has several shortcomings.
For example, the TRIPs Council could consider in the future a number of
actions to tackle the situation, including the extension of the obligation to
make available customs measures to goods in transit and for export.
Id. at 6. See generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, THE FIGHT AGAINST COUNTERFEITING AND
PIRACY IN THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS OF THE EU (2008), available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?file=21459 (providing
a detailed analysis of the EU IPR Enforcement Strategy).
88. EUROPEAN COMM'N, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR TRADE, EVALUATION OF THE




In response to the EU efforts, leading developing countries such as Ar-
gentina, Brazil, China, and India registered their strong opposition, citing
distractions from WTO trade talks, which they claimed were "supposed
to focus on development" in the Doha Round.89 As noted by a Chinese
official, the TRIPS Council is "not the right time or right place" to discuss
intellectual property enforcement. 90 In China's view, those issues should
be handled by the DSB instead.9'
In the next TRIPS Council meeting in October 2006, the European
Union, with formal support from Japan, Switzerland, and the United
States, submitted to the Council a joint communication seeking to
strengthen the implementation of the enforcement provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement.92 As the communication declared: "The TRIPS
Council is an appropriate forum to examine and assist Members in the
implementation of enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
The work of the TRIPS Council in this regard should complement Mem-
bers' efforts to use other cooperative mechanisms to address IPR en-
forcement. ' 93 Citing ongoing challenges in the area, the European Union
and the paper's cosponsors:
- Invite other Members to engage in a constructive discussion of
how to implement the enforcement provisions of TRIPS in a more
effective manner.
- Invite other Members to engage in a constructive discussion of
accompanying measures which could enhance the effectiveness of
national implementing legislation and enforcement efforts, such as
for example promoting interagency co-operation, fostering a higher
public awareness, and reinforcing institutional frameworks.
- Ask the Secretariat to prepare a synopsis of Members' contribu-
tions to the Checklist of Issues on Enforcement1941 that would serve
as a basis for the above-mentioned discussion.
- Stand ready, in cooperation with recipients of technical assistance
and with relevant international organizations, to better focus the
technical assistance they provide in favour of developing countries in
order to facilitate the implementation of enforcement provisions.95
When the European Union sought to make a formal presentation of
this proposal, less-developed countries objected largely on procedural
89. EU Gets Little Support for Enforcement Proposal at WTO; CBD Issue Unresolved,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 16, 2006), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2006/01/25/ustr-
clarifies-demand-for-details-on-chinas-ipr-enforcement-cases/.
90. Id.
91. See TRIPS Council Issues Still Alive for WTO Ministerial, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2005/10/28/trips-council-issues-still-alive-
for-wto-ministerial/.
92. TRIPS Council, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Joint Communication
from the European Communities, Japan, Switzerland and the United States, 4, IP/C/W/485
(Nov. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Joint Communication].
93. Id.
94. TRIPS Council, Checklist of Issues on Enforcement: First Draft: Note by the Secre-
tariat, IP/C/W/9 (July 28, 1995).
95. Joint Communication, supra note 92, 1 7.
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grounds.96 As a result, the European Union could not formally present
its proposal; it made a statement instead, and the proposal was subse-
quently rejected.97 The reactions from less-developed countries were un-
derstandable. These countries were already concerned about the rather
high standards required by the TRIPS Agreement, with which they had
great difficulty complying following the expiration of the agreement's
transitional periods. 98 In effect, less-developed countries were dealing
with what Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis have described as the
"Uruguay Round 'hangover'" 99-to be more precise in the intellectual
property context, "TRIPS veisalgia." These poorer countries were also
very concerned about the growing TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-extra obliga-
tions that developed countries had pushed upon them through new bilat-
eral and regional trade and investment agreements. 100
Moreover, less-developed countries feared that a greater discussion of
the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement would eventually open
themselves to future challenges over non-compliance in the enforcement
area.101 To many of these countries, compliance issues should be ad-
dressed only through the use of the mandatory WTO dispute settlement
process. 102 Some of these countries also feared that a greater discussion
of enforcement issues in the TRIPS Council would lead to unconstructive
"finger pointing" that would slow down the Council's work while creating
unnecessary distractions. 10 3
During the next TRIPS Council meeting in January 2007, the United
States circulated another paper, sharing its experience on border enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights.104 The document discussed the vari-
ous techniques that the United States found helpful in addressing
96. See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, WTO TRIPS Council Stumbles over Inclusion of
Enforcement, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2006/
10/27/wto-trips-council-stumbles-over-inclusion-of-enforcement/ (recounting the disagree-
ment between developed and less-developed countries over how to address intellectual
property enforcement in the TRIPS Council).
97. See id.
98. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369,
379-86 (2006) (discussing the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on less-developed
countries).
99. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANI-
ZATION: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 111 (2007).
100. See Yu, supra note 98, at 383-86.
101. See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Developed Countries Seek to Elevate Enforcement
Measures in TRIPS Council, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.ip-watch.
org/weblog/2006/10/25/developed-countries-seek-to-elevate-enforcement-measures-intrips
-council/ (noting that "the paper carries the implied threat [by developed countries] that
countries failing to provide 'adequate' protection of intellectual property rights ultimately
could be found not to be in compliance with TRIPS").
102. See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, TRIPS Meeting: Boost to IP Issues as Part of Re-




104. TRIPS Council, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Part III of the TRIPS
Agreement): Experiences of Border Enforcement: Communication from the United States,
IP/C/W/488 (Jan. 30, 2007).
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intellectual property infringement. 10 5 The United States also called on
the TRIPS Council to "make a positive contribution to addressing [intel-
lectual property enforcement] problems through a constructive exchange
of views and experiences. 1 0 6 Although less-developed countries found
the United States' approach procedurally acceptable, they insisted that
their position "had not changed, and they still [did] not believe [the en-
forcement issue] belong[ed] in the TRIPS Council." 107 China, with the
support of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, India, and South Africa, stated spe-
cifically that "enforcement could not be a permanent agenda item in the
council. ' 108 The enforcement issue was particularly sensitive to China,
because the United States, at that time, was contemplating whether to file
a WTO complaint against China concerning its lack of protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 10 9
In June 2007, Switzerland introduced another paper, suggesting ways to
implement the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and to
improve the overall enforcement of intellectual property rights. 110 This
paper underscored the need to develop well-functioning communication
and coordination structures in the area of border measures."' 1 A few
months later, Japan introduced the last enforcement paper from the de-
veloped world, sharing its experiences on border enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights while outlining the recent trend on intellectual
property infringements.' 1 2
Shortly after the release of these papers, the ACTA negotiations were
announced.113 Since then, developed countries have not circulated any
new papers on enforcement during the TRIPS Council meetings. For the
purposes of this Article, it is worth noting that all the key ACTA negoti-
ating parties-Japan, the United States, the European Union, and Swit-
zerland-had at one time or another submitted their own papers on
enforcement to the Council. 1 4 Thus, despite the wide criticisms over
105. See id. at 1.
106. Id.
107. Gerhardsen, supra note 102.
108. Id.
109. See Peter K. Yu, The U.S.-China Dispute over TRIPS Enforcement, in IP EN-
FORCEMENT AND AWARENESS RAISING IN ASIA 239 (Christoph Antons ed., 2011) (criti-
cally examining the United States' decision to file a TRIPS enforcement complaint against
China before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body). The complaint was filed on April 16,
2007, a few months after the January 2007 TRIPS Council meeting. Request for Consulta-
tions by the United States, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007).
110. TRIPS Council, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication and
Coordination as a Key to Effective Border Measures: Communication from Switzerland, IP/
C/W/492 (May 31, 2007); see also Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Quiet TRIPS Council Meeting
Expected; Enforcement Push Continues, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 1, 2007), http://www.
ip-watch.org/weblog/2007/06 /01/quiet-trips-council-meeting-expected-enforcement-push
-continues/ (reporting Switzerland's proposal).
111. TRIPS Council, supra note 110.
112. TRIPS Council, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from
Japan, IP/C/W/501 (Oct. 11, 2007).
113. See USTR Press Release, supra note 6.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 84-112.
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how developed countries ignored multilateral fora in their efforts to es-
tablish ACTA, evidence does suggest their intent to open discussions on
enforcement at the WTO. As these countries have claimed, the unwill-
ingness of less-developed countries to discuss enforcement issues gave
them no choice but to explore discussions in another forum.
2. WIPO
At WIPO, the key ACTA negotiating parties faced similar, and per-
haps even greater, challenges. During the WIPO General Assembly in
October 2004, Brazil and Argentina introduced a proposal to establish a
WIPO Development Agenda. 115 After years of deliberation in the Provi-
sional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development
Agenda and the Inter-sessional Intergovernmental Meeting on a Devel-
opment Agenda for WIPO, the forty-five recommendations for action
were adopted in October 2007.116 Recommendation 45 specifically calls
on WIPO "[t]o approach intellectual property enforcement in the context
of broader societal interests and especially development-oriented con-
cerns," taking into consideration the objectives laid out in Article 7 of the
TRIPS Agreement." 7
Although WIPO-administered treaties, like the Paris, Berne, and
Rome Conventions, provide no mandatory and effective enforcement
mechanisms, enforcement issues have been addressed at the organiza-
tion-quite unlike the TRIPS Council. Before WIPO considered the cre-
ation of a Development Agenda, enforcement-related advisory
committees already existed. 118 During the 1998-1999 biennium, the Pro-
gram and Budget for WIPO called for the establishment of the Advisory
Committee on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights" 9 and the Ad-
visory Committee on Management and Enforcement of Copyright and
Related Rights in Global Information Networks. 120 In October 2002,
these two committees were merged into a single committee, the Advisory
Committee on Enforcement (ACE). 121 As the WIPO General Assembly
115. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Proposal to Establish a Development
Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/govbody/en/wo-ga_31/wo-ga_31_lj.pdf.
116. See Press Release, WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for
WIPO (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article
0071.html; see also The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development
Agenda, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/
recommendations.html (last visited July 6, 2008) [hereinafter 45 Adopted Recommenda-
tions] (listing all 45 recommendations).
117. 45 Adopted Recommendations, supra note 116, recommendation 45.
118. See Preceding Committees and Meetings, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Nov. 17,
2010), http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/ace/archive.html.
119. When this advisory committee was first created, it was known as the Advisory
Committee on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights in Global Electronic Commerce.
Id. During the 2000-2001 biennium, the committee was renamed by dropping the phrase
"in Global Electronic Commerce." Id.
120. Id.
121. See Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/ace/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) (providing information
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stated in its report:
The mandate of the Committee in the field of enforcement, which
excludes norm setting, was limited to technical assistance and coordi-
nation. The Committee should focus on the following objectives: co-
ordinating with certain organizations and the private sector to
combat counterfeiting and piracy activities; public education; assis-
tance; coordination to undertake national and regional training pro-
grams for all relevant stakeholders and exchange of information on
enforcement issues through the establishment of an Electronic
Forum.122
Based on the discussions in the General Assembly, it was quite clear that
delegates from less-developed countries were highly concerned that the
ACE would undertake normative or standard-setting activities. 123 It was
against this background that the General Assembly limited the commit-
tee's mandate to technical assistance and coordination. 124
The first session of the ACE was held in Geneva in June 2003, with
participation from seventy-two WIPO member states, five international
intergovernmental organizations, and sixteen nongovernmental organiza-
tions. 125 During that meeting, members addressed various enforcement
issues, including "the coordination, training and development of enforce-
ment strategies"'126 and the establishment of the Electronic Forum on In-
tellectual Property Issues and Strategies (the IPEIS Forum). 127
A year later, the second session was held to address the role of the
judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial authorities in enforcement activ-
ities, including such related issues as litigation costs. 128 Shortly after this
session, Brazil and Argentina introduced their proposal to establish a de-
velopment agenda at WIPO. 12 9 That proposal was subsequently adopted
by the General Assembly in October 2007.130
about the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement); List of Meetings of the Advisory
Committee on Enforcement, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/meetings/
enltopic.jsp?group-id=142 (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) (providing hyperlinks to the ACE
meeting documents).
122. WIPO, WIPO General Assembly Report, 114(iii), at 25, WO/GA/28/7 (Oct. 1,
2002).
123. See id. 1$ 82-120, at 19-26 (recording the delegates' different views on the man-
date of the proposed ACE).
124. See id. 114(iii), at 25.
125. First Session of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE), WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/ace/sessionl.html (last visited May 5,
2010).
126. Id.
127. See WIPO, Advisory Comm. on Enforcement [ACE], Conclusions by the Chair,
3, at 1, 6, at 2, WIPO/ACE/1/7 Rev (June 13, 2003).
128. See ACE, Conclusions by the Chair, 9 5, at 2, WIPO/ACE/2/13 (June 30, 2004).
129. WIPO, supra note 115; see also Press Release, WIPO, Member States Agree to
Further Examine Proposal on Development (Oct. 4, 2004), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/
en/prdocs/2004/wipo-pr_2004.396.html.
130. See Press Release, WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for
WIPO (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article
0071.html; see also 45 Adopted Recommendations, supra note 116 (listing all 45 recommen-
dations of the WIPO Development Agenda).
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During the third ACE session in May 2006, which focused on educa-
tion, training, and awareness-building in the area of enforcement,131 dele-
gates disagreed on not only the committee's mandate but also the ability
of civil liberties groups to participate in the session.132 While developed
countries took a rather narrow view of enforcement, less-developed
countries, powered by the discussions on the new WIPO Development
Agenda, wanted to include issues such as limitations and exceptions,
competition issues, and biopiracy (or the misappropriation of traditional
knowledge and genetic resources). 133
The fourth ACE session met a year later, a month after the adoption of
recommendations for the WIPO Development Agenda. 134 The meeting
sought to address "the importance of cooperation and coordination espe-
cially among law enforcement agencies at the national, regional and inter-
national levels."' 135 Although Italy sought to broaden the Committee's
'mandate to include the establishment of guidelines and best practices on
enforcement of intellectual property rights" during the 2007 WIPO Gen-
eral Assembly,1 36 the proposal was neither adopted at the General As-
sembly nor explored in the ACE meeting.1 37 Instead, Brazil suggested at
the meeting that the ACE should take into consideration the newly-
adopted WIPO Development Agenda.1 38 Meanwhile, "the United States
did not have a strong contingent" in the session, suggesting that the
newly-announced ACTA might have "move[d] some attention away from
venues such as WIPO.139
In November 2009, the ACE met again to examine the "[c]ontribution
of, and costs to, right holders in enforcement, taking into consideration
Recommendation No. 45 of the WIPO Development Agenda. ' 140 As the
discussion topic suggested, the Development Agenda now has a growing
influence on the work of the ACE. One participant even acknowledged
that "'[t]he enforcement committee is now the pet of the developing
countries.' "141
131. See ACE, Draft Agenda, item 5, at 1, WIPO/ACE/3/1 (Mar. 23, 2006).
132. See W1PO Discusses Enforcement as Some Seek Broader Mandate, Consumer
Voice, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 19, 2006), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2006/05/19/
wipo-discusses-enforcement-as-some-seek-broader-mandate-consumer-voice/.
133. See id.
134. See ACE, Conclusions by the Chair 1, WIPO/ACE/4/10 (Nov. 5, 2007).
135. Id. 8, at 2.
136. Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng & Viviana Mufioz Tellez, The Changing Structure and
Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement 26 (S. Ctr., Research Paper No. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com docman&task=docdown
load&gid=714&Itemid=&lang=en.
137. See id.
138. See William New, WIPO Committees Casting About for Future Work, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2007/11/05/wipo-committees
-casting-about-for-future-work/.
139. Id.
140. ACE, Draft Agenda, item 5, at 1, WIPO/ACE/5/1 Prov. Rev (Sept. 28, 2009).
141. Kaitlin Mara & William New, IP Enforcement Work at WIPO Gets Boost from
Developing Nations, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/web
log/2009/11/06/ip-enforcement-work-at-wipo-gets-boost-from-developing-nations/ (quoting
an unnamed participant); see also id. ("'For the first time developing countries [referring to
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This recent turn of events and the increasingly pro-development stands
taken by WIPO (including its ACE) may have forced developed coun-
tries to other fora-not only ACTA but also the WCO and the Global
Congress; the Fifth Global Congress, for example, was held only a month
after the fifth ACE session. 142 To some extent, the developments at both
WIPO and the WTO resembled the notorious stalemate between devel-
oped and less-developed countries over the Nairobi text when the Paris
Convention was under revision in the early 1980s. 143 In response to this
stalemate, developed countries, led by the United States and influenced
by multinational corporations, abandoned WIPO for the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATF) with a goal to establish new substan-
tive intellectual property norms that are enforceable through a
mandatory dispute settlement process. These norms eventually became
embodied in the TRIPS Agreement. 144
Notwithstanding the stalemate between developed and less-developed
countries on the enforcement front, there is still a possibility that the dis-
cussions will return to the WTO or WIPO. Indeed, the discussion of in-
tellectual property enforcement has recently returned to the TRIPS
Council. In the June 2010 meeting, for example, China and India made
important interventions, expressing their concerns about the release of
the draft ACTA text and the highly disturbing trend concerning TRIPS-
plus enforcement standards. 145 As these countries argued, these TRIPS-
plus standards could cause a wide variety of systemic problems within the
international trading system, creating legal conflicts and uncertainty while
upsetting the balance struck in the TRIPS Agreement. 146 India further
Brazil and Pakistan] put forth the agenda."' (quoting Ali Asad Gilani, First Secretary,
Permanent Mission of Pakistan to Geneva)).
142. See Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agree-
ments, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 24, 26 (1999) ("The decision to use a plurilateral coali-
tion to create new global standards reflects increasing disillusion with WIPO as a norm-
setting venue because of its lack of enforcement power."); see also Michael Geist, The
ACTA Threat to the Future of WIPO, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.
ip-watch.orglweblog/2009/04/14/the-acta-threat-to-the-future-of-wipo/ (relating the Cana-
dian officials' suggestion that the establishment of ACTA may be attributable to the "the
perceived stalemate at WIPO, where the growing emphasis on the Development Agenda
and the heightened participation of developing countries and non-governmental organisa-
tions have stymied attempts by countries such as the United States to bull their way toward
new treaties with little resistance").
143. See generally Yu, supra note 29, at 505-11 (discussing the revision of the Paris
Convention).
144. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Prop-
erty Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 358-67 (2004).
145. See Catherine Saez, Health Waiver, IP Enforcement Discussed at Lively WTO
TRIPS Council Meeting, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 10, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010 /06/10/health-waiver-ip-enforcement-discussed-at-lively-wto-trips-
council-meeting/ (reporting that China and India "voiced concerns about efforts by devel-
oped countries to introduce provisions into trade agreements that reach beyond the TRIPS
agreement, referred to as 'TRIPS-plus' measures").
146. See TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting, 11 248-73, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010)
[hereinafter TRIPS Council Minutes]; see also The Problems with the "TRIPS Plus" En-
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reminded the Council that the second sentence of Article 1.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement delineates one of the Agreement's maximum stan-
dards, or the so-called "ceilings.' 47 In India's view, the TRIPS Agree-
ment prohibits members from raising the protection levels to the extent
that such protection contravenes the Agreement. 148 India also lamented
how intellectual property negotiations at the bilateral and regional levels,
including the recent ACTA negotiations, have now bypassed the existing
multilateral framework. 149
In the next TRIPS Council meeting in October 2010, less-developed
countries continued to register their concerns about the impact of ACTA
negotiations. As Indonesia noted, "[t]he ACTA initiative has failed to
keep in line the TRIPS standards and thus undermined the safeguards
provided by the TRIPS Agreement.' 150 Likewise, Brazil criticized
ACTA for "propos[ing] only one remedy against counterfeiting and
piracy, and that remedy is repression.' 51 While the country recognized
the need for enforcement, it noted that enforcement alone "is not enough
to combat a problem that results from the interplay of factors that are to
be found in different economic and social realities."1 52
In sum, given the wide divergences between developed and less-devel-
oped countries, it remains unclear what the future will hold for the devel-
opment of international intellectual property enforcement standards at
forcement Trend: China's View, S. BULL., July 28, 2010, at 13 (reprinting China's draft
statement); Why "IPR Enforcement" in A CTA & FTAs Harm the South, S. BULL., July 28,
2010, at 10 [hereinafter India's TRIPS Council Intervention] (reprinting India's draft
statement).
147. Article 1.1 provides: "Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in
their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement." TRIPS Agreement art.
1.1.
148. As India declared:
Although [the] TRIPS Agreement is usually considered to be a minimum
levels agreement, enforcement levels cannot be raised to the extent that they
contravene TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS plus measures cannot be justified on
the basis of Art 1:1 since the same provision also states that more extensive
protection may only be granted "provided that such protection does not con-
travene the provisions of this Agreement".
In addition to laying certain minimum standards, [the] TRIPS Agreement
also provides "ceilings", some of which are mandatory and clearly specified
in the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement has achieved a
very careful balance of the interests of the right holders on the one hand, and
societal interests, including development-oriented concerns on the other.
Enforcement measures cannot be viewed in isolation of the Objectives con-
tained in Art 7 ....
India's TRIPS Council Intervention, supra note 146, at 10-11 (emphasis added); see TRIPS
Council Minutes, supra note 146, 1 265, 272; see also Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A
Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to International Trade? ACTA Border Measures and
Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 644, 653-57 (2011) (discussing the maximum
standard set by the second sentence of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement).
149. See TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 146, 267.
150. Kaitlin Mara, TRIPS Council Discusses Efficacy of ACTA, Public Health Amend-






the WTO, WIPO, or other multilateral fora. Nor is it clear what issues
will be raised at those fora or how high the standards will be, if they are
to be developed at all.
II. FEAR #1: LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
A. THE ACTA BLACK Box
From the very beginning, the ACTA negotiations had been kept in se-
cret. While some questioned, jokingly, whether the acronym ACTA
stands for "Anti-China Trade Alliance" 153 or "Anti-Canada Trade Agree-
ment,'1 54 others suggested sadly that the treaty may, in effect, be an
"Anti-Consumer Trade Agreement. ' 155 Although ACTA officially
stands for "Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement," these alternative la-
bels are not too far off the mark, considering the agreement's wide impli-
cations for China, Canada, and consumers and the fact that the
agreement's focus has gotten quite far away from commercial
counterfeiting.
The secrecy surrounding the ACTA negotiations attracted severe criti-
cism from consumer advocates and civil liberties groups. As Robert
Weiss of Essential Action wrote in his comment to the USTR: "There is
no conceivable rationale for the cloak-and-dagger aura around the talks,
and the refusal to disclose draft texts and relevant background docu-
ments. '' 156 Likewise, Robin Gross of IP Justice lamented:
The lack of transparency and public participation in the process to
negotiate ACTA is deeply troubling to anyone who cares about de-
mocracy and the public interest. Outside of a scant press release or
two, the USTR has provided the general public with virtually no
public information about the proposed substance of ACTA. 157
Taken together, these comments show four sets of public interest con-
cerns that ACTA has raised: (1) lack of transparency; (2) very limited
public, non-industry participation; (3) a huge democratic deficit; and (4)
153. See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, ACTA Up, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Oct. 24, 2007, 11:51 AM),
http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2007/10/acta-up.php.
154. See, e.g., Howard P. Knopf, Macera & Jarzyna, LLP, Remarks at the 18th Annual
Conference on Intellectual Property and Policy at Fordham University School of Law
(Apr. 9, 2010).
155. See Kimberlee Weatherall, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, LAWFONT.
COM (June 12, 2008, 9:17 AM), http://www.lawfont.com/2008/06/12/the-anti-consumer-
counterfeiting-tired-trade-agreement/; Susan K. Sell, Professor of Political Science and In-
ternational Affairs, The George Washington University, Remarks at the Transatlantic Con-
sumer Dialogue Meeting on ACTA and Consumers (Apr. 28, 2010) (for more information
regarding this source, please contact the Author).
156. Letter from Robert Weissman, Dir., Essential Action, to Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade
Rep. (Sept. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Essential Action Comment], available at http://www.ustr.
gov/archive/assets/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2008/asset-upload-file989-15121.pdf.
157. Robin Gross, ACTA's Misguided Effort to Increase Govt Spying and Ratchet-Up
IPR Enforcement at Public Expense, IP JusT. (Mar. 21, 2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/
03/21/acta-ipj-comments-ustr-2008march/.
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virtually no domestic or global accountability. 158
While this "cloak of secrecy" initially insulated ACTA negotiators from
external pressure and outside criticism, it eventually backfired on them
by fueling concerns, fears, rumors, allegations, speculations, and paranoia
and by distracting them from focusing on substantive discussions. As one
information technology analyst wrote somewhat exaggeratedly in the
Sydney Morning Herald:
The ACTA draft is a scary document. If a treaty based on its pro-
visions were adopted, it would enable any border guard, in any treaty
country, to check any electronic device for any content that they sus-
pect infringes copyright laws. They need no proof, only suspicion.
They would be able to seize any device-laptop, iPod, DVD re-
corder, mobile phone, etc-and confiscate it or destroy anything on
it, merely on suspicion. On the spot, no lawyers, no right of appeal,
no nothing.159
Although ACTA is unlikely to require such draconian measures, con-
cerns regarding overzealous border guards searching and confiscating
travelers' iPods, DVD players, and laptops struck a rare chord with the
consuming public, most of whom are generally not too interested in intel-
lectual property matters. These distractions were so bad that one of the
treaty's key proponents even wrote to the USTR to request for greater
transparency in the negotiation process. As Dan Glickman, the chairman
and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), wrote
in a letter to Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and USTR Ron Kirk:
Outcries on the lack of transparency in the ACTA negotiations are
a distraction. They distract from the substance and the ambition of
the ACTA which are to work with key trading partners to combat
piracy and counterfeiting across the global marketplace.
We appreciate the US government's efforts thus far to broaden its
consultative process on the ACTA. Despite these exceptional ef-
forts, the protests persist, fostering apprehension over the Agree-
ment's substance. We understand that the ACTA parties agree on
the desirability to provide meaningful opportunities for the public to
provide input. We support this objective and encourage the US gov-
ernment to direct that process so that we can engage in a meaningful
dialogue on substance rather than procedural matters. 160
158. See ROBIN GROSS, IP JUSTICE WHITE PAPER ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-COUNTER-
FEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) 4-8 (2008), available at http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/IPJusticeACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf; Susan K. Sell, The Global IP
Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 9
(lQsensato, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2008), available at http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-
content/uploads/Sell IP EnforcementState-of Play-OPs-lJune 2008.pdf.
159. Graeme Philipson, Digital Copyright: It's All Wrong, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
June 10, 2008, http://www.smh.com.au/news/perspectives/digital-copyright-its-all-wrong/
2008/06/09/1212863545123.html.
160. Letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman & CEO, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc.,
to Senator Patrick Leahy (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22785108/
MPAA-letter-re-ACTA;see also Nate Anderson, Shocker: Ars, Hollywood Agree on Need
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To a large extent, the wild speculations and the resulting "distractions"
were sparked by the unnecessary closed-door negotiations, which made it
difficult for the public to have a rational policy debate. As a student com-
mentator colorfully noted, "[w]ith no open negotiating process, and no
draft publicly available, ACTA is a black box that could contain a
bomb.' 61 To alleviate this concern, ACTA negotiators repeatedly em-
phasized that the new agreement would not result in such draconian out-
comes.162 They also quickly reached a consensus on the de minimis
provision, 163 notwithstanding the negotiating parties' initial disagreement
over the scope of such a provision, as well as some lingering concerns
from selected industry groups-most notably INTA and the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce. 164
While Glickman's letter may have suggested a mid-way change of the
for ACTA Openness, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 20, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
news/2009/11/shocker-ars-hollywood-agree-on-need-for-acta-openness.ars (discussing the
MPAA letter).
161. Margot Kaminski, Recent Development, The Origins and Potential Impact of the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 247 (2009).
162. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT
(ACTA): FACT SHEET 2 (2008), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/
october/tradoc 140836.11.08.pdf ("ACTA is not designed to negatively affect consumers:
the EU legislation (2003 Customs Regulation) has a de minimis clause that exempts travel-
lers from checks if the infringing goods are not part of large scale traffic. EU customs,
frequently confronted with traffics of drugs, weapons or people, do neither have the time
nor the legal basis to look for a couple of pirated songs on an i-Pod music player or laptop
computer, and there is no intention to change this."); USTR, FACT SHEET: ANTI-COUN-
TERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) 4 (2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset upload-file760_15084.pdf ("The focus of the dis-
cussion on border measures has been on how to deal with large-scale intellectual property
infringements, which can frequently involve criminal elements and pose a threat to public
health and safety. Past U.S. free trade agreements have called for ex officio authority for
border enforcement, meaning that border officials are empowered to enforce the law on
their own initiative, without waiting for a complaint from a right holder. But this in no way
requires searches of travelers' music players or computers.").
163. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 14.2 (including a de minimis provision stipulating that
"[a] Party may exclude from the application of this Section small quantities of goods of a
non-commercial nature contained in travellers' personal luggage").
164. See Michael Geist, Canada's ACTA Briefing, Part Five: The Fight Over a De
Minimis Exception, MICHAEL GEIST'S BLOG (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/
content/view/3834/125/ ("[Slome groups are concerned that it would send a signal that
purchasing counterfeit products for personal use is acceptable or that it could lead to the
importation of counterfeit medicines."); Global Organizations Provide Governments with
Recommendations on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Bus. ACTION TO STOP COUN-
TERFEITING & PIRACY (June 25, 2010), http://www.iccwbo.org/bascap/index.html?id=37650
(stating in the joint recommendations and comments on ACTA submitted by BASCAP
and INTA the belief that "making an explicit exception that permits travelers to bring in
goods for personal use sends a wrong message to consumers that buying counterfeits is
accepted by the government"); see also Shared Challenges, Common Goals, supra note 37,
at 3 (noting the need to "fe]xamine whether, and under which circumstances, consumers
should also be penalized for purchasing and/or possession of counterfeit and pirated prod-
ucts in countries that don't already have such measures"); TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI
E. ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS § 6:50, at
703 (2008) ("Because of the growing trade in counterfeit and pirate products, there are
some governments, notably France, that have decided to take stringent measures by target-
ing tourists who may have only one counterfeit item. Switzerland appears to be following
France's example." (footnote omitted)).
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MPAA's position,165 it also shows a rather complicated picture behind
the transparency issue. That picture goes beyond the simple claim that
ACTA was negotiated in secret because the U.S. government or the ma-
jor intellectual property industries wanted it that way. To be certain, the
United States initiated the secretive process in December 2007, a few
months before the first round of negotiations. 166 Nevertheless, that pro-
cess quickly took on a life of its own and arguably backfired on the inter-
ests of both the negotiating parties and their supportive industries. Yet,
because the negotiating parties invested so much in this secretive process,
bearing the high political costs of such secrecy, changing the process was
more complicated than adding a new item on to the meeting agenda.
To make matters worse, the secretive approach antagonized not only
the public but also lawmakers, including those who have strongly sup-
ported intellectual property industries. Senators Patrick Leahy and Ar-
len Specter, for example, sponsored the Pro-IP (Prioritizing Resources
and Organization for Intellectual Property) Act of 2008.167 Yet they were
left in the dark and had to openly demand more transparency over the
negotiating process.168
It is indeed bizarre that ACTA negotiators, the industries, and their
lobbyists did not think more carefully about the unintended political
complications that their secretive approach would create. After all, if
lawmakers were shut out of the process, the debate would no longer be
over substance but rather process and trust.169 In Europe, for instance,
the secretive process led the European Parliament to adopt a highly criti-
cal resolution. That resolution showed as much about the Parliament's
concern for a lack of transparency as its demand for respect-an under-
standable demand following the recent entering into force of the Lisbon
165. See Letter from Dan Glickman, supra note 160, at 1.
166. See McCoy Declaration, supra note 47, at 13 (noting the United States' proposal
that "documents relating to the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement... will be
held in confidence").
167. S. 3325, 110th Cong. (2005). The Pro-IP Act originated as the Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights Act of 2008. Bill Summary & Status for the 110th Congress,
S.3325, THE LmR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlO:SN03325:@
@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). The bill was sponsored by Senator Patrick
Leahy and cosponsored by twenty-one senators, including Senator Arlen Specter. Id.
168. See Letter from Patrick Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, &
Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to Susan C.
Schwab, USTR (Oct. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Letter from Senators Leahy and Specter], avail-
able at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/senate-acta-letter-20081002.pdf.
169. See Nate Anderson, Key Senators Oppose DRM, ISP Filtering in Secret ACTA
Treaty, ARs TECHNICA (Oct. 3, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/10/key-
senators-oppose-drm-isp-filtering-in-secret-acta-treaty.ars ("It's not clear that Leahy and
Specter are against any of the items suggested for ACTA by various rightsholder groups,
but the two senators are quite concerned that ACTA not limit Congressional power to
adapt laws to circumstances. The cynical among us might see the letter as little more than
an attempt to preserve personal power-that is, a battle of fiefdoms more than content."
(referring to letter from Senators Leahy and Specter to the USTR)).
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.170 Immediately after
the adoption of this resolution, one member of the European Parliament
declared emphatically that "the European Parliament is not a
doormat." 171
In Canada, similar sentiments arose. While many Canadian lawmakers
were concerned about the impact of the secretive agreement on their con-
stituents, they were equally concerned about the process. As Charlie
Angus, a member of the Canadian Parliament, noted, Canada should not
allow the United States "to shape the substance of any copyright reform
legislation" before his Parliament has an opportunity to do so. 172 As
much as he was concerned about the agreement's content, he was also
worried that new international obligations would create constraints that
bind his Parliament's ability to undertake future legislative reform. 173
To some extent, the ill-advised secretive approach urged by the ACTA
negotiating parties awakened and brought together two groups of un-
likely allies: ACTA's critics and policymakers who were frustrated by the
lack of information and consultation. As a result, ACTA was challenged
on both substantive and procedural grounds. By raising transparency and
accountability questions, the secretive approach also transformed issues
that were too technical to capture public consciousness into matters lay
people could understand and relate to.
1. Official Reasons
Thus far, the United States and other administrations have failed to
offer satisfactory explanations for their secretive approach. As the USTR
noted in its denial of the request from the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),174 ACTA-related
documents concerned "information that [wals properly classified in the
interest of national security pursuant to Executive Order 12958."175 IS-
sued in April 1995 during the Clinton administration, Executive Order
12958 allows materials to be classified when "the unauthorized disclosure
of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to
170. See Nate Anderson, European Parliament Unites Against 3 Strikes, ACTA Secrecy,
ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 9, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/03/european-
parliament-unites-against-3-strikes-acta-secrecy.ars.
171. Id. (reporting a European Parliament member "summ[ing] up the vote as an 'epic
win' that showed 'the European Parliament is not a doormat"').
172. Letter from Charlie Angus, Member of Parliament, to Peter Van Loan, Minister of
Int'l Trade (Jan. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Charlie Angus], available at http://www.
straight.com/article-282136/vancouver/ndp-mp-charlie-angus-raises-questions-about-anti
counterfeiting-trade-agreement.
173. See id.; see also Michael Geist, ACTA Conclusion Leaves Flexibility for Made-in-
Canada Approach, MICHAEL GEIST's BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/
content/view/5368/135/ ("[F]or many Canadians, a core concern with the agreement was
the possibility that it could severely limit the ability to establish a made-in-Canada ap-
proach on copyright and intellectual property policy.").
174. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
175. Letter from Carmen Suro-Bredie, Chief FOIA Officer, USTR, to James Love,
Dir., Knowledge Ecology Int'l (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.keionline.org/misc-
docs/3/ustr foia.denial.pdf.
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the national security. ' 176 In this executive order, national security is
broadly defined as "the national defense or foreign relations of the
United States. ' 177 Meanwhile, "foreign government information" covers
a broad category of information:
(1) information provided to the United States Government by a for-
eign government or governments, an international organization of
governments, or any element thereof, with the expectation that the
information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in
confidence; [and]
(2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a
result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or govern-
ments, or an international organization of governments, or any ele-
ment thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or
both, are to be held in confidence .... 178
Although government officials, industry groups, and academic com-
mentators have repeatedly noted the strong link between counterfeiting
and piracy on the one hand and organized crime and terrorism on the
other,179 national security, in this case, is more correctly identified with
the maintenance of good foreign or diplomatic relations with ACTA ne-
gotiating partners. To better understand the impact of the disclosure of
these documents on foreign relations, it is important to distinguish the
documents by separating them into three different categories: (1) docu-
ments developed by foreign governments and submitted to the home gov-
ernment in confidence; (2) documents jointly developed by the home and
foreign governments throughout the ACTA negotiating process; and (3)
documents developed by the home government. Although the first type
of documents, from a diplomatic standpoint, deserves the strongest pro-
tection, the other types of documents warrant much less.
Indeed, the nondisclosure of the last type of documents should be at-
tributed to an additional reason, which is stated in the Summary of Key
Elements Under Discussion, a six-page, jointly-developed consensus doc-
ument that was released by ACTA-negotiating governments shortly after
President Obama's inauguration.180 As stated in the April 2009 docu-
176. Exec. Order No. 12,958, § 1.2, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995).
177. Id. § 1.1(a).
178. Id. § 1.1(d)(1)-(2).
179. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 5, pmbl. ("[T]he proliferation of counterfeit and pi-
rated goods, as well as of services that distribute infringing material, . . . in some cases,
provides a source of revenue for organized crime and otherwise poses risks to the public.");
International Copyright Piracy: A Growing Problem with Links to Organized Crime and
Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2003); Moists NAIM, ILLICIT: How SMUG-
GLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 126-28
(2005); TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 137-44
(2005); Maureen Walterbach, Comment, International Illicit Convergence: The Growing
Problem of Transnational Organized Crime Groups' Involvement in Intellectual Property
Rights Violations, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 613-15 (2007).
180. USTR, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT-SUMMARY OF KEY EL-




ment, which has since been repeatedly revised:
[I]t is accepted practice during trade negotiations among sovereign
states to not share negotiating texts with the public at large, particu-
larly at earlier stages of the negotiation. This allows delegations to
exchange views in confidence facilitating the negotiation and com-
promise that are necessary in order to reach agreement on complex
issues.181
In a declaration submitted in the EFF's follow-up challenge to its par-
tially denied FOIA request, Assistant USTR Stanford McCoy, who was
the chief ACTA negotiator until assuming his current post, elaborated:
In my experience, of paramount importance to a successful negotia-
tion is an environment in which negotiating partners can exchange
ideas, draft texts, draft comments on texts, and other negotiating
records, with the understanding that these exchanges will be held in
confidence. When negotiating partners function in an environment
of confidence, they are freer to engage in the give-and-take that is
necessary to reach a successful conclusion.182
To some extent, it is understandable why intellectual property rights
holders would rather keep the treaty negotiating process secret. While it
is unlikely that professional counterfeiters would seek to influence the
treaty negotiations, many rights holders-in particular those in the music
industry-have unfortunately considered the file-sharing-loving public as
the new counterfeiters. Since September 2003, the industry has filed law-
suits against more than 35,000 individuals. 183 At the time of the negotia-
tions, the industry was still in the middle of a "copyright war" with the
public.184 Given the industry's intent to push for an agreement targeting
the file-sharing public, the industry logically might have expected the gov-
ernment not to disclose the draft agreement to those whom they consid-
ered adversaries or who were likely to disrupt the development of such
an agreement. While it is sad that an industry took such a belligerent
approach, it is particularly troublesome when government negotiators
also looked at the public at large through an industry-induced bellicose
lens. After all, governments are supposed to work for the public, and it is
the public constituents who elect lawmakers.
In the European Union, similar explanations were given when the EU
Council of Ministers denied a public access request by the Foundation for
a Free Information Infrastructure (FFII) for ACTA-related documents.
Cited for the denial was the need for "protection of the public interest
181. Id.
182. McCoy Declaration, supra note 47, at 6-7.
183. Fred von Lohmann, RIAA v. The People Turns from Lawsuits to 3 Strikes, ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/12/riaa-v-
people-turns-lawsuits-3-strikes.
184. For discussions of the copyright wars, see generally WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PAN-
ICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009); Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual
Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1 (2006); Jessica Litman, War
Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright
Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004).
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with regard to international relations. 18 5 As the Council stated further
in a draft reply to the European Ombudsman, 186 the disclosure of these
documents "would negatively affect the climate of confidence in the on-
going negotiations and hamper open and constructive co-operation,
which is essential in this process."'1 87 The Council further pointed out
that "if the EU's negotiating partners had reason to believe that their
positions expressed during confidential negotiations could be made pub-
lic unilaterally by the EU side, it would also have an adverse effect in
future negotiations."' 188 As to documents that did not concern interna-
tional relations, the Council claimed that they should remain classified
because their disclosure "would reveal the EU's strategic objectives to be
achieved in those negotiations."'' 89 The Council further warned that had
the classified documents been disclosed, "the overall conduct of the on-
going negotiations would thereby be compromised, which would be prej-
udicial to the EU's interest in the efficient conduct of such
negotiations." 90
Although both the European Union and the United States have taken
more open approaches in negotiations at WIPO, WTO, WHO, and other
international fora, 19 1 negotiations at the bilateral and plurilateral levels
have indeed been kept secret in the past. Given the controversial nature
of intellectual property reform today, it is understandable why negotia-
tors would rather limit the discussion to themselves.
From a tactical standpoint, a secretive approach would make the nego-
tiations smoother and much more successful. Such an approach would
also help insulate the negotiations from external influences, which range
from political complications in the capitols to opposition from civil soci-
ety groups at both the national and international levels. In addition, by
concealing the positions of each party, a secretive approach would greatly
185. Draft Letter from Pierre de Boissieu, EU Council of Ministers, to Nikiforos Dia-
mandouros, European Ombudsman 3 (Apr. 17, 2009) [hereinafter EU Council Reply],
available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st08/st08355.en09.pdf (draft reply
letter in response to Complaint 90/2009/(JD)OV filed by Ante Wessels of the FFII); see
also Press Release, Found. for a Free Info. Infrastructure, EU Council Refuses to Release
Secret ACTA Documents (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://press.ffii.org/Press%
20releases/EU % 20Council % 20refuses%20to%20release%20secret%20ACTA%20docu
ments.
186. The European Ombudsman "is appointed by the European Parliament for a re-
newable five-year term and can investigate complaints of maladministration against the
EU's bodies and institutions (except its courts)." CLIVE ARCHER, EUROPEAN UNION 45
(2008).
187. EU Council Reply, supra note 185, at 3.
188. Id. at 3-4; see also EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 162, at 2 ("For reasons of
efficiency, it is only natural that intergovernmental negotiations dealing with issues that
have an economic impact, do not take place in public and that negotiators are bound by a
certain level of discretion.").
189. EU Council Reply, supra note 185, at 4.
190. Id.
191. See Essential Action Comment, supra note 156, at 1-3; see also Memorandum
from Elec. Frontier Found. et al. to Ron Kirk, USTR, attachment 1 (July 22, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachmentl transparencyustr.pdf (discussing
the openness in these and other international fora).
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reduce the pressure faced by the negotiators while at the same time pro-
moting an amicable long-term negotiating relationship. Such a relation-
ship may benefit these negotiators in the long run, ,as it may go beyond
the negotiation of this particular agreement or this particular version of
the agreement. 192 For example, the benefits of an amicable relationship
during the ACTA negotiations could be easily extended to cover the
ongoing negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP),
which thus far have included among its negotiating parties Australia, Bru-
nei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the
United States, and Vietnam. 193
Even more beneficial, a secretive approach would allow a country to
complete their negotiations and then decide whether they want to walk
away from the treaty they helped shape and negotiate. Powerful coun-
tries have indeed taken such an approach in international negotiations in
the past, earning frustrations from their weaker negotiating partners. For
instance, while the United States was heavily involved in the negotiation
of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions under the auspices of UNESCO and demanded sig-
nificant concessions from other negotiating parties,1 94 it (along with
Israel) eventually voted against the adoption of the Convention.195 As of
this writing, the United States still has no intention to become a signatory
of the Convention.
192. For example, although Australia already has an FTA with the United States, it is
now negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement with the United States as well as
with other countries in the Pacific Rim. Overview of Australia's Participation in Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations, AUSTL. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
193. See id. As the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade described:
The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP-better
known as 'P4') between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singa-
pore was signed in 2005. Negotiations for an expanded agreement including
the United States, Australia, Peru and Viet Nam began in March 2010. Ma-
laysia joined the negotiations during the third round in Brunei in October
2010.
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.
& TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-
and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/index.php (last updated Aug. 4, 2011).
194. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expres-
sions, Oct. 20, 2005, U.N. Doc. CLT-2005/Convention Diversite-Cult Rev. 2, available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf; see also Christopher M.
Bruner, Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and the Future of Trade in Cul-
tural Products, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 351, 383-404 (2008); Naomi Mezey, The Para-
doxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 2013-14 (2007); Peter K. Yu,
Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 433,
434-35 (2008); Eireann Brooks, Note, Cultural Imperialism vs. Cultural Protectionism:
Hollywood's Response to UNESCO Efforts to Promote Cultural Diversity, 5 J. INT'L Bus.
& L. 112, 120-32 (2006).
195. See Alan Riding, Unesco Adopts New Plan Against Cultural Invasion, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 2005, at E3 (reporting that "[t]he convention, the result of two years' heated and
occasionally bitter negotiations, was adopted at Unesco's Paris headquarters by 148 votes
in favor, with the United States and Israel voting against and just four countries-Austra-
lia, Nicaragua, Honduras and Liberia-abstaining").
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If these benefits are not enough, policymakers have a deep worry that
the disclosure of ACTA would create a slippery slope where the public
would demand disclosure of negotiations concerning other bilateral and
plurilateral trade and investment agreements. As a leaked document in-
dicated in the EU context: "The [European Commission] feared to estab-
lish a precedent for the free trade agreement currently under negotiation.
It is not the intention that the position of the EU in those will be com-
pletely public. This could have great repercussions for the interests of the
EU."1' 96
Notwithstanding these potential concerns, it is worth noting that the
United States indeed managed to release documents covered by the De-
cember 2007 confidential agreement after consulting with other ACTA
negotiating parties. 197 Unlike trade agreements, which can include tar-
iffs, quotas, financial data, number of shipments, or other sensitive infor-
mation, ACTA focuses primarily on intellectual property enforcement
and does not deserve the same type of protection as a trade agreement. 198
196. Brenno de Winter, New ACTA Leaks Reveal Internal Conflicts Among Negotiaters
[sic], COMPUTER WORLD (Feb. 25, 2010), http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=05CD8788-1A
64-6A71-CE97003E8DC06B00.
197. See McCoy Declaration, supra note 47, at 10. As Assistant USTR Stanford McCoy
noted in his declaration:
Some of [the records disclosed to the Electronic Frontier Foundation] were
protected by the confidentiality agreement we reached with the other ACTA
negotiating partners. However, after reviewing the documents carefully, we
considered that, from the U.S. point of view, release of some of the docu-
ments would not harm the negotiations. In light of the confidentiality agree-
ment, we consulted with our partners and asked them to agree to release the
records in question, and they agreed.
Id. As Essential Action reminded the USTR:
It is true that some trade talks, including U.S. bilateral free trade negotia-
tions, are conducted in secrecy. But this is no rationale for secrecy in the
ACTA contekt, for several reasons. First, it is illogical for USTR to point to
its own practice of demanding secrecy as a justification for secrecy in this
case. Second, even if secrecy were the norm, there is no argument to be
made for following a bad, self-imposed policy just because of precedent.
Third, if there is any logic to the secrecy in bilateral talks (and we do not
believe a good case can be made), it is that negotiators necessarily are dis-
cussing benefits and sacrifices for different national industry groups, and if
the industry groups were able to respond to every proposal, the negotiation
might be bogged down. But this argument has no relevance to the ACTA
context. Are negotiators worried that counterfeiters might seek to influence
the negotiations?
Essential Action Comment, supra note 156, at 2.
198. See Sherwin Siy, The Trouble with ACTA, AM. CONST. Soc'Y's BLOG (Apr. 6,
2010, 5:33 PM), http://www.acslaw.org/node/15774; see also ILIAS, supra note 7, at 6
("While the title of the agreement denotes it as a 'trade agreement,' the ACTA-as cur-
rently being fashioned-differs in nature from other U.S. regional and bilateral trade
agreements. Traditionally, U.S. trade agreements have been rules-based arrangements
where the United States and trading partners agree to trade liberalization measures, in-
cluding eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers to trade among the countries participating
in the free trade area. In contrast, the USTR has portrayed the ACTA as a leadership and
standards-setting agreement. Another way that the ACTA would differ from traditional
trade agreements is in its coverage of issues. Trade agreements negotiated by the United
States tend to be broadly focused, covering a range of issues of which IPR is one. Other
issues covered include market access, tariff barriers, government procurement, services,
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To some extent, calling ACTA a trade agreement is more a pretext for
secrecy than identifying the actual nature of the agreement. As Sherwin
Siy of Public Knowledge rightly criticized, "ACTA's status as a trade ne-
gotiation seems less based in the nature of its substance than in the con-
venience that this designation provides." 199
2. Additional Reasons
While negotiation strategy and foreign relations were offered as the
two official reasons behind the secretive process,20° a careful analysis of
the negotiation context reveals a few additional reasons. First, if one
revisits the early stages of the TRIPS negotiations, one could not help but
notice the lack of substantive negotiations in the early sessions of the
TRIPS Negotiating Group.201 In those sessions, the negotiators spent a
tremendous amount of time, energy, and resources building up consensus
on the need for stronger protection, agreeing on the scope of protection
of the new agreement, and at times arguing over the negotiation man-
date.202 As Daniel Gervais recalled: "Between 1987 and 1989, negotia-
tions progressed slowly, as the Secretariat amassed a vast amount of
material explaining, comparing and identifying lacunae of existing intel-
lectual property conventions and national laws. Delegations tabled docu-
ments outlining areas where new rules were considered useful. 20 3
investment, and rules of origin. The ACTA, in contrast, would focus more narrowly on
IPR issues." (footnotes omitted)).
199. Siy, supra note 198; see also Rose, supra note 1 ("This is not a trade agreement.
This is a multilateral intellectual property agreement. It's only about intellectual property.
They've called it a trade agreement in order to get secrecy and protection that trade agree-
ments normally get." (quoting Gigi Sohn, president of Public Knowledge)).
200. In addition to the European Union and the United States, South Korea offered the
same reasons to justify denying a public access request for ACTA-related documents. See
Danny O'Brien, Blogging ACTA Across the Globe: Lessons from Korea, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/01/acta-and-korea
(stating that IPLeft's August 2008 request for disclosure of South Korea's stance on the
ACTA negotiation was denied, due to "a harmful effect on a diplomatic relationship with
foreign countries and severe damage to considerable national interests").
201. For excellent discussions of the TRIPS negotiations, see generally DANIEL GER-
VAiS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 3-27 (3d ed. 2008)
(describing the origins and development of the TRIPS Agreement); JAYASHREE WATAL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGrTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11-47
(2001) (recounting the negotiation process for the TRIPS Agreement); Yu, supra note 98,
at 371-79 (examining four different accounts of the origins of the TRIPS Agreement).
202. See GERVAIS, supra note 201, at 3-27.
203. Id. at 14; see also Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development:
The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 507-08 ("Prior to the tabling of these texts,
the discussions had focused on identifying existing norms and possible trade-related gaps
therein, but the emerging outline of a possible TRIPS result had essentially been at the
level of principles, not legal texts."). The negotiating documents, including those of the
Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (NG11), are available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
gattdocs.e.htm. For discussions of the disagreement between developed and less-devel-
oped countries over the negotiating mandate, see WATAL, supra note 201, at 21; Peter K.
Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REV. 979, 984-85
(2009).
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Although there has yet to be any public record of the early ACTA
negotiating sessions and there may never be, one can only imagine how
much information there actually was in the first few negotiating rounds.
As the leaks have shown, many of the early documents were negotiation
tables that merely collected provisions or negotiation points.20 4 Moreo-
ver, as the negotiations continued, new issues came up and likely were
incorporated into the negotiating agenda.20 5 For example, in the middle
of the negotiations, the discussion of the seizure of in-transit generic
drugs became a very hot issue due to new developments in Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.20 6 Thus, the ACTA negotiating
parties could very well have been telling the truth when they insisted dur-
ing the early stages that "[a] comprehensive set of proposals for the text
of the agreement d[id] not yet exist. ''20 7
Second, while the United States and the European Union have been
heavily criticized for their secretive approach in the negotiation process,
it is important to note that emerging countries like Singapore and South
Korea might have been equally, if not more, concerned about the disclo-
sure of their negotiating positions. 20 8 Given how much the draft provi-
sions resembled those of U.S. or EU laws and given the harsh criticisms
these governments had received in the past following the negotiation of
FTAs with the United States, negotiators from these countries were un-
derstandably concerned about criticisms at home-over their incompe-
tence, inadequate representation of their countries, their kowtowing to
powerful foreign interests, or, worse, betrayal of their own people. In-
deed, a leaked Dutch document identified Singapore and South Korea-
along with Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Portugal, and the United
States-as opponents to the disclosure of the draft text.20 9
204. See Leaked Draft, supra note 19.
205. See, e.g., Kaitlin Mara, Drug Seizures in Frankfurt Spark Fears of EU-Wide Pat-
tern, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 5, 2009), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog12009/06/05/
drug-seizures-in-frankfurt-spark-fears-of-eu-wide-pattern/ (reporting about the seizure of
generic drugs in Europe).
206. See Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on
Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Pub-
lic Welfare, 1 WIPO J. 43, 47-48 (2009) (discussing the seizure of generic drugs in the
Netherlands); Mara, supra note 205 (reporting about the seizure of generic drugs in
Europe).
207. USTR, supra note 180, at 1 (emphasis added). As the European Commission ex-
plained in a fact sheet in November 2008:
A number of "texts", wrongly presented as draft ACIA agreements have
been circulated on the web. At a preliminary stage of the discussions about
the idea of a future ACTA, some of the negotiating parties have submitted
concept papers, to present their initial views of the project to other partners.
Some of these concept papers have been circulated on the net or commented
in the press and presented as "draft ACTA texts or negotiating guidelines",
which they are not.
EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 162, at 4.
208. See Michael Geist, New ACTA Leak: U.S., Korea, Singapore, Denmark Do Not
Support Transparency, MICHAEL GEIsT's BLOG (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.
ca/content/view/48191125/.
209. See Michael Geist, Talks on Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty Spring a Leak, TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 12, 2010, at B2; Geist, supra note 208. As stated in Computer World:
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In retrospect, the concerns for emerging countries were generally
somewhat different from those of the United States and the European
Union. While the former feared that such disclosure would have serious
political ramifications at home,210 the latter feared that such disclosure
would result in parties walking away from the negotiation table (in addi-
tion to protesting at home).211 In many emerging and less-developed
countries, there is still a significant disconnect between what policymak-
ers want at the international level and what the actual local conditions are
in those countries.212 The relationships between capitols and diplomatic
outposts (usually Brussels, Geneva, New York, or Washington) are com-
plicated to say the least. The policymakers' increasing, and sometimes
blind, focus on using intellectual property protection to attract foreign
direct investment might have also led them to agree to stronger intellec-
tual property protection at the international level than is suitable at
home.213 As Kevin Gallagher observed, policymakers in less-developed
countries increasingly "trade away" the ladder that would enable them to
catch up with other developed countries.214
Finally, transparency could be used as a bargaining chip for the ACTA
negotiating parties. For example, before the eighth round of negotiations
in Wellington, the USTR spokesperson stated (with implicit signals to
other negotiating parties):
Increasing transparency in the ACTA negotiations, including pro-
viding improved means for public input into the process, is a priority
for the United States. In this upcoming round of ACTA negotia-
tions, the U.S. delegation will be working with other delegations to
resolve some fundamental issues, such as the scope of the intellectual
property rights that are the focus of this agreement. Progress is nec-
essary so that we can prepare to release a text that will provide
meaningful information to the public and be a basis for productive
The U.K. wants full disclosure with support from, among others, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and Austria. Germany and Denmark
are opposed to that. It turns out that Singapore and South Korea also de-
mand secrecy. Japan switched position and now favors full disclosure. The
U.S. is silent on the matter. But the position of Washington becomes appar-
ent when the report states that Italy and France fear retaliation.
de Winter, supra note 196. The leaked Dutch document is available at http://www.big
wobber.nl/2010/02/25/dutch-internal-acta-documents/.
210. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 314 (2009).
211. See James Love, Ambassador Kirk: People Would Be "Walking Away from the
Table" if the ACTA Text Is Made Public, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://keionline.org/node/706.
212. See DEERE, supra note 210, at 314 ("Developing country diplomats working on IP
issues in Geneva frequently expressed frustration with IP reforms underway at home that
sacrificed TRIPS flexibilities.").
213. See Yu, supra note 82, at 892-901 (discussing the "incentive-investment divide").
214. Kevin P. Gallagher, Trading Away the Ladder? Trade Politics and Economic De-
velopment in the Americas, 13 NEW POL. ECON. 37, 37 (2008). The title of this article builds
on Ha-Joon Chang's widely cited book, HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002), which in turn draws on the
economic insights from FREIDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
(Sampson Lloyd trans., 1885).
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dialogue. We hope that enough progress is made in New Zealand in
clearing brackets from the text so that participants can be in a posi-
tion to reach a consensus on sharing a meaningful text with the
public. 215
As Professor Geist noted, reading between the lines, one could see the
suggestion that satisfactory resolution of the differences between the
United States and other negotiating parties-and more likely, accommo-
dation of the United States' preferences-would be a condition for dis-
closure of the draft agreement.216 After all, although the United States
faced pressure from lawmakers and civil society organizations, it still
might have faced less pressure at home than many of its negotiating part-
ners. At the very least, U.S. negotiators might have been less concerned
about such pressure than the others. Their lack of concern thereby gave
them a stronger bargaining position.
Meanwhile, the "transparency" bargaining chip could also be played in
the opposite direction. For example, those countries that would obtain
gains in a much more transparent environment could use leaks or the
threat of loosening up the secret veil to secure concessions. In the case of
ACTA, those countries that took advantage of these opportunities were
generally less powerful within the group and therefore needed public sup-
port at home or elsewhere to fight back demands from their more power-
ful negotiating partners. Nevertheless, these countries might have been
concerned about the potential retaliations by the more powerful negotiat-
ing parties, which could range from ejection from the ACTA negotiations,
to greater demands during the negotiating rounds, to other trade or dip-
lomatic repercussions outside ACTA.
3. Secretive, Undemocratic Approach
Although these five reasons, combined together, help explain why
ACTA negotiating parties were reluctant to discuss the draft treaty in the
open, the lack of transparency, public participation, and accountability in
the negotiation process remained highly problematic in a democratic soci-
ety. Without the release of the draft text, it was indeed hard for
lawmakers and the public at large to debate whether the treaty reflected
appropriate standards and policies.
In addition, a secretive, undemocratic approach resulted in the creation
of "a process that necessarily has an artificially constrained view of the
215. Press Release, USTR, The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Releases State-
ment on Upcoming ACTA Negotiating Round in New Zealand (Apr. 11, 2010), http://
www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april office-us-trade-representative
-releases-statement-up.
216. See Michael Geist, U.S.: No ACTA Transparency Unless Other Countries Cave on
Substance, MICHAEL GEIST'S BLOG (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/
view/4949/125/ ("Note what the U.S. is actually saying-resolving scope of the treaty (the
E.U. is seeking a broader scope that includes patents) and removing square brackets (the
sources of disagreement) is needed to reach consensus on sharing text with the public.").
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values at stake. '217 As the Computer and Communications Industry As-
sociation and NetCoalition wrote to the USTR Ron Kirk, "given the
highly technical nature of intellectual property law, and the inconsistent
U.S. court decisions in this area, USTR would benefit from broad public
input to ensure that U.S. negotiating positions do not stray from U.S.
law." 218
During the negotiations, the U.S. administration provided key briefings
to selected industry groups, even though it had kept the public in the
dark.219 Under the confidential agreement among the negotiating par-
ties, each party could disclose selected information to a small group of
individuals outside the government.220 In the United States, these indi-
viduals included: (1) government advisors and (2) those with "a need to
review or be advised of the information in [ACTA-related] documents"
(a designation determined unilaterally by the administration). 221 Be-
cause industry leaders and corporate lobbyists typically serve on the ad-
ministration's industry trade advisory committees, 222 they had access to
key ACTA information while most consumer advocates and civil liberties
groups did not.223 As a result, the administration's selective disclosure of
217. Siy, supra note 198.
218. Letter from the Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n and NetCoalition to Ron
Kirk, USTR (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.cdt.org/copyright/LettertoAmbassador
KirkJulyl42009.pdf.
219. See James Love, White House Shares the ACTA Internet Text with 42 Washington
Insiders, Under Non Disclosure Agreements, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Mar. 20, 2009,
4:10 PM) http://www.keionline.org/node/660.
220. See McCoy Declaration, supra note 47, at 6.
221. See id. (stating that ACTA-related documents "may be given only to government
officials or persons outside government who participate in the party's domestic consulta-
tion process and have a need to review or be advised of the information in these
documents").
222. See Advisory Committees, USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/intergovernmen-
tal-affairs/advisory-committees (last visited May 3, 2010). One of these committees,
ITAC-15, focuses on intellectual property in particular. As Assistant USTR Stanford Mc-
Coy noted in his declaration:
ITAC-15 provides valuable information and technical expertise to USTR
that allows USTR to more effectively address intellectual property concerns
around the world. ITAC members have security clearances .... Members of
ITAC-15 include representatives from the software, recording, movie, and
publishing industries, as well as the Global Health Council. To solicit views
from ITAC members, USTR posts documents on a secure website, and indi-
vidual members can access the documents and provide comments directly to
individual USTR officials. ITAC comments may range from technical com-
ments on wording choices in draft negotiating texts to overall U.S policy on
trade-related IPR issues.
McCoy Declaration, supra note 47, at 8. For a criticism of the role, structure, and opera-
tion of the ITACs, see Trade Advisory Committee System: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, lllst Cong. (2009) (testimony of Gigi B.
Sohn, President, Public Knowledge).
223. The Center for Democracy and Technology and Public Knowledge constituted the
very rare exceptions; despite not being able to sit on any advisory committee, they had
access to a small portion of the draft agreement after they agreed to sign a nondisclosure
agreement. See Love, supra note 219; see also McCoy Declaration, supra note 47, at 8
("Advisors from other advisory committees, including representatives from public interest
groups such as Consumers Union, also have access to these texts, and some members of
the advisory committees have provided comments."); Sherwin Siy, ACTA Remains Closed:
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the negotiating documents created an additional problem of "unequal ac-
cess by stakeholders. '2 24 As Gwen Hinze of the EFF rightly protested:
There's a fundamental fairness issue at stake here. It's now clear
that the negotiating texts and background documents for this trade
agreement have been made available to representatives of major me-
dia copyright owners and pharmaceutical companies on the Industry
Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property. Yet private cit-
izens-who stand to be greatly affected by ACTA-have had to rely
on unofficial leaks for any substantive information about the treaty
and have had no opportunity for meaningful input into the negotia-
tion process. This can hardly be described as transparent or bal-
anced policy-making. 225
Worse still, while some industries had access to the "confidential" doc-
uments, or portion thereof, other industries did not. As Professor Geist
has shown through a freedom of access request in Canada, the Canadian
government, in its now-aborted plan to develop an Intellectual Property
and Trade Advisory Group, sought to invite fourteen industry groups
(such as those representing the recording, movie, software, and game in-
dustries) while leaving out key industries in the telecommunications,
technology, and internet sectors.226
The Difference Between Inclusion and Transparency, PuB. KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 20, 2009,
4:20 PM), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2710 (discussing the very limited access to
ACTA-related documents that Public Knowledge had); USTR's Advisory Committee on
Intellectual Property Rights: Public Interest Groups Still Calling for a Voice, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2004/ll/04/ustrs-advisory-
committee-on-intellectual-property-rights-pubic-interest-groups-still-calling-for-a-voice/
(reporting that "a U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the role, structure
and operations of the trade advisory committee system (prepared at the request of the U.S.
Senate Committee on Finance) noted that at that time only two of USTR's industry advi-
sory committees included non-business interests-in both instances as a result of legal
challenges").
224. Kimberlee Weatherall, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: What's It All
About? (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1017&context=kimweatherall (last visited May 3, 2010).
225. Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., EFF and Public Knowledge Reluctantly
Drop Lawsuit for Information About ACTA (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.eff.
org/press/archives/2009/06/17.
226. See Michael Geist, Public Left Out of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Talks, TORONTO
STAR, July 28, 2008, at B4; see also Kaitlin Mara, US Wrestles with Transparency as Europe-
ans Urge Release of ACTA Texts, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 27, 2009, 10:43 AM), http:/l
www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/03/27/us-wrestles-with-transparency-as-europeans-urge-
release-of-acta-texts (quoting Eddan Katz, EFF, as stating that, "'by opening up the pro-
cess you'll see participation from different kinds of companies,' such as search engines,
internet service providers, small businesses, software manufacturers and social networks").
In some countries, a failure to account for such powerful interests-for example, the
highly powerful Telmex in Mexico-could lead to complications for, if not the impossibility
of, the agreement's future implementation. See Blayne Haggart, ACTA: All Global Trea-
ties Are Local, BLAYNE HAGGART'S ORANGESPACE (Mar. 6, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://
blaynehaggart.blogspot.com/2010/03/acta-all-global-treaties-are-local.html (pointing out
that ACTA negotiating parties failed to align their interests with those of Telmex, a politi-
cally powerful internet service provider owned by the third richest man in the world). It is,
indeed, no surprise that the Mexican Senate recently voted against ACTA. See Michael
Geist, Mexican Senate Votes AgainstACTA, MICHAEL GEIST's BLOG (July 22, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5945/196/; see also Mexican Senate Urges
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Furthermore, the current negotiating process also overlooked the need
for governmental agencies to have access to the negotiating docu-
ments.227 Under the pre-negotiated arrangement, ACTA negotiators
could determine on their own whether they wanted to share confidential
information with those colleagues who were not involved in the negotia-
tions.228 From the rights holders' perspective, such a strategy would be
effective because it would prevent other agencies, such as those involved
in public health or education, from derailing the discussions. From the
standpoint of good government, however, such an approach would im-
pede the ability of other equally competent government agencies to pre-
pare for changes that would be required under the new agreement. The
secretive approach also took away the opportunity for these agencies to
share their experiences and best practices and to warn about potential
unintended consequences in areas outside the intellectual property field.
To complicate matters, both the Second Bush and Obama Administra-
tions chose to negotiate the agreement as a sole executive agreement.229
As Jack Goldsmith and Lawrence Lessig pointed out in an opinion piece
in the Washington Post, such an approach has raised some very serious
constitutional concerns:
Historical practice and constitutional structure suggest that [sole
executive agreements] must be based on one of the president's ex-
press constitutional powers (such as the power to recognize foreign
governments) or at least have a long historical pedigree (such as the
president's claims settlement power, which dates back over a
century).
Joining ACTA by sole executive agreement would far exceed these
precedents. The president has no independent constitutional author-
ity over intellectual property or communications policy, and there is
no long historical practice of making sole executive agreements in
this area. To the contrary, the Constitution gives primary authority
over these matters to Congress, which is charged with making laws
that regulate foreign commerce and intellectual property. 230
Rejection ofA CTA, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 23, 2011, 3:40 PM), http://www.ip-watch.
org/weblog/2011/06/23/mexican-senate-rejects-acta/ (reporting that the Mexican Senate
"approved a resolution rejecting the secretly negotiated Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement").
227. See McCoy Declaration, supra note 47 at 6.
228. See id.
229. See Katz & Hinze, supra note 142, at 30. The use of sole executive agreements can
be partly attributed to the fact that the executive branch has lost its fast-track trade author-
ity at the expiration of the Trade Promotion Authority in 2007. Id. For an excellent over-
view of fast track trade authority, see generally TODD TUCKER & LORI WALLACH, THE
RISE AND FALL OF FAST TRACK TRADE AUTHORITY 1-7 (2009), available at http://www.
fasttrackhistory.org/The RiseAndFallOfFastTrack.pdf.
230. Jack Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement Raises Consti-
tutional Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2010, at A23; see also ILIAS, supra note 7, at 3
("The use of an executive agreement to conduct the ACTA negotiations is a departure
from the way that the United States has pursued IPR goals in other international trade
negotiations. In general, the United States has advanced IPR goals internationally as part
of congressional-executive trade agreements or treaties, subject to congressional ap-
proval."); Oona A. Hathaway & Amy Kapczynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-Counterfeiting
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Such a "go-it-alone" approach, according to Professors Goldsmith and
Lessig, would violate President Obama's pledge for greater transparency
during his first electoral campaign. 231 Such an approach would also have
serious implications for other areas of international law.232 As they con-
tinued: "If the president succeeds in expanding his power of sole execu-
tive agreement here, he will have established a precedent to bypass
Congress on other international matters related to trade, intellectual
property and communications policy. '233
Finally, if ACTA ultimately is to be accepted by the public as fair and
legitimate, completing the agreement through a shady backdoor deal is
unlikely to lead to wide public acceptance of the new norms embodied in
the agreement. As Kimberlee Weatherall reminded us:
The secrecy is ... operating, once again, to bring intellectual prop-
erty law into disrepute. To the extent that at some later point gov-
ernments and IP owners will ask people to accept the outcomes as
"fair" and ones that should be adopted, it will be more difficult to
convince them when the agreement has the appearance of a secret
deal done with minimal public input. Since neither copyright, nor
trade mark, are readily "self-enforcing" laws they depend for their
effectiveness on a certain amount of support among the public. Se-
cret negotiations on IP policing powers are not an ideal way to gar-
ner such support.2 34
It is indeed ironic that the agreement includes a transparency provi-
sion. 235 If the ACTA negotiating parties want to teach others how to
honor commitments under the transparency provision, teaching by exam-
ple is unlikely to be feasible. How can one expect others to respect trans-
parency when the negotiating parties do not even respect transparency in
the first place? Moreover, if a lack of transparency is the key to the suc-
cess of these negotiations, why would ACTA members give up this
formula of success after completing their negotiations?
B. LEAKS AND CONSOLIDATED TEXT
Despite the initial secretive, nontransparent approach, the barrage of
criticisms and public access requests from lawmakers, academics, con-
Trade Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement, ASIL INSIGHTS, Aug. 24, 2011, at 1, http://
www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insightll0824.pdf ("[I]f concluded as a sole executive agree-
ment, [ACTA] would represent a significant expansion of the scope of such agreements.
As a result, it could pave the way for more extensive use of sole executive agreements in
the future.").
231. See Goldsmith & Lessig, supra note 230.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. Weatherall, supra note 224 (footnotes omitted); accord Michael Geist, ACTA Ne-
gotiations, Day Three: Secret Talks on Transparency, MICHAEL GEIST's BLOG (Nov. 5,
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4515/125/ ("ACTA is quickly becoming so
broadly discredited that it will be nearly impossible to garner public support for the treaty.
'The secret copyright treaty' is hardly a selling feature for a treaty that may be dead-on-
arrival in the minds of citizens around the world.").
235. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 30.
2011] 1015
SMU LAW REVIEW
sumer advocates, and civil liberties groups led the negotiating parties to
release limited information in the form of press releases, meeting agen-
das, fact sheets, negotiation summaries, and discussion papers. The
jointly-developed Summary of Key Elements Under Discussion, for exam-
ple, clarified the objectives of ACTA, summarized the key issues under
discussion, and provided an overview of the suggested contents for the
agreement.236 With close coordination, trade ministries or foreign affairs
departments also posted information on specially-created websites that
were dedicated to the negotiation of the agreement. 237 In addition, from
time to time, countries solicited comments from the public about differ-
ent parts of the agreement. 238 They also provided briefings to the public
about the state of the negotiations. 239 Although countries had clear and
often unrevealed differences in their negotiating positions, the contours
of the agreement slowly emerged.
While disclosure of official information remained sparse at this stage of
negotiations, civil liberties groups had been active in providing informa-
tion to help the public understand the agreement's potential impact. For
example, in March 2008, more than a couple of months before the first
round of negotiations, IP Justice published a pioneering and very inform-
ative white paper discussing the potential negotiation items on ACTA.240
Academics and civil liberties groups across the world also worked hard to
obtain information through FOIA, the Canadian Access to Information
Act, or their equivalents. 241 Many of them even managed to obtain
"leaked" information or documents, which were quickly posted onto the
Internet via WikiLeaks and other websites.242 In addition, commenta-
tors-most notably Professor Geist-offered concise yet valuable com-
mentary on the potential provisions while keeping the public up-to-date
236. USTR, supra note 180.









238. In the United States, for example, the Office of the USTR accepted public com-
ments on ACTA from February 15, 2008, to March 21, 2008. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA): Request for Public Comment, 73 Fed. Reg. 8910 (Feb. 15, 2008).
239. See, e.g., Nic Suzor, DFAT Briefing on the Current State of A CTA, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIERS AUSTL. (Oct. 25, 2008, 8:01 AM), http://www.efa.org.au/2008/10/25/dfat-
briefing-on-the-current-state-of-acta/ (reporting about the briefing of the Australian De-
partment of Foreign Affairs and Trade).
240. GRoss, supra note 158, at 4-8.
241. Examples of these academics and organizations are Michael Geist, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, the Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, IPLeft, Knowl-
edge Ecology International, and Public Knowledge, among others. See, e.g., FOIA: Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (A CTA), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.
org/cases/eff-and-public-lknowledge-v-ustr.
242. See, e.g., Leaked Draft, supra note 19; Weatherall, supra note 224, at 3.
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about the state of the negotiations. 243
Finally, because ACTA relied heavily on the provisions of the IFTAs
negotiated by the United States and the economic partnership agree-
ments (EPAs) advanced by the European Union, researchers and com-
mentators were able to gain important insight into the possible treaty
language by carefully studying the provisions in those agreements, which
arguably provided good proxies for the possible ACTA provisions. 244 By
closely watching the call for comments in countries such as Australia and
New Zealand, 'these scholars and commentators were also able to get a
good sense of what provisions would be included in the agreement. 245
In March 2010, a draft dated January 2010 was leaked to the public,
indicating the different positions that the negotiating parties had alleg-
edly taken.246 This document indicated who the demandeurs were with
respect to each particular provision or negotiating item.247 While this
draft likely had created embarrassment for officials involved in the
ACTA negotiations, especially those that had been less than forthright or
truthful about the negotiations, it also raised questions among other gov-
ernment officials who did not have access to the negotiating documents.
In addition, the leaked document confirmed or denied many of the con-
cerns and fears that had been registered thus far.
Following the eighth round of negotiations in New Zealand in April
2010, the ACTA negotiating parties finally agreed to release a consoli-
dated draft of the agreement. 248 As noted in the consensus press release,
"there was a general sense from this session that negotiations have now
advanced to a point where making a draft text available to the public will
help the process of reaching a final agreement. ''2 49 The text was released
on April 21, 2010, in the United States, the European Union, and Japan
(and on April 22, 2010, in Australia and New Zealand). While the offi-
cially released version was very similar to the earlier leaked version, some
of the provisions and footnotes in the leaked version had been removed
or altered. 250 The official draft also failed to include any attribution to
the bracketed texts, which made the official version less attractive than
the unauthorized version.
To some extent, the negotiators seemed to have failed to learn from the
mistakes made by the recording industry, which provided consumers with
243. See, e.g., Geist, supra note 62.
244. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 161, at 251 (surmising on ACTA's potential terms
by closely examining the FTA texts).
245. See Suzor, supra note 239 (noting that even "without disclosing the draft text,
[people] could ascertain the boundaries of the agreement by 'reading between the lines' of
the calls for comments posted on the DFAT website in preparation of each round").
246. Leaked Draft, supra note 19.
247. See id. (disclosing countries' positions on various provisions).
248. See Consolidated Draft, supra note 18.
249. Press Release, USTR, The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Releases State-
ment of ACTA Negotiating Partners on Recent ACTA Negotiations (Apr. 16, 2010), http://
www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/office-us-trade-representative
-releases-statement-ac.
250. Compare ACTA, supra note 5, with Leaked Draft, supra note 19.
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only tethered downloads despite the superior copies available from file-
sharing services. 251 The ACTA negotiators' lack of foresight is particu-
larly disappointing. After all, how can one expect them to develop solu-
tions that successfully adapt to the changing technological environment if
they could not even foresee the potential problems created by providing a
draft text that was far inferior to what had already been leaked online?
Following the disclosure of the consolidated draft in April 2010, the
negotiation process has become more transparent. Nevertheless, there
remained lingering questions concerning how transparent the negotiation
process would be from that point forward; how much public input there
would be in the remaining months of the negotiations; and whether the
agreement's "oversight committee," 252 if created, would eventually be
open to participation by civil society organizations.
Moreover, since the release of the consolidated draft, the negotiating
parties-most notably, the United States-refused to provide further dis-
closure of ongoing discussions until the end of the negotiations.25 3 It is
indeed disappointing that the negotiating parties had taken the highly
unappealing position that an international agreement as broad and im-
portant as ACTA could be negotiated behind closed doors with minimal
non-industry input. Although the ACTA negotiations are now complete,
the debate concerning the need for greater transparency in intellectual
property negotiations lingers as countries negotiate the TPP and other
bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade and investment agreements.25 4
The fears arising from ACTA, therefore, will continue if policymakers
251. See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 653,
669 (2005) (describing the "tethered" downloads from the revamped Napster service).
252. See discussion infra Part VI.
253. See Monika Ermert, ACTA Negotiators Vow to Mesh with National-Level Rights;
Withhold New Text, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 2, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://www.ip-watch.
org/weblog/2010/07/02/a cta-negotiators-vow-to-mesh-with-national-level-rights-withhold-
new-text/ (reporting that negotiating parties refused to release a new draft text after the
ninth round in Lucerne); James Love, Confirmation that Obama Administration Was
"Lone Hold Out" for Releasing Bracketed ACTA Text to the Public in Summer of 2010,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Apr. 25, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://keionline.org/node/l120 (re-
porting that "the United States was the 'lone hold out' for releasing the ACTA text at the
9th round of negotiations at Lucerne, Switzerland").
After the consolidated draft, the next draft was disclosed only after the conclusion of the
final round of negotiations in Tokyo. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened
for signature May 1, 2011 (Nov. 15, 2010 draft), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
webfmsend/2379. The last draft, which was disclosed before the release of the final text,
was marked December 3, 2010. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Dec. 3, 2010
draft), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfmsend/2417; see also Monika Ermert, 'Final
Final' A CTA Text Published; More Discussion Ahead for EU, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec.
6, 2010, 10:05 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/201011206/ %e2%80%98final-final%e
2%80%99-acta-text-published-more-discussion-ahead-for-eu/ (reporting about the release
of the December 3 draft text following closed-door "legal scrubbing" in Sydney). The U.S.
administration did not issue a notice for public consultation until two weeks after the re-
lease of this draft text and until three months after the last round of negotiations. See Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Request for Comments From the Public, 75 Fed. Reg.
79069 (Dec. 17, 2010). The final text was adopted on April 15, 2011. See ACTA, supra
note 5.
254. See Catherine Saez, US IP Enforcement Ambitions in Trans-Pacific Trade Agree-
ment Stir Reactions, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 16, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.ip-watch.
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continue to ignore the public demand for transparency and
accountability.
III. FEAR #2: UPWARD RATCHET AT HOME
Although the public discussions of ACTA, thus far, have focused pri-
marily on the lack of transparency and accountability, a related fear in-
duced by the secretive process concerned the potential upward ratchet of
intellectual property standards in those countries that already had very
high standards, such as the United States and members of the European
Union.2 55
When the draft negotiation documents were leaked in bits and pieces,
consumer advocates, civil liberties groups, and academic commentators
began to confirm some of their worst fears. The documents also raised
concerns among those less-developed countries that had not been invited
to negotiate ACTA but that most likely would be "coerced" into joining
the agreement or adopting its standards in the near future. 256
Interestingly, despite the leaked documents, officials from the Euro-
pean Union and the United States continued to insist that the agreement
would not require changes in the existing laws within their countries.
2 57
Other countries, by contrast, made much weaker statements that could
potentially include some revision of their laws. For instance, Australia
indicated that it did not "seek to drive change in domestic law through
ACTA. '258 Canada insisted that ACTA would be "subservient" to do-
mestic copyright law. 259 Meanwhile, New Zealand noted that the agree-
ment "w[ould] not change [its] ability to set its own standards for the
protection of copyright and trade marks. '260 Other than the European
Union and the United States, none of these parties was willing to state
that ACTA would not require legislative changes at the domestic level.
org/weblog/2011/03/16/us-ip-enforcement-ambitions-in-trans-pacific-trade-agreement-stir-
reactions/ (reporting about the ongoing TPP negotiations).
255. See discussion infra Part V.
256. See discussion infra Parts VI.A-B.
257. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 162, at 2 ("ACTA will not go further than the
current EU regime for enforcement of IPRs-which fully respects fundamental rights and
freedoms and civil liberties, such as the protection of personal data .... "); USTR, supra
note 162, at 4 (proclaiming that ACTA will not rewrite U.S. law and that "[o]nly the U.S.
Congress can change U.S. law").
258. Brett Winterford, Australia Comes Clean on ACTA Role, IT NEWS (Mar. 11,
2010), http://www.itnews.com.au/News/169254,australia-comes-clean-on-acta-role.aspx
("Australia already has a high standard for IP protection (including a safe harbour scheme)
that many others are yet to meet, and seeks an agreement capable of broad acceptance.
The Government does not seek to drive change in domestic law through ACTA." (quoting
a spokesman of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade)).
259. See Canadian Copyright Law to Trump ACTA, Clement Says, CBC NEWS (Dec. 1,
2009), http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/12/01/clement-copyright-acta-ndp.html
("The ACTA negotiations are in fact subservient to any legislation put forward in [the
Canadian House of Commons]." (quoting Tony Clement, Canadian Minister of Industry)).
260. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, N.Z. MINISTRY





A careful reading of the leaked documents as well as the official draft
texts has raised serious doubt about the accuracy of the positions of virtu-
ally all of these parties,261 especially when one takes into account the
many significant differences between EU and U.S. intellectual property
laws, not to mention the additional differences among the ACTA negoti-
ating parties.262 Consider the United States, for example. As Gwen
Hinze observed in her preliminary analysis of the consolidated draft:
[T]he text includes a EU proposal, for criminal sanctions for "incit-
ing, aiding and abetting" intellectual property infringement (Article
2.15(2)). That language is taken from the draft 2007 EU IPR en-
forcement criminal sanction directive. US copyright law does not
recognize the concept of "inciting" copyright infringement, so it is
unclear what this means and when it would apply. This raises the
concern that ACTA could expand the scope of secondary copyright
liability for Internet intermediaries, consumer device manufacturers
and software developers, beyond the boundaries of the doctrines
enunciated by US courts. Next, ACTA's chapter on "Special Mea-
sures Related to Technological Enforcement of Intellectual Property
in the Digital Environment" contains a proposal (apparently put for-
ward by Japan, based on the leaked 18 January 2010 draft) requiring
ACTA signatories to enable IP rightsholders to expeditiously obtain
subscriber identity information from ISPs after giving "effective noti-
fication" (Article 2.18 (3ter)(Option 2)). This appears to be inconsis-
tent with US standards of due process and judicial oversight. US
copyright holders must currently file a lawsuit and seek a court in-
junction to force ISPs to disclose such information. Further, ACTA's
civil enforcement chapter includes two proposals for UK-style loser-
pays attorney fee awards, something that is not common practice in
US civil litigation (Article 2.25).263
Indeed, when her EFF colleague Eddan Katz pressed Assistant USTR
Stanford McCoy further over whether his office could assure the rejec-
tion of those proposals that are in direct conflict with U.S. law, McCoy
punted the question by "answer[ing] that ACTA will focus on large-scale
intellectual property infringement and 'in no way requires search of per-
261. See, e.g., ROBERTO D'ERME ET AL., OPINION OF EUROPEAN ACADEMICS ON ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (2011), available at http://www.iri.uni-hannover.de/
tl files/pdf/ACTA opinion_200111_2.pdf (highlighting the inconsistencies between ACTA
and existing EU law); ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS ET AL., THE ANTI-COUNTERFEIT-
ING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA): AN ASSESSMENT 66 (2011) ("For those European Par-
liamentarians for whom conformity with the EU Acquis is sine qua non for granting
consent, this study cannot recommend that they provide such consent to ACTA as it now
stands."); James Love, Areas Where the Oct 2, 2010 ACTA Text Is Inconsistent with U.S.
Law, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Oct. 9, 2010, 9:59AM), http://keionline.org/node/970
(highlighting the inconsistencies between ACTA and existing U.S. law).
262. See TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 6:5, at 623 ("Given the complexity of
IPR enforcement and the different obligations imposed by TRIPS, it is rare for two WTO
Member States to have the same IPR enforcement system, although there may be many
common enforcement elements.").
263. Gwen Hinze, Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text, ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.eff/org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-
analysis-officially-released-acta-text.
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sonal computers or music players."264 The fact that ACTA would not
result in iPod-searching border guards seems to be rather different from
the fact that the agreement would require no legislative changes at all.
To be certain, many of the differences at the time of the negotiations
were still in square brackets, and these brackets were eventually re-
moved.2 65 Given the United States' strong bargaining position and its
role as one of the agreement's primary drafters, one could assume that
the United States might have expected to obtain a treaty that would not
require substantial changes in its domestic law.
Nevertheless, treaty negotiation is a two-way street that requires give
and take. If no country is going to change anything in its own laws, what
is the point of having treaty negotiations in the first place? While there
are still benefits to having a lower-common-denominator treaty that lays
down the common standards of the negotiating parties, 266 with the hope
that such an agreement would eventually send a useful "signal" to induce
other non-parties to raise their standards, it is unlikely that the EU and
U.S. industries would have been content with such a barebones treaty,
given the positions they took before and during the negotiations and the
comments they filed with their governments.
A. LIES, DAMN LIES, AND ACTA
There are four plausible scenarios. First, as Cory Doctorow pointed
out in the copyright context, "[slince all these countries have irreconcila-
bly different copyright systems, someone is lying. My money is on all of
them. '267 If this scenario were indeed true, it would be a disgrace for
government officials to mislead the public about the need for change in
domestic laws. Such a scenario would raise serious accountability ques-
tions. Even if we assumed the government officials had been truthful and
sincere, there would still be tough questions on why the officials were that
ignorant about the intention of other negotiating parties or why they
were so naive to believe they could achieve a treaty in which only their
264. Stephanie Condon, Bush Administration Defends Secrecy over Anti-counterfeiting
Treaty, CNET (Sept. 22, 2008, 3:14 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10047945-38.
html.
265. Compare ACTA, supra note 5 (providing the final text), with Consolidated Draft,
supra note 18 (showing bracketed provisions).
266. As Bruce Lehman, then-Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks of the U.S. Department of Commerce, noted about the need for Congress to
enact the DMCA to implement the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties:
When that legislation is in effect, then we will have a template that we can
use, that the Trade Representative can use, that we in the Commerce Depart-
ment can use, the State Department can use, when we are in negotiations
with other governments to advise them as to what they need to do to imple-
ment their responsibilities in these treaties to provide effective remedies.
Intellectual Property Rights: The Music and Film Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong. 51-834
(1998) (Remarks of Bruce Lehman).
267. Cory Doctorow, Copyright Undercover: ACTA & the Web, INTERNET EVOLUTION
(Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.internetevolution.com/document.asp?doc_id=188055.
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negotiating partners would need to change their laws. Either way, the
questions would signify serious competence issues.
Second, none of the officials was lying, and the draft text was much,
much more ambitious than the consensus the negotiating parties could
eventually achieve. Thus, the negotiators might have expected that the
agreement would become a heavily watered-down, lower-common-de-
nominator treaty by the time it was completed. If this scenario were true,
all the time, energy, and resources that negotiators put into the process
would have been wasted. More disturbing, these scarce resources could
have been used elsewhere at a time when the global economic crisis had
created an acute shortage of resources throughout the world. This scena-
rio therefore would raise puzzling questions about why countries engaged
in the negotiation of this treaty in the first place.
Third-and the reason why many people hate lawyers-conflicts be-
tween the agreement and domestic law will not arise based on how laws
operate in the participating countries. For example, in a so-called dualist
jurisdiction like the United States, international agreements are rarely
self-executing-that is, treaties can rarely be enforced in courts without
the support of prior implementing legislation from Congress.268 Because
ACTA was negotiated as a sole executive agreement, it virtually guaran-
tees that it will not modify any domestic law.269 As the USTR stated in
its fact sheet in the early days of the negotiations, "[o]nly the U.S. Con-
gress can change U.S. law. ' '270 That statement, of course, is not entirely
correct in a common law jurisdiction where judges do make law. How-
ever, it does state the correct legal conclusion that a sole executive agree-
ment cannot change U.S. law.
In this scenario, if conflicts exist between the agreement and domestic
law, domestic law will prevail and will remain intact until Congress
chooses to amend the law. In fact, the United States can always choose
not to fully implement an international agreement, its reputation and
standing in the international community notwithstanding. For example,
section 110(5)(B) of the U.S. Copyright Act remains intact even though a
WTO dispute settlement panel has found the Fairness in Music Licensing
Act inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement.2 71 Likewise, despite an ad-
verse WTO panel decision, the United States has yet to amend section
211(a)(2) of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, which prohib-
268. In jurisdictions where treaties are self-executing, courts will directly apply the trea-
ties as if they are domestic laws. See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircum-
vention, 84 DENy. U. L. REV. 13, 34 (2006).
269. See Sean Flynn, A CTA's Constitutional Problem: The Treaty that Is Not a Treaty,
26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 903 (2011); Goldsmith & Lessig, supra note 230.
270. USTR, supra note 162, at 4.
271. See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
7.1-.2, WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000). For discussions of this WTO dispute, see generally
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the
Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Laurence R. Helfer, World
Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music
Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
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its the registration or renewal of trademarks previously abandoned by
trademark holders whose business and assets have been confiscated
under Cuban law. 272 In both situations, Congress refused to change its
laws even though the United States is in breach of WTO rules. 2
73
Obviously, if the United States chooses not to honor its commitments,
there is an additional question concerning what other countries could do
under ACTA. Unlike the WTO, ACTA does not possess any enforce-
ment mechanism. Instead, Article 38 merely outlines the consultation
process between the signatory parties over matters affecting the imple-
mentation of the agreement. 274 Thus, structurally, the agreement is
closer to an organized, treaty-based dialogue than a plurilateral trade
agreement (although the U.S. administration thus far has remained reluc-
tant to admit ACTA's very limited legal effect on U.S. law).27
5
Finally-and the reason why people hate politicians-the negotiators
might have taken the oft-used diplomatic position that "nothing is agreed
until everything is agreed. '2 76 In short, the negotiators might have had a
good-faith belief that they could succeed in convincing their negotiating
partners to remove those brackets that required modification of domestic
law in their specific country. Such beliefs were not entirely unfounded
from negotiators from countries with very strong bargaining power, such
as the United States and members of the European Union. Nevertheless,
the strong disagreement between these two trading powers over various
intellectual property areas has raised serious competence issues. Indeed,
many of these disagreements-such as the scope of coverage of the sec-
tion on border measures-last until the very end.277
Regardless of which of the four scenarios one finds the most plausible,
ACTA has raised justified fears that it will have serious adverse implica-
tions for not only consumers but also businesses within the United States.
Even if the laws remain the same, one may wonder whether and how
much ACTA will affect the common law interpretations of existing
laws278 and whether and how the laws will be enforced differently once
272. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, J 6, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002).
273. See Dinwoodie, supra note 271, at 763-64; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners
(Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901,
939-40 (2006).
274. See ACrA, supra note 5, art. 38.
275. See Flynn, supra note 269, at 904 (declaring that "ACTA is not a binding interna-
tional agreement under U.S. law" and yet a treaty under international law).
276. Moraes, supra note 29, at 176.
277. For discussions of the divide between the European Union and the United States
over ACTA, see Michael Geist, Could the EU Walk Away From ACTA?, MICHAEL
GEIST's BLOG (July 22, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5224/125/; Michael
Geist, Could the EU Walk Away from ACTA, Redux, MICHAEL GEIST's BLOG (Sept. 8,
2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5292/125/.
278. See Siy, supra note 198 (suggesting that ACTA provisions may "require particular




the agreement comes into effect.279 As Professors Goldsmith and Lessig
reminded us, "a judicial canon requires courts to interpret ambiguous
federal laws to avoid violations of international obligations. This means
courts will construe the many ambiguities in federal laws on intellectual
property, telecom policy, and related areas to conform to the
agreement. 280
B. POLICY LAUNDERING AND BACKDOOR LAWMAKING
If the claim that ACTA will not increase protection within the United
States turns out to be incorrect, and some adjustments are indeed re-
quired to avoid flouting the country's newly-added international obliga-
tions, such an agreement will result in what commentators have called
"policy laundering. ' 281 As two commentators defined:
"Policy laundering" is a term that describes efforts by policy actors to
have policy initiatives seen as exogenously determined, or even seen
as requirements imposed by powerful others. The United States and
the United Kingdom are identified as policy actors that routinely
push for the establishment of regulatory standards in international
policy venues so that domestic policies can be brought into line with
those policies "under the requirement of harmonization and the
guise of multilateralism. '282
In the case of ACTA, many of the protections required by the agree-
ment have been considered controversial, unpopular, and inexpedient
both on American soil and abroad.283 The controversial nature of these
protections was indeed partly the reason why the negotiation of the
agreement had to be kept mostly secret in the first place. Notwithstand-
ing their unpopularity at home, these controversial protections had been
received much more favorably by industries, among policymakers, and at
279. See Rob Pegoraro, Copyright Overreach Goes on World Tour, WASH. POST, Nov.
15, 2009, at Gi ("A U.S. trade official who spoke on the condition of anonymity empha-
sized that the government's proposals for ACTA color within the lines of existing U.S.
laws. But trying to globalize them invites fine-print changes in emphasis or detail that
could lead to changes in their enforcement here.").
280. Goldsmith & Lessig, supra note 230; see also Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.").
281. For discussions of "policy laundering," see, for example, David Banisar, Stopping
Science: The Case of Cryptography, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 253, 282-86 (1999); Ian Hosein,
The Sources of Laws: Policy Dynamics in a Digital and Terrorized World, 20 INFO. Soc'Y
187, 188-89 (2004); Introduction: The Problem of Policy Laundering, THE POLICY LAUN-
DERING PROJECT, http://www.policylaundering.org/PolicyLaunderinglntro.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2011).
282. Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and
Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
121, 128 (2006); see also Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 777, 787-88 (2010) (discussing policy laundering).
283. See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Current Negotia-
tions by the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 2010
O.J. (C 147) 1, 3 (by Peter Hustinx) [hereinafter Opinion of the European Data Protection
Supervisor]; Siy, supra note 198.
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the intergovernmental level, with many considering them necessary. 284
As a result, those policymakers who wanted to get these protections im-
plemented at home had a strong incentive to take the provisions outside
to a more favorable, and largely unaccountable, international forum.28 5
Once the provisions had been adopted as part of an international
agreement-in this case, ACTA-the administration could then bring
them back to the home soil. Because of the newfound need for interna-
tional harmonization, the laundering process had helped improve the per-
ception of the unpopular and ill-advised provisions at home, thereby
making them look more legitimate in the public policy debate.286 As
Pamela Samuelson reminded us:
Had [the development of the WIPO Database Treaty] succeeded in
Geneva, Clinton administration officials would almost certainly have
then argued to Congress that ratification of the treaties was neces-
sary to confirm U.S. leadership in the world intellectual property
community and to promote the interests of U.S. copyright industries
in the world market for information products and services.287
Policy laundering is dangerous because it will upset the dynamics of the
domestic lawmaking process. 288 When Congress deliberates the needed
legislation to implement a treaty or to ensure full compliance with that
treaty, the main focus of the policy debate may no longer be whether the
policy would benefit the American economy or, better, the American
people. Instead, the focus may become whether the failure to adopt such
a policy would isolate the country from the international community. The
tone of the debate and the congressional committees involved may
change. Even if the same committees are involved, they may have a diffi-
cult time adapting to new international issues, which are often quite dif-
ferent from the domestic issues that they are used to handling.2 89
While policy laundering is undesirable and would result in the adoption
of ill-advised laws and policies, it is particularly problematic from the
standpoint of democratic governance. 290 If left unchecked, policy laun-
dering would result in what I have described as backdoor lawmaking,
which is defined as "a process of outsourcing the legislative process to an
international forum of unelected representatives in an effort to create
284. See Greg Sandoval, Obama to 'Aggressively Protect' Intellectual Property, CNET
NEWS (Mar. 12, 2010, 9:10 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-3101_3-20000347-261.html (re-
porting President Obama's pledge to use "the full arsenal of tools" to combat intellectual
property infringement).
285. See Yu, supra note 282, at 788-91 (discussing policy laundering and backdoor
lawmaking).
286. Cf. Hosein, supra note 281, at 188 (acknowledging the general notion that "inter-
national cooperation is inherently good" and the general belief that international coopera-
tion is "seen as benign and ... for the most part uninterrogated").
287. Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 374
(1997).
288. See Introduction: The Problem of Policy Laundering, supra note 281.
289. See id.; Yu, supra note 282, at 787.
290. See Hosein, supra note 281, at 190.
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laws that the domestic legislature would not have otherwise enacted. '291
By presenting ACTA to the legislature as a fait accompli, the adminis-
tration successfully used backdoor lawmaking to make an end run around
Congress and the domestic deliberative process. 292 The agreement could
also forestall pending efforts to reform the intellectual property sys-
tem.293 Such a form of lawmaking represents rent seeking at its best, and
the laws created through the process will eventually haunt the American
people.
ACTA and the backdoor lawmaking it initiated pose similar dangers to
the European Union. For example, the agreement would bring into the
Union criminal provisions that have been resoundingly rejected during
the deliberation of the EU Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Di-
rective 294 (IPRED) in 2004.295 Because of the complications raised by
harmonizing criminal laws within the Union, the discussion of the follow-
up directive on criminal enforcement (IPRED2) remains stalled in the
legislative process. 296
291. Yu, supra note 268, at 54-55.
292. Other commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., Katz & Hinze,
supra note 142, at 33 ("U.S. law renders ACTA a target vehicle for policy laundering.");
Aaron Shaw, The Problem with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (And What to Do
About It), 2 KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY STUD. 1, 4 (2008), available at http://www.kestudies.
org/ojs/index.php/kes/article/view/34/57 (stating that ACTA "threaten[s] to overturn the
existing balance of rights and regulations established through global governance institu-
tions"); Siy, supra note 198 (suggesting that "ACTA might be a form of 'policy
laundering"').
293. See Kaminski, supra note 161, at 250 ("Since there is important legislation on pre-
cisely the same issues pending in, for example, the European Union, ACTA represents a
clear attempt to bypass internal process in addition to multilateral process."); Letter from
Charlie Angus, supra note 172 (stating that "if Canada agrees to ACTA before new legisla-
tion is introduced, the government will have given away to [the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR)] the right of the House [of Commons] to shape the substance of any
copyright reform legislation" and that "[it is a hollow claim to suggest that ACTA would
be subservient to Parliament when the commitments for ACTA are being hammered out
before Parliament has had a chance to see the new legislation"); Monika Ermert, Embat-
tled ACTA Negotiations Next Week in Geneva; US Sees Signing This Year, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (May 30, 2008), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/05/30/embattled-acta-negoti-
ations-next-week-in-geneva-us-sees-signing-this-year/ ("'In my opinion it is not acceptable
that international agreements are negotiated behind closed doors while Parliament is
working on legislation on the very same issue in a co-decision procedure.... It is contra-
dictory to European rules to prejudice EU legislation in that way,. .. and it does not serve
our democratic process."' (quoting Eva Lichtenberger, Green Party member of the Euro-
pean Parliament)).
294. Directive 2004/48, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004
on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45.
295. See Monika Ermert, ACTA Negotiators: Maximal Protection Proposals Unlikely in
Final Text, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 18, 2010, 4:50 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2010/02/18/acta-negotiators-maximal-protection-proposals-unlikely-in-final-text/
(stating that "criminal law sanctions were rejected during the legislative process for the IP
Enforcement Directive (IPRED) in 2004").
296. See Lassi Jyrkki6, Smooth Criminal Harmonisation: ACTA, EU and IPR Enforce-
ment, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/04/08/
smooth-criminal-harmonisation-acta-eu-and-ipr-enforcement/ (discussing in the ACTA
context the challenges in harmonizing intellectual property-related criminal provisions
within the European Union); see also Monika Ermert, European Commission on ACTA:
TRIPS Is Floor Not Ceiling, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 22, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://www.
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Although the European Commission continued to insist that "ACTA
will not go further than the current EU regime for enforcement of
IPRs-which fully respects fundamental rights and freedoms and civil lib-
erties, such as the protection of personal data, '297 the Commission's ad-
vocate-like summary on criminal enforcement in its fact sheet arguably
betrayed its mixed intentions:
It would be key to the effectiveness of ACTA as an enforcement
instrument for it to contain clear standards for deterrent and effi-
cient criminal action against counterfeit. There is no EU legislation
in this area yet. The Commission has proposed a Directive harmonis-
ing the treatment of criminal IP infringements at EU level in 2006,
but it has not been adopted so far. This means that The EU Presi-
dency, on behalf of its Member States will coordinate this area of the
negotiation .... 298
It is therefore understandable why the European Parliament was rather
upset with the secrecy behind ACTA.299 As one parliament member
noted: "'This Parliament will not sit back silently while the fundamental
rights of millions of citizens are being negotiated away behind closed
doors. We oppose any "legislation laundering" on an international level
of what would be very difficult to get through most national legislatures
or the European Parliament."' 300
Indeed, some commentators suggested that the European Union
sought to use ACTA as a policy laundering exercise to revive the discus-
sion of IPRED2.301 They also noted the potential EU-related compe-
tency problems ACTA had raised concerning the agreement's criminal
enforcement provisions. 302 It is indeed interesting to explore whether the
European Union sought to use ACTA to export its enforcement mea-
sures to the United States-and, for that matter, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and other non-EU countries.
Despite strong denial by both the European Commission and other
ACTA negotiating parties,303 the push by the European Union for
greater criminal enforcement and border controls for all forms of intellec-
tual property rights seemed to have paralleled the push by the United
ip-watch.org/weblog/2009 /04/22/ european-commission-on-acta-trips-is-floor-not-ceiling/
(noting that "the rotating EU presidency take[s] the lead in negotiating the criminal law
aspects of ACTA").
297. EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 162, at 2.
298. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
299. See Parliament Threatens Court Action on Anti-Piracy Treaty, EURACTIV (Mar. 12,
2010), http://www.euractiv.com/en/health/meps-defy-commission-internet-piracy-
agreement-news-326215.
300. Id. (quoting Stavros Lambrinidis, member of the European Parliament).
301. See Monika Ermert, ACTA May Prompt Quick Restart to EU Harmonisation of
Criminal Enforcement of IP, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2009, 7:42 PM), http://
www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/12/21/acta-may-prompt-quick-restart-to-eu-harmonisation-
of-criminal-enforcement-of-ip/.
302. See Ante Wessels, EU Competence to Conclude Free Trade Agreements Under the
Lisbon Treaty, FOUND. FOR A FREE INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE (June 8, 2010, 2:17 PM), http:/
/action.ffii.org/ACTA/lisbon.
303. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 162, at 2.
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States to globalize the equally unpopular Digital Millennium Copyright
Act 30 4 (DMCA).30 5 In both cases, the negotiating parties seek to push on
to others legislation that is highly unpopular at home, yet unavailable in
the other country. This is policy laundering at its best, and it is hard to
find a more unpleasant, quid pro quo bargain!
IV. FEAR #3: UPWARD RATCHET ABROAD
A. TRIPS-PLUS PROTECTION
While ACTA may have a limited impact on the European Union and
the United States, as well as those other countries that have already
raised their intellectual property enforcement standards by virtue of new
bilateral or regional trade agreements, it will require much more substan-
tial changes in other countries. After all, the ACTA's key objective is to
develop high common standards for the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights3 6-standards that are higher than what al-
ready exists under the TRIPS Agreement and other international intel-
lectual property treaties. In many countries, especially those in the less-
developed world, such ratcheting up of intellectual property protection is
likely to be highly problematic.
To provide a few examples, ACTA requires participating countries to
offer protection against both the circumvention of technological mea-
sures used to protect copyrighted works307 and the removal of copyright
management information,3°S-at times beyond what is required by the
WIPO Internet Treaties.309 A greater push for anti-circumvention laws
and digital rights management tools is likely to have serious implications
for system interoperability 310 and free and open source software. 311
ACTA also requires participating countries to tighten their regulations
304. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
305. See Gwen Hinze, Leaked ACTA Internet Provisions: Three Strikes and a Global
DMCA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/
11/leaked-acta-internet-provisions-three-strikes-and- (criticizing ACTA for creating "a
[g]lobal DMCA").
306. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 162, at 1.
307. See ACTA, supra note 5, arts. 27.5-6.
308. See id. art. 27.7. For a critique of the anti-circumvention protection in the context
of less-developed countries, see generally Yu, supra note 268, at 40-58.
309. See WIPO Copyright Treaty arts. 11-12, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No.
105-17 (1997) [hereinafter WCTI; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty arts.
18-19, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT].
310. See Yu, supra note 268, at 38 ("In recent years, the DMCA... has been misused to
deter competition and interoperability in tangible products that only incidentally incorpo-
rated copyrightable software code."). For excellent discussions of the unintended conse-
quences of the DMCA, see generally Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended
Consequences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 487 (2005); Unintended Consequences: Seven Years Under the DMCA, ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 2006), http://www.eff.org/files/DMCA-untended-vf.pdf.
311. See, e.g., Speak Out Against ACTA, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., http://www.fsf.org/
campaigns/acta/ (last modified June 16, 2009).
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over internet service providers (ISPs). 312 Although the negotiating par-
ties could not agree on the adoption of a DMCA-style notice-and-take-
down procedure or provide active deterrents against repeat
infringement, 313 ACTA states explicitly that "each Party's enforcement
procedures shall apply to infringement of copyright or related rights over
digital networks, which may include the unlawful use of means of wide-
spread distribution for infringing purposes. ' 314 The Agreement further
provides:
A Party may provide ... its competent authorities with the authority
to order an online service provider to disclose expeditiously to a
right holder information sufficient to identify a subscriber whose ac-
count was allegedly used for infringement, where that right holder
has filed a legally sufficient claim of trademark or copyright or re-
lated rights infringement, and where such information is being
sought for the purpose of protecting or enforcing those rights.315
In addition, despite the potential for quick technological obsolescence, 316
the agreement facilitates the introduction of anti-camcording laws,317
which have sent one young American woman to jail for two days after
taping her sister's birthday party in a cinema.318
In the area of border control, ACTA states that "[e]ach Party shall en-
courage the development of specialized expertise within its competent
authorities responsible for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights. '319 The agreement thereby could "entail significant change in
agency structure and legal authority. ' 320 In addition, greater criminal en-
forcement could shift costs, responsibility, and risks from private rights
holders to that of national governments. 321 Depending on one's interpre-
312. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 27. For a critique of some of these regulatory mea-
sures, see generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong
Kong, 48 U. LoUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 701-19 (2010).
313. In lieu of a DMCA-style safe harbor, Article 27.2 provides: "These procedures
shall be implemented in a manner that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate activity,
including electronic commerce, and, consistent with that Party's law, preserves fundamen-
tal principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy." ACTA, supra note
5, art. 27.2. Footnote 13 lists as an example "a regime providing for limitations on the
liability of, or on the remedies available against, online service providers while preserving
the legitimate interests of right holder." Id. art. 27.2 n.13.
314. Id. art. 27.2.
315. Id. art. 27.4.
316. See Yu, supra note 312, at 727 (discussing technology neutrality and the ill-advised
nature of technology-specific legislation).
317. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 23.3 ("A Party may provide criminal procedures and
penalties in appropriate cases for the unauthorized copying of cinematographic works from
a performance in a motion picture exhibition facility generally open to the public.").
318. See Dan Rozek, Alleged Pirate Won't Walk Plank, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009,
at 10 (reporting that one woman "had faced up to three years in prison [for] ... copying
parts of the film [Twilight: New Moon] during a family birthday party" and had "spent two
days in a jail cell following her arrest").
319. ACTA, supra note 5, art. 28.1.
320. TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 6:52, at 705-06 (noting that "the upgrading
of the border enforcement system to a more aggressive and proactive system will entail
significant change in agency structure and legal authority").
321. As Carlos Correa noted:
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tation, the burden in the enforcement area is likely to be very significant
for many less-developed countries.322 As noted in the IP Justice White
Paper:
The financial expense to tax-payers to fund ACTA would be enor-
mous and steal scarce resources away from programs that deal with
genuine public needs like providing education and eliminating hun-
ger. ACTA would burden the judicial system and divert badly
needed law enforcement and customs resources away from public se-
curity and towards private profit. 323
Criminalization is regarded by its proponents as a stronger deterrent than
civil remedies. For right holders there are some significant advantages: ac-
tions can or must be initiated ex officio and the cost of procedures is fully
borne by the states. However, it is clear that IPRs are private rights and that
states' only obligation under the TRIPS Agreement is to ensure that enforce-
ment procedures are available, and not to enforce IPRs themselves on its
own cost and responsibility.
Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for Developing
Countries, in ICTSD, ISSUE PAPER No. 22, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27, 42 (2009) (foot-
note omitted); see also Li Xuan, Ten General Misconceptions About the Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at
14, 28 ("[R]esponsibility of enforcement has cost implications.... [Bly shifting responsi-
bility, it would shift the cost of enforcement from private parties to the government and
ensure right-holders are beneficiaries without asking responsibility."); Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan, Re-delineation of the Role of Stakeholders: IP Enforcement Beyond Exclusive
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 43, 51-52 (noting
the "trend for externalizing the risks and resources to enforce IP rights away from the
originally responsible rights-holders towards state authorities").
322. See TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 6:53, at 706 ("There are significant
government cost considerations if administrative agencies involved in border enforcement
are given added authority to make substantive decisions on the merits."); id. § 6:54, at 709
("The added undertaking [of criminal enforcement] could be expensive because law en-
forcement officers have additional equipment and training needs to conduct criminal inves-
tigations."); Correa, supra note 321, at 54 ("The sophistication and cost of the means
necessary to deter IPRs infringement are significant and may well exceed the tax income
eventually generated by legitimate activities that would have been otherwise displaced.");
Carston Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Prospective, in ICTSD,
supra note 321, at xiii, 15 ("[E]nforcement actions take real resources. Courts, police
forces, customs offices, and other competent authorities need to be adequately staffed and
equipped to respond to complaints by right holders and to act on their own. In addition,
governments face the costs of maintaining prisons and, possibly, destroying seized pirated
and counterfeit products that cannot be auctioned off as generic goods."); Li, supra note
321, at 28 ("Establishing and strengthening the enforcement of intellectual property rights
is a costly exercise both in terms of scarce financial resources and the employment of
skilled human resources."); Sell, supra note 158, at 9 ("The opportunity costs of switching
scarce resources for border enforcement of IP 'crimes' is huge. There surely are more
pressing problems for law enforcement in developing countries than ensuring profits for
OECD-based firms."); Timothy P. Trainer, Intellectual Property Enforcement: A Reality
Gap (Insufficient Assistance, Ineffective Implementation)?, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 47, 74 (2008) ("If ACTA is to be meaningful and welcoming to developing coun-
tries (or developed countries that are having implementation problems) that voluntarily
agree to new and higher standards, there must be an assistance program that is better
developed than what has been available in the past."); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Econom-
ics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 2-6 (2010) (discussing the costs of strong intellectual prop-
erty enforcement norms and the resulting trade-offs).
323. See Robin Gross, IP Justice Comments to U.S. T.R. on the Proposed Anti-Counter-
feiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), IP JUST. (Mar. 21, 2008, 4:35 AM), http://ipjustice.org/
wp/2008/03/21/acta-ipj-comments-ustr-2008march/; see also Correa, supra note 321, at 43
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Indeed, because ACTA does not require rights holders to post bond or
other forms of security that could be used to defray potential damages,324
its encouragement of ex officio actions "not only [could] shift the initia-
tive and costs for taking action to the state but also entail significant risks
of damaging claims by affected importers whenever the goods suspended
in the end are not IP infringing. '325 Even worse, these claims could
frighten investors, thus defeating what some less-developed countries see
as a main purpose of improving intellectual property protection and en-
forcement in the first place. 326 These claims might also lead to bilateral
actions, if not retaliation, from usually more powerful states, creating a
"double whammy" which they would not face had the risks not been
transferred from private rights holders to state authorities.
Even in the United States, there are significant trade-offs between in-
creased enforcement and other public policy goals. 327 As Carsten Fink,
WIPO's first-ever chief economist, reminded us, "greater spending on
counter-terrorism in the US after September 11, 2001[,] has left fewer
resources for fighting crime, reportedly causing rates of crime to go up in
("[I]n developing countries that suffer from high levels of street crime and other forms of
criminality that put at risk the life, integrity, or freedom of persons on a daily basis, it
seems reasonable that fighting such crimes should receive higher priority than IP-related
crimes where protected interests are essentially of a commercial nature (except when asso-
ciated with adulteration of health and other risky products)." (footnote omitted)); Li Xuan
& Carlos M. Correa, Towards a Development Approach on IP Enforcement: Conclusions
and Strategic Recommendations, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra note
29, at 207, 210 (noting that the demands for strengthened intellectual property enforce-
ment "seem to overlook the cost of the required actions, the different priorities that exist
in developing countries regarding the use of public funds (health and education would
normally be regarded as more urgent than IP enforcement) and the crucial fact that IPRs
are private rights and, hence, the burden and cost of their enforcement is to be borne by
the right-holder, not the public at large"); Xue Hong, Enforcement for Development: Why
Not an Agenda for the Developing World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 29, at 133, 143 ("Increment and strength of public enforcement measures will
inevitably impose an economic burden on the developing countries and divert the priorities
of these countries, such as prosecution of violent crimes or relief of poverty."); Frederick
M. Abbott & Carlos M. Correa, World Trade Organisation Accession Agreements: Intellec-
tual Property Issues 31 (Quaker United Nations Office, Global Economic Issues Paper No.
6, 2007), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/WTO-IP-English.
pdf ("For many developing countries, protection of IPRs is not, nor should it be, a national
priority. Financial resources are better invested in public infrastructure projects, such as
water purification and power generation."); Biadgleng & Mufioz Tellez, supra note 136, at
3 ("Police raids and the use of criminal law enforcement mechanisms ... require extensive
use of public funds and in developing countries may entail pulling resources away from
other law enforcement efforts when there are other means, particularly via civil law, that
may be strengthened to allow private parties to enforce their rights and which do not re-
quire extensive use of public funds.").
324. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 18 (giving parties the authority to collect bonds, but
not requiring them to do so).
325. Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 321, at 52.
326. See generally ROBERT SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT (1990) (discussing the importance of intellectual property protection for eco-
nomic development in less-developed countries).
327. See generally Yu, supra note 322, at 2-6 (noting that high intellectual property
enforcement standards often come with a hefty price tag and difficult tradeoffs).
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many US cities."328 Likewise, commentators have noted that it is "simply
impossible to raid all the warehouses [in New York] all of the time with-
out swallowing the entire [New York Police Department's] anti-counter-
feiting budget and taking officers off other duties. '329 Even the
European Commission recognized its macro-level resource challenges in
the EU IPR Enforcement Strategy:
It is important to identify a limited number of countries on which the
efforts of the Commission in the framework of the present strategy
should be concentrated. The human and financial resources allo-
cated to the enforcement of IPR being limited, it is unrealistic to
pretend that our action can extend equally to all, or even most, of the
countries where piracy and counterfeiting occur.330
To date, capacity and resource constraints have remained a key con-
cern for many less-developed countries, 331 even though negotiators from
many developed countries continue to insist blindly-and, I would add,
incorrectly-that the lack of protection in these countries shows a lack of
political will.332 As Fink rightly observed:
Given other demands on public expenditure and diminishing returns
to enforcement actions, society "tolerates" to some extent violations
of laws .... In addition, "tolerable" levels of IPRs-infringements
may well differ from country to country, depending, inter alia, on
societies' preferences for different public goods. As mentioned in
the introductory section, developing countries are likely to have dif-
ferent public spending priorities. Even within the law enforcement
domain, the optimal share of budgetary resources devoted to IPRs
enforcement will be lower in countries with higher levels of violence
or less secure real property rights. Indeed, the enforcement part of
the TRIPS Agreement sensibly recognizes that governments face
competing demands for scarce law enforcement resources.333
It is therefore no surprise that less-developed countries specifically de-
manded during the TRIPS negotiations the inclusion of Article 41.5 in
328. Fink, supra note 322, at 2; see also Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported
Counterfeit Goods: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm'n, 109th
Cong. 9 (2006) (prepared statement of Chris Israel, U.S. Coordinator for International
Intellectual Property Enforcement, U.S. Department of Commerce) ("With finite re-
sources and seemingly infinite concerns, how [the United States] focus[es its] efforts is
crucial."); Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: Hearing
Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm'n, 109th Cong. 183 (2006) (testimony of
Peter Pitts, President, Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, New York) ("When I was
at the [Food and Drug Administrationi, people asked me why don't you stop people at the
border and arrest them coming in from Canada? The answer is that's not the best bang for
the regulatory dollar. What government needs to do is go after the big time criminals.").
329. PHILLIPS, supra note 179, at 36.
330. EU IPR Enforcement Strategy, supra note 11, at 5 (citation and footnote omitted).
331. See Fink, supra note 322, at 16; Yu, supra note 322, at 2-6.
332. See generally Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the
U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REv. INTELL. PROP. L. 412 (2008)
(criticizing the political will argument).
333. Fink, supra note 322, at 16.
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the Agreement, 334 which states explicitly that a WTO member state is not
required to devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement
than to other areas of law enforcement. 335 A similar provision can also
be found in ACTA, which states that "[n]othing in this Agreement creates
any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between
enforcement of intellectual property rights and enforcement of law in
general. ' 336 In the chapter on international cooperation, Article 33.3
states further: "Cooperation under this Chapter shall be conducted con-
sistent with relevant international agreements, and subject to the laws,
policies, resource allocation, and law enforcement priorities of each
Party."337
While the agreement does not explicitly require border guards to
search one's iPod, DVD player, laptop, or other electronic devices, it
gives them the authority to order the seizure, confiscation, or destruction
of the suspected counterfeit or pirated goods.338 The agreement also fa-
cilitates the provision of ex officio authority to suspend the allegedly in-
fringing goods, 33 9 which at times could exceed what is available in the
European Union340 or the United States.341 Indeed, if border guards in
these countries choose to conduct more intrusive searches, ACTA will
provide the needed support for such draconian measures as well as a de-
fense against the potential civil liberty intrusions or human rights viola-
334. See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, Annex B-4, 33, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) ("Articles 1.1
and 41.5 were key concessions to the developing world, which the United States and other
developed third parties seek now to dismiss and disregard."); CARLOS CORREA, TRADE
RELATED AsPEcTs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 417 (2007) ("[Article 41.5] was
introduced upon a proposal by the Indian delegation, and essentially reflects developing
countries' concerns about the implications of Part III of the [TRIPS] Agreement.");
UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 585 (2005) (noting
that Article 41.5 "was in fact one of the few provisions in Part III where developing coun-
tries' views made a difference").
335. TRIPS Agreement art. 41.5; see also Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Devel-
oping Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727, 778-81 (2011) (discussing Article 41.5 in
relation to the recent U.S.-China TRIPS enforcement dispute).
336. ACTA, supra note 5, art. 2.
337. Id. art. 33.3.
338. See id. art. 29.
339. See id. art. 16.1(a)-.2(a); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trading's End: Is ACTA
the Leading Edge of a Protectionist Wave?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 6, 2011, 2:48 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/05/06/tradinge2%80%99s-end-is-acta-the-leading-
edge-of-a-protectionist-wave/ ("Probably the most problematic provisions mandate that
customs authorities be enabled to act ex officio to seize 'suspect goods' at the border,
without definition of the basis for suspicion, and without mandating that a determination
be made regarding the offense the suspect goods allegedly commit.").
340. See Correa, supra note 321, at 58 (noting that, with respect to the obligation to
criminalize intentional infringements of any kind of IPR on a commercial scale, "the Euro-
pean Commission is demanding from [the EPA-participating] countries a higher standard
than that domestically deemed acceptable in the EU context").
341. See TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 5:1, at 540 ("The Department of
Homeland Security's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's... protection of patents
against the importation of infringing goods varies substantially from the agency's protec-




tions. After all, it is very likely that ACTA will be exported to countries
that have yet to show respect for human rights and civil liberties.342
Finally, with respect to remedies, ACTA lumps together infringements
in different forms of intellectual property rights-including copyright,
patent, and trademark343-although that approach remains highly con-
troversial344 and necessitates the carving out of exceptions in sensitive
areas.345 Indeed, many of the remedial provisions, which range from
those concerning pre-established or statutory damages346 to criminal pen-
alties on copyright-related activities that have only "indirect economic or
commercial advantage, '347 are troublesome even in developed coun-
tries.348 To some extent, ACTA could globalize the No Electronic Theft
(NET) Act,3 4 9 which is rather controversial in the United States. In addi-
tion, the agreement could affect how injunctions are to be granted and
damages calculated.350 Disturbingly, the agreement could also result in
the creation of new penalties for "aiding and abetting" intellectual prop-
erty infringements. 351
In fields adjacent to intellectual property, ACTA could have serious
negative implications on the protection of personal data and individual
privacy, an issue that is of great concern to the Europeans,352 although
342. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
343. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 5(h) (stating that "intellectual property refers to all
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of
the TRIPS Agreement"); see also Sell, supra note 158, at 12 (criticizing ACTA and the IP
enforcement agenda's "big tent approach" for "strategic obfuscation" over the considera-
ble differences among the various types of intellectual property rights).
344. See Hinze, supra note 263; Ermert, supra note 296 (quoting Luc Devigne, the Eu-
ropean Union's lead ACTA negotiator, as stating that "all IP rights are equal").
345. See ACTA, supra note 5, n.2 (allowing a party to "exclude patents and protection
of undisclosed information from the scope of [the section on civil enforcement]"); id. n.5
("It is understood that there shall be no obligation to apply the procedures set forth in [the
section on border measures] to goods put on the market in another country by or with the
consent of the right holder."); id. n.6 ("The Parties agree that patents and protection of
undisclosed information do not fall within the scope of [the section on border measures].").
346. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 9.3. Article 9.3 specifically provides:
At least with respect to infringement of copyright or related rights protecting
works, phonograms, and performances, and in cases of trademark counter-
feiting, each Party shall also establish or maintain a system that provides for
one or more of the following:
(a) pre-established damages; or
(b) presumptions for determining the amount of damages sufficient to com-
pensate the right holder for the harm caused by the infringement; or
(c) at least for copyright, additional damages.
Id. (footnote omitted).
347. Id. art. 23.1.
348. See Yu, supra note 312, at 701-09, 716-19.
349. Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(b), 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
350. See generally JAMES LOVE, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, COMMENTS ON ACTA
PROVISIONS ON INJUNCTIONS AND DAMAGES (2010), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/
kei rn 2010_l.pdf (discussing the ACTA provisions on injunctions and damages).
351. See ACTA,supra note 5, art. 23.4 ("With respect to the offences specified in [Arti-
cle 23] for which a Party provides criminal procedures and penalties, that Party shall en-
sure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available under its law.").
352. See, e.g., Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 283, at 1,
11-13 (discussing ACTA's shortcomings in protecting personal data in the area of data
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ACTA does contain a safeguard provision to protect personal privacy.353
As Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection Supervisor, noted, the
agreement's data sharing arrangement 354 is highly troubling from the
standpoint of individual privacy. 355 The concerns become even greater
when data are being shared with governments in countries that have very
limited or virtually no protection of personal data and individual pri-
vacy.356 In countries that have repressive governments, such intrusion
could even lead to human rights violations, thereby raising challenging
complicity questions on the part of the European Union, the United
States, and other cooperating governments. 357
Given the growing volume of academic literature and public commen-
taries that deal with the proposed ACTA provisions358 and intellectual
property reforms induced by new bilateral and regional trade and invest-
ment agreements, 359 this Part does not analyze further the specifics of
each of these provisions. Instead, the rest of this Section delves into how
ACTA-induced protections could harm countries abroad, in particular
those in the less-developed world. Because many of the provisions were
drawn directly from the FTAs or EPAs and seek to transplant laws liter-
ally from the developed world,360 they could harm less-developed coun-
tries in at least four different ways. 361
First, as we learn from the failed "law and development" movement,
legal transplants tend to be insensitive to the local environment. 362 Be-
cause of the differences in economic conditions, imitative or innovative
capacity, and research and development productivities, an innovative
model that works well in one country does not always suit the needs and
sharing and the potential inclusion of a graduated response mechanism and noting the
European Data Protection Supervisor's "regrets that he was not consulted by the Euro-
pean Commission on [ACTA's] content").
353. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 4.1(a) ("Nothing in this Agreement shall require a
Party to disclose ... information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to its law,
including laws protecting privacy rights, or international agreements to which it is party
. . . . 11).
354. See id. art. 34.
355. See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 283, at 9-13.
356. See id. at 10-11 (arguing that EU should only share data with countries that adopt
certain data protection measures).
357. See discussion infra Part V.B.
358. See, e.g., Program on Info. Justice and Intellectual Prop., Am. Univ. Washington
Coll. of Law, ACTA Section Analysis, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta-
section-analysis (last visited June 13, 2010).
359. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weather-
all, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia
Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259,
260 (2008); Jean-Fr6dric Morin, Multilateralizing TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strat-
egy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009).
360. See ILIAS, supra note 7, at 6.
361. See Yu, supra note 82, at 890.
362. See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS &
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 280 (1980) (contending that the law and development
movement is "an energetic but flawed attempt to provide American legal assistance and to
transfer American legal models, which were themselves flawed").
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interests of another. 363 Unquestioned adoption of foreign intellectual
property laws therefore may not only fail to result in greater innovative
efforts, industrial progress, and technology transfer, but may also drain
away the resources needed for dealing with the socio-economic and pub-
lic health problems created by the new legislation.
Even worse, such adoption would exacerbate the dire economic plight
of many less-developed countries, as the new laws would enable foreign
rights holders to crush local industries through threats, or even actual use,
of litigation. 364 Even if the new laws would be beneficial in the long run,
many of these countries might not have the wealth, infrastructure, and
technological base to take advantage of the opportunities created by the
system in the short run.365 For countries with urgent and desperate public
policy needs and a population dying due to a lack of access to essential
medicines, the realization of the hope for a brighter long-term future
seems far away, if not unrealistic. If protection is strengthened beyond
the point of appropriate balance, the present population undoubtedly
would greatly suffer.
Second, the transplanted laws could stifle local development, because
the interests and players that the new laws would benefit, or are designed
to protect, might be absent from the local communities. Most of the time,
the laws could favor foreign rights holders at the expense of the local
constituents. 366 Although commentators and policymakers have ex-
plained at length why stronger intellectual property protection in less-
developed countries could help stimulate inventive activities at the local
level, 367 the linkage between intellectual property protection and inven-
tive activities depends on whether the intellectual property system is
struck at the right balance. 368 If the system overprotects, intellectual cre-
363. See generally Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intel-
lectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 97 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993); Yu,
supra note 82, at 889.
364. See Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 30-31 (2002) (discuss-
ing the lawsuit major pharmaceutical manufacturers brought against the South African
government).
365. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECT-UAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECON-
OMY 237 (2000). (noting that "[l]ong-run gains would come at the expense of costlier access
in the medium term").
366. As Carlos Correa rightly noted:
While [higher intellectual property enforcement standards] may benefit a se-
lected group of individuals or innovative domestic companies, tightened
measures against IPRs violations are in the primary interest of right holders
in developed countries, who control the vast majority of IP-protected intel-
lectual assets worldwide. Enforcement rules generate costs for developing
countries that may not be compensated by the alleged benefits. In fact, costs
may off-set benefits, especially when the states are required to substitute
right holders in the defence of their private rights and assume liabilities that
correspond to the latter.
Correa, supra note 321, at 59.
367. See generally SHERWOOD, supra note 326.
368. See Yu, supra note 98, at 382.
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ators and inventors eventually may not have enough raw materials to de-
velop their creations. Meanwhile, the public will have very limited access
to the needed information and knowledge. 369
Third, although promoting uniform rules may be beneficial, greater
harmonization of legal standards could take away the valuable opportuni-
ties for experimentation with new regulatory and economic policies.370
The creation of diversified rules could also facilitate competition among
jurisdictions, thus rendering the lawmaking process more accountable to
the local populations by allowing them to decide for themselves what
rules and systems they want to adopt. 371 In the Digital Age, when laws
are introduced quickly and often without convincing empirical evi-
dence, 372 greater experimentation and competition are indeed badly
needed.373
Finally, and most importantly, legal transplants-especially those in-
volving controversial laws and policies-could bring to the recipient
countries problems from the source countries, similar to the introduction
of diseases from the metropolitan areas to the colonized world a few cen-
turies ago. 3 7 4 Examples include the anti-circumvention provision and the
notice-and-take-down procedure of the DMCA, which are non-prescient,
flawed, and prone to abuse.375 The fact that legal transplants could bring
problems with them is particularly troubling for less-developed countries,
which have very limited expertise in assessing the potential problems and
unintended consequences that these ill-advised transplants will cause. 376
Even worse, many of these countries do not have the needed resources to
put in place mechanisms that will help them correct the system, should
the transplants upset its balance. 377 Because reforms based on foreign
369. See id.
370. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 685, 707-08 (2002).
371. See id. at 706-07.
372. See Yu, supra note 268, at 50-54.
373. See id. at 40-58.
374. See KELLEY LEE, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH: AN INTRODUCTION 42 (2004)
(discussing the introduction of infectious diseases to the New World by Europeans
settlers).
375. See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe Harbor: Chilling
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010); Jennifer
M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown Notices
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 686-87 (2006); Yu, supra note 268, at 32-57.
376. See Yu, supra note 82, at 889.
377. See id. at 890; see also COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (2002), available at http://www.iprcommis-
sion.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT]
(noting that "the costs of getting the IP system 'wrong' in a developing country are likely to
be far higher than in developed countries" and that the lack of "sophisticated systems of
competition regulation [in less-developed countries] to ensure that abuses of any monop-
oly rights . . . makes such countries particularly vulnerable to inappropriate intellectual
property systems"); MASKUS, supra note 365, at 237 (noting that developed countries
"have mature legal systems of corrective interventions" in which "the exercise of IPRs
threatens to be anticompetitive or excessively costly in social terms").
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models always incur political costs on those pushing for reforms, policy-
makers also may have limited political capital to put in place further cor-
rection mechanisms once their initial intellectual property reforms fail.378
To be certain, law-transplanting international agreements, like ACTA,
generally lay out the minimum standards for intellectual property protec-
tion and enforcement. 379 Countries, therefore, are free to introduce limi-
tations and exceptions that meet the three-step test as enunciated in the
Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and the WIPO Internet Trea-
ties.380 In the area of anti-circumvention protection, the agreement states
that "a Party may adopt or maintain appropriate limitations or exceptions
to measures implementing the provisions. '31  That provision further
states that the obligations "are without prejudice to the rights, limitations,
exceptions, or defences to copyright or related rights infringement under
a Party's law."'382
Nevertheless, many less-developed countries have neither the capacity
nor the geopolitical leverage to introduce these exceptions. As Public
Knowledge reminded us in its comments to the USTR:
[I]n countries lacking a robust and flexible regime of limitations and
exceptions, many legitimate uses remain unlawful, but are permitted
through non-enforcement. Requiring specific enforcement practices
in such a situation, before legitimate uses can be recognized and
codified into local limitations and exceptions, will frustrate the bal-
ance of intellectual property required to ensure creativity and
innovation. 383
It is therefore no surprise that commentators have widely criticized the
U.S. trade policy for "exporting exclusive rights but not the flexibility and
balance that facilitated the emergence of leading thinkers in new innova-
tive spaces such as the internet. ''384
One may wonder how big an impact ACTA would have in a post-FTA
world, where countries are increasingly committed to TRIPS-plus stan-
dards. While ACTA, as a TRIPS-plus agreement, 385 will undoubtedly
378. See Yu, supra note 82, at 890.
379. See ACTA, supra note 5, pmbl. (stating the intent to "provide effective and appro-
priate means, complementing the TRIPS Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, taking into account differences in their respective legal systems and
practices").
380. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2),
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Conven-
tion]; TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 27.2, 30; WCT, supra note 309, art. 10; WPPT, supra note
309, art. 16(2).
381. ACTA, supra note 5, art. 27.8.
382. Id.
383. See PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, IN THE MATTER OF ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT: COMMENTS OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 2 (2008), available at http://www.public
knowledge.org/pdf/pk-acta-comments-20080321.pdf.
384. Mara, supra note 226.
385. See ACTA, supra note 5, pmbl. (stating the intent to "provide effective and appro-
priate means, complementing the TRIPS Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, taking into account differences in their respective legal systems and
practices").
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raise the standards of many countries, it remains fair to question whether
ACTA will be any different from the many bilateral or plurilateral agree-
ments these countries have already entered into or are likely to do so in
the future. 386 Because these countries will have already raised their stan-
dards to ACTA levels, in part to comply with their FTA or EPA obliga-
tions, ACTA might neither raise their intellectual property standards nor
introduce new ones.3 87
Nevertheless, as Kimberlee Weatherall pointed out convincingly, there
are two main reasons why countries should not easily give in to higher
TRIPS-plus standards in ACTA, even though they may be subject to simi-
lar TRIPS-plus bilateral or plurilateral agreements.388 First, when coun-
tries sign on to bilateral or regional trade and investment agreements,
they usually obtain concessions in areas outside the intellectual property
field, such as in agriculture or textiles. 389 If the increase in intellectual
property protection turns out to outweigh the benefits of these non-intel-
lectual property related concessions, countries can always scale back as
long as they are willing to forgo the beneficial terms in other areas.390
Second, it is one thing to have a bilateral agreement-even an agree-
ment with one of the most powerful trading partners, like the European
Union or the United States-but it is quite another thing to have multiple
agreements (or a plurilateral agreement) with many different trading
partners.391 As Professor Weatherall continued:
Although [those countries that have signed on to FTAs with the
United States or EPAs with the European Union] are currently a
party to stringent standards, those standards are found only in one
bilateral agreement. Further consolidation of such standards at a
plurilateral level only further decreases their flexibility and increases
the number of trade partners who may complain of their failure to
meet such standards .... 392
B. ACTA-PLus PROTECTION
While the unquestioned transplantation of TRIPS-plus protections
from developed countries would undoubtedly harm their less-developed




390. As Professor Weatherall noted in the Australian context:
When Australia signed to such terms in AUSFTA, it did so in a trade deal,
where there were other 'benefits' (however illusory some might have been).
And it retains the freedom to step away from the AUSFTA at some future
point if the costs outweigh the benefits. Signing up to such terms in an
ACTA would be agreeing that these are to be general international stan-
dards: removing any remaining flexibility we have and giving a whole new set
of people the right to complain if we want to resile.
Kim Weatherall, Geist on ACTA, LAW FONT (Nov. 4, 2009, 3:00 AM), http://www.lawfont.
com/2009/11/04/geist-on-acta/.




counterparts, 393 ACTA may lead to protection that is even stronger than
what is offered in the developed world.39 4 Even if we assume that the
transplanting countries have good intentions and sincerely push for
stronger protection as "a difficult but essential measure to jumpstart
global economic development" in less-developed countries,395 the out-
come could be rather different from what these countries have
envisioned.
First, as mentioned earlier, countries may not have the knowledge and
capacity to correctly implement the provisions by including both the pro-
tection and its accompanying limitations or exceptions. At times, these
countries may simply transcribe provisions in international agreements
onto their domestic laws.396 Such transcription leaves out important limi-
tations or exceptions that the agreement allows, but fails to mention ex-
plicitly. As Rochelle Dreyfuss pointed out in the case of trade secret
protection, "since TRIPS does not mention a right to reverse engineer
[which exists in the United States], transcription would create a level of
protection surpassing that found in the United States, where the right to
copy is privileged. ' 397 Like the TRIPS Agreement, ACTA focuses pri-
marily on laying out the minimum standards for intellectual property pro-
tection and enforcement. Because countries may not be aware of the
different limitations and exceptions reserved in ACTA, unquestioned
transcription of the treaty language could likely lead to higher protection
than is currently offered in the developed world.
Second, even if countries are aware of the flexibilities that have been
built into the agreement, policymakers may be strongly discouraged from
introducing limitations and exceptions. For example, they may face ex-
ternal pressure from their powerful trading partners: Section 301 actions
and the suspension of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits
immediately come to mind.398 Even if the limitations and exceptions may
be found in one of the powerful trading partners, those limitations and
393. See Yu, supra note 82, at 889-91 (discussing the problems of transplanting laws
that are not tailored to local conditions).
394. Cf. Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO Sys-
tem for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79, 93 (2004) ("By creating
through bilateral negotiations standards of protection higher than those applied domesti-
cally, the powerful U.S. pharmaceutical industry may be able to force an amendment of
U.S. domestic law in ways simpler and less costly that through lobbying in Congress.").
395. Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Im-
pact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). As Professor Gervais noted, during the TRIPS
negotiations less-developed countries "were told to overlook the distasteful aspects of in-
troducing or increasing intellectual property protection and enforcement in exchange for
longer-term economic health." Id.
396. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71
U. CH. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004).
397. Id.
398. See Correa, supra note 394, at 79 ("Threatening the removal of trade preferences
or cutting development aid became common practice."); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Part-
ners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L.
REV. 131, 138-40 (2000) (criticizing the Section 301 process).
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exceptions may raise concerns among other equally powerful trading
partners. For example, the European Union has questioned the compli-
ance of the fair use provision in U.S. copyright law with the TRIPS
Agreement,399 despite the fact that many consider fair use a key strength
of the U.S. copyright system.4°° ACTA does not even mention fair use or
fair dealing at all.401 Likewise, even though Article 6(4) of the EU Infor-
mation Society Directive allows each member state to "take appropriate
measures to ensure that rightholders make available to the beneficiary of
[the specified] exception or limitation provided for in national law.., the
means of benefiting from that exception or limitation, '402 the U.S.
DMCA does not include a similar exception.40 3
In the near future, it is very likely that ACTA will be considered one of
the key factors in determining whether a country has adequately pro-
tected intellectual property rights. As the U.S. Trade Act stipulates, the
USTR can take Section 301 actions against countries that have failed to
provide "adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights
notwithstanding the fact that [they] may be in compliance with the specific
obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights.' '4°4
Based on that logic, it will be no surprise if the USTR takes ACTA
obligations into consideration in the Section 301 process once the agree-
ment is adopted. 405 After all, the USTR has put Canada repeatedly on
399. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 115 (2000).
400. See, e.g., Rick Boucher, Limiting Progress of Science and Useful Arts: Legislating
as a Means of Enhancing Market Leverage, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 7, 10-12 (2007)
(declaring that "fair use [benefits] society as a whole").
401. See ACTA, supra note 5.
402. Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001
on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Informa-
tion Society, art. 6(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17-18.
403. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
404. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2006) (emphasis added).
405. As Public Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier Foundation noted in their joint
public comment submitted to the USTR as part of the 2010 Special 301 process:
The 2008 and 2009 Special 301 reports refer to the proposed Anti-counter-
feiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) being negotiated by the USTR on behalf
of the U.S. and 36 other countries, which is intended to create new IP en-
forcement standards that go beyond those in the TRIPs Agreement. ACTA
negotiating countries intend that developing countries will be required to ac-
cede to and implement ACTA.... [O]ne of the controversial criteria used by
the USTR to evaluate countries' identification in the Special 301 Report is
their accession to, and particular implementation of, the WIPO Internet
Treaties. The references to ACTA in the two previous Special 301 Reports
appear to indicate that accession to ACTA, and implementation of its sub-
stantial standards, will be required of countries to avoid adverse considera-
tion in the Special 301 annual review.
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE & EFF, IN THE MATTER OF 2010 SPECIAL 301 REVIEW: IDENTIFICA-
TION OF COUNTRIES UNDER SECTION 182 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at 6 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-eff-special-301-20100218.pdf; see also Nate
Anderson, ACTA Arrives (Still Bad, but a Tiny Bit Better), ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/acta-is-here.ars/ ("How will ACTA be
used? Probably in the same way that the DMCA has been used: as a worldwide stick to
2011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the Section 301 Watch List, citing the country's failure to ratify the WIPO
Internet Treaties, among' other reasons. 40 6 Likewise, before China ac-
ceded to the WIPO Internet Treaties, the USTR stated in the 2005 Na-
tional Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, "[t]he United
States considers the WIPO treaties to reflect many key international
norms for providing copyright protection over the Internet," and
"China's accession to the WIPO treaties is an increasingly important pri-
ority for the United States .... ",407
Moreover, countries may be dissuaded from introducing exceptions
through either lobbying efforts by foreign rights holders or technical as-
sistance efforts initiated by both the rights holders and their supportive
governments. 408 At the very least, the template created by ACTA will be
presented by some technical assistance "experts" as best practices around
the world-or even the gold standard for intellectual property enforce-
ment. In discussion with those in the publishing industry in Hong Kong
(my hometown), I was told disturbingly that fair use is good only for
countries with well-established publishing industries, like the United
States. According to one industry representative, the publishing industry
in Hong Kong has yet to develop to a stage where fair use would be bene-
ficial-an unproven faith-based proposition that I believe is also woefully
incorrect!
The third reason why limitations and exceptions may not be introduced
is because policymakers in less-developed countries have developed a
maximalist mindset, which assumes more is always better.40 9 This mind-
set is deeply inspired by the oft-presumed linkage between intellectual
property protection and foreign direct investment.410 While the attrac-
tion of foreign direct investment has always been used as a
beat through a US-centric version of copyright and IP law."); Richard Poynder, Michael
Geist on The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), RICHARD POYNDER-
INDEPENDENT JOURNALIST, 9-10 (Mar. 7, 2010), http://www.richardpoynder.co.uk/Geist-
Interview.pdf ("[W]ithin a year or so many of those [developing] countries will be told, as
part of trade deals, that this is the new standard and this, therefore, is what they have got
to incorporate into their domestic law. And then it won't be long before we will see these
countries being named in Special 301 reports as having inadequate IP laws because they
don't conform to ACTA." (quoting interview response by Professor Geist)).
406. See USTR, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 25 (2010) (stating that "Canada will remain
on the Priority Watch List in 2010" and "should fully implement the WIPO Internet Trea-
ties, which Canada signed in 1997").
407. USTR, 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRI-
ERS 96 (2005).
408. See Dreyfuss, supra note 396, at 26.
409. See James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property,
2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, pt. I.A, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/
articles/pdf/2004DLTROO09.pdf (criticizing the maximalist intellectual property rights
culture).
410. For discussions of the relationship between intellectual property protection and
foreign direct investment, see generally Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Rela-
tionship Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 163 (1998); Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, in INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 41 (Carsten
Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
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macroeconomic justification for stronger intellectual property protection,
economists have shown a rather ambiguous relationship between the
two.411 Economists have also questioned whether foreign direct invest-
ment is always desirable.412 Even more problematic, there is a compli-
cated inverse relationship between stronger intellectual property
protection and greater foreign direct investment.413 As intellectual prop-
erty protection strengthens, some rights holders may consider other
means of investment-such as licensing.414 Under that scenario, the
volumes of foreign investment will actually decrease.
Finally, policymakers in less-developed countries may be blinded by
their concern about compliance with international obligations. As Keith
Maskus and Jerome Reichman pointed out, many countries are "compli-
ance oriented. ' '415 Policymakers in these countries, therefore, fail to
"treat intellectual property as an integral part of national or regional sys-
411. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puz-
zle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 176-80 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007)
(reviewing the literature discussing the theoretical ambiguity over this presumed linkage).
As economists have shown:
[Intellectual property protection is more likely to attract FDI only when two
additional conditions are met. First, the country needs to have a strong ca-
pacity to imitate foreign products and technologies. If local competitors are
unable to copy these products and technologies, the business interests of for-
eign firms are unlikely to be threatened, and intellectual property protection
will be unnecessary. Second, the country needs to have a sufficiently large
market to enable foreign firms to capture economies of scale or scope. In a
country that lacks such a market, foreign firms are unlikely to find it advanta-
geous to move their productions abroad.
Id. at 177.
412. As Keith Maskus observed:
It seems increasingly to be taken for granted that FDI and the acquisition of
new technologies through FDI and licensing are beneficial for the recipient
country.... [Although] there is a strong presumption in this direction .... it
is not a necessary outcome in all situations. Rather, it is important that such
flows result in stronger competition, in order to ensure these gains for the
long term.
Maskus, supra note 410, at 66; see also id. at 42 ("Emerging countries have strong and
growing interests in attracting trade, foreign direct investment .... and technological ex-
pertise, although such encouragements must be tempered with accompanying programs to
build local skills and to ensure that the benefits of competition actually arise.").
413. See Yu, supra note 411, at 179 ("If the firm chooses to externalize its production
through, say, licensing, stronger intellectual property protection arguably would have the
'cancel out' effect of reducing FDI.").
414. See MASKUS, supra note 365, at 123 ("[A]s IPRs in a particular nation become
stronger, firms will tend to choose more technology licensing and joint ventures and less
FDI."); Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 410, at 172 (stating that "higher levels of protec-
tion may cause [transnational corporations] to switch their preferred mode of delivery
from foreign production to licensing").
415. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF A TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RE-
GIME 3, 18 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); see DEERE, supra note
210, at 242 ("TRIPS implementation in the OAPI [African Intellectual Property Organiza-




tems of innovation. '416 Indeed, as I noted earlier, there is a growing "in-
centive-investment divide" among policymakers who are responsible for
developing intellectual property regimes. 417 Obsessed with using intellec-
tual property rights to attract foreign investment, technology transfer, in-
ward trade flows, and human capital, policymakers in these countries
have focused so much on investment that they ignore one of the primary
reasons behind having intellectual property rights in the first place-that
is, to provide incentives for creativity and innovation.
In short, while ACTA may not require less-developed countries to of-
fer stronger intellectual property protection, they may still offer protec-
tion that is stronger than is required under the agreement and available in
developed countries. As Carolyn Deere has shown recently, and shock-
ingly, some of the poorest countries in francophone Africa have adopted
some of the highest intellectual property protections 418-standards that
"were well in advance of their TRIPS deadlines. ' 419 As she rightly ques-
tioned, "Why did some of the poorest countries adopt some of the highest
IP standards?" 420 This question is important, especially when viewed in
light of the fact that "[n]o African [least-developed country] has ever
been cited on the US Special 301 list or subject to a WTO dispute."'421
Avoiding foreign pressure, therefore, was not the reason why those coun-
tries introduced high intellectual property standards.
Given the state of economic development in those countries, one has to
question not only whether the TRIPS-induced high protectionist stan-
dards are expedient but also whether such high protection is indeed real-
istic under the local conditions. After all, in many less-developed
countries, stronger protection on the books is often moderated in reality
by lax enforcement-or what commentators have termed "benign neg-
lect. '422 If rights holders count on ACTA to offer them the needed pro-
tection for their investment, they are likely to be quickly disillusioned and
vastly disappointed.
V. FEAR #4: THE ACTA BOOMERANG
Part III discussed how ACTA is likely to modify U.S. laws despite what
the USTR and other government officials have claimed.423 Such modifi-
416. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 415, at 18.
417. See Yu, supra note 82, at 892-901 (discussing the "incentive-investment divide").
418. See DEERE, supra note 210, at 232 ("[I]n francophone Africa,... a group of the
world's poorest countries adopted some of the world's highest IP standards at an earlier
date than TRIPS required."). See generally id. at 240-86 (discussing the implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement in francophone Africa).
419. Id. at 20.
420. Id. at 104.
421. Id. at 306.
422. E.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field
of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism, 8 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 77, 100 (2005); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 16 (2004).
423. See discussion supra Part III.
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cation could take the form of statutory revision, changes in common-law
interpretation of existing laws, or changing emphasis on how laws are to
be enforced. 424 Part IV explored how ACTA is likely to result in changes
in the less-developed world.425 This Part looks at the interface between
the two and examines how the changes identified in Part IV could also
backfire on U.S. consumers and businesses, creating what some commen-
tators have described as the "boomerang effect. 426
A. IMPACT ON LOCAL CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES
As discussed earlier, ACTA will undoubtedly raise the standards of
many other countries, including those that negotiated the agreement as
well as those others that join the agreement after its completion. 427 At
the international level, ACTA, therefore, will lock in some of the existing
legal standards, which, in turn, could privilege those business models that
rely heavily on strong intellectual property protection. 428 The agreement
may also lead to both TRIPS-plus and ACTA-plus protections-as a re-
sult of the push by either local policymakers or customs authorities. 429
While policymakers may call for protection in excess of what is required
under the international obligations, customs authorities may increase the
actual protection through either overzealous protection or confusion
caused by the complex agreement.
By adopting standards that have been widely used by the existing in-
dustries, ACTA may also harm small and mid-sized enterprises and inno-
vative start-ups. 430 The agreement may further reduce consumer access
to innovative products or services from abroad.431 Thanks to globaliza-
tion, consumers today can have easy access to a wide variety of products
and services. While some foreign products or services are unavailable in
the United States or the European Union, due to strong lobbying from
the domestic industries or conscious business choices made on the part of
424. See discussion supra Part III.B.
425. See discussion supra Part IV.
426. E.g., Harold C. Wegner, TRIPs Boomerang-Obligations for Domestic Reform, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 535 (1996).
427. See discussion supra Part IV.
428. See GROSS, supra note 158, at 8 ("Market competition will ... be discouraged by
ACTA because device manufacturers will need licenses just to build interoperable de-
vices."); Katz & Hinze, supra note 142, at 32-33 ("ACTA will constrain national legislation
governing domestic networks and physical infrastructure. It will also restrict the global
flow of information by regulating, and potentially criminalizing, the next generation of
innovative network technologies."); see also Yu, supra note 268, at 57-61 (discussing en-
trenched standards and lock-in effects).
429. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
430. See CORREA, supra note 334, at 450 ("In many developing countries criminal pen-
alties apply in cases of patent infringement as well. This may constitute an important de-
terrent for companies, especially small and medium enterprises, willing to operate around
patented inventions."); Leah Chan Grinvald, ACTA's Trademark Implications for Small
Businesses (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author); Peter K. Yu, Don't Rush into
Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 21, 2010 (discussing how
ACTA can harm small and mid-sized firms in the United States).
431. See discussion supra Part III.
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local manufacturers, these products are legitimate and important to con-
sumers. Leading examples are electronic goods and cell phone technolo-
gies that are unavailable in the United States or the European Union but
that have been developed to an advanced stage in Japan and South Ko-
rea, two of the ACTA negotiating parties.432
Because the internet is global by nature, changes in other countries can
also easily affect the information U.S. users will be able to obtain. In fact,
if firms are eager to develop a transnational policy that will satisfy the
laws and policies of all the major markets, the more restrictive laws and
policies other countries have, the more these laws will eventually dictate
the type of policy to which U.S. internet users are subject.
As I have observed often in the Chinese context, it is important to look
at not only how the internet will affect China but also how China will
affect the internet. Unless companies are willing to abandon the Chinese
market, or give up the efficiency created by economies of scale or scope,
they will have to develop policies to take this major market into account.
At times, a policy that effectively accommodates the more restrictive in-
formation-control policy in China will lead to sacrifice abroad-such as a
reduction of coverage of politically sensitive information.
Although China has always been used as the poster boy of censor-
ship,433 it is important to remember that many other countries also have
restrictive policies. 434 As Google has recently shown, the company has
received requests for user data or content removal from government
agencies in a diverse array of countries, including China, Brazil, Ger-
many, India, the United States, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Italy,
Argentina, Spain, Australia, and Canada, among others.435 In their book,
Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain
have also documented information-control policies in different parts of
the world. 436
432. See JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF
Music 57 (2001) (noting that, before the arrival of Diamond Multimedia's Rio, "the only
portable, Walkman-like devices that would play MP3s were manufactured in either Korea
or Germany"); STEVEN LEVY, THE PERFECT THING: How THE IPOD SHUFFLES COM-
MERCE, CULTURE, AND COOLNESS 27 (2006) (discussing the various mp3 technologies that
have been available in South Korea before their wide adoption in the United States).
433. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Internet Freedom, Address De-
livered at the Newseum in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.foreign
policy.com/articles/2010/01/21/internet-freedom?page=full.
434. See Rebecca Mackinnon, The Green Dam Phenomenon, WALL ST. J. AsIA, June
18, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124525992051023961.html ("The In-
ternet censorship club is expanding and now includes a growing number of democracies.
Legislators are under growing pressure from family groups to 'do something' in the face of
all the threats sloshing around the Internet, and the risk of overstepping is high."); Christo-
pher Rhoads & Loretta Chao, Iran's Web Spying Aided by Western Technology, WALL ST.
J., June 22, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124562668777335653.
html (discussing internet control in Britain, Germany, United States, and Australia).
435. The Google transparency report is available at http://www.google.com/trans
parencyreport/governmentrequests/.
436. See ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTER-
ING (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter ACCESS DENIED].
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Even worse, U.S. citizens may be subject to more intrusive searches
abroad. Although ACTA does not require intrusive searches, it does en-
courage such searches, especially when local policymakers believe that
more thorough, and often more intrusive, searches will improve their
country's standing with the United States or ensure better ratings in next
year's Section 301 report. As we have vivid memories from the days of
heightened security following September 11, 2001, and as today's air trav-
elers unfortunately still experience on occasion, powerful laws sometimes
can lead to overzealousness, if not overreaching, on the part of law en-
forcement officers.437
Likewise, bona fide entrepreneurs and legitimate businesses may be
affected by heightened protection abroad. As Eddan Katz and Gwen
Hinze noted, "U.S. technology exporters looking to expand into new
markets will confront foreign laws lacking the flexibility that was key to
their innovation. '438 Under that scenario, there is a
potential for US Internet companies to be subject to more onerous
requirements and higher levels of liability in other countries in which
they operate. And this in turn, is likely to have an adverse impact on
citizens' freedom of expression, and ability to access content hosted
on platforms in different countries.439
The additional protection may also lead to greater confusion on the
part of border and customs authorities. For example, generic drugs de-
veloped or distributed by a U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturer can be
locked up by customs authorities that fail to make distinctions between
two arguably different forms of packaging.440 As Sean Flynn pointed out
convincingly in the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue meeting at the U.S.
Department of Commerce in April 2010, the labels for many drugs look
quite similar to each other by virtue of public health regulations and the
use of names derived from international nonproprietary names for phar-
maceutical substances or active pharmaceutical ingredients. 441 In those
cases, heightened protection required by ACTA could encourage law en-
forcement authorities to err on the side of protection.
To be certain, the affected businesses can always seek help from their
governments-in the case of the United States, the American embassy or
the USTR. However, such a mishap would not have taken place had the
protection and enforcement levels not been raised without careful consid-
437. See, e.g., Stephen Dinan, Airport Rules Changed After Ron Paul Aide Detained,
WASH. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2009), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/
nov/i1/rules-changed-after-paul-aide-detained-at-airport/ (reporting about the overreach-
ing of Transportation Security Administration screeners).
438. Katz & Hinze, supra note 142, at 34.
439. Hinze, supra note 263.
440. Thanks to Sean Flynn for providing this wonderful example. See Consumer
Groups Fear ACTA Could Encourage Generic Drug Seizures, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Apr.





eration of the corresponding legislative and policy changes that may be
needed to implement the agreement.
In fact, given the limited training and lack of sophistication in many
less-developed countries, it is a mistake for policymakers in developed
countries to assume that the complex ACTA provisions will always be
interpreted and implemented as intended. Given the stiff competition
abroad and the limited procedural safeguards and inadequate rule-of-law
developments in many less-developed countries, it is also misguided to
assume that it will be easy for U.S. firms to contest wrongful judgments
made by local customs authorities. Indeed, customs measures, if unrea-
sonable or unreasonably implemented, could ultimately become a
nontariff barrier to trade-a concern that has dominated international
trade discussions in the past.4 4 2
Moreover, as Timothy Trainer and Vicki Allums reminded us:
[A]n intellectual property rights ... border enforcement system or
any type of enforcement system that empowers competent authori-
ties to take ex officio actions imposes greater responsibilities on the
enforcement officials. The government officials, whether police, cus-
toms, or others, would have to be able to recognize the possible exis-
tence of an IPR violation in order to take any enforcement action.
The ability of enforcement authorities to identify suspect goods re-
quires that there be a vigorous training program between the IPR
owners and the enforcement authorities in order for the enforcement
officials to formulate a legal basis to believe that there is an IPR
violation.443
To date, many enforcement authorities in less-developed countries do not
have the needed financial resources, human capital, administrative capac-
ity, or legal expertise to make the implementation of ACTA successful.444
Moreover, in places with high risks of corruption, giving customs authori-
ties a considerable amount of discretionary authority seems to be a rather
bad idea.4 45 It is also unlikely that U.S. citizens or businesses will be
442. See MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND
THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 105 (1998) (listing "unreasonable customs pro-
cedures" as a nontariff barrier).
443. TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 6:43, at 685 (footnote omitted).
444. See id. § 6:53, at 707 ("[I]f the border enforcement agency does not have any legal
expertise in IPR issues, a new unit would have to be organized.").
445. See Letter from Stewart Baker, Asst. Sec'y for Policy, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Susan C. Schwab, USTR (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/
stewardbaker schwab_7aug2008.pdf ("In essence, [the ACTA] language would encourage
foreign customs authorities to bar imports and exports if the authorities concluded on their
own initiative that the goods might violate copyright or be confusingly similar to trade-
marked goods. These are sweeping powers to act against suspected IP violators, and the
powers can easily be misused either intentionally or unintentionally. Misuse could even
harm small U.S. exporters competing with foreign companies favored by local govern-
ments. Generally speaking, the customs agencies of the other participating countries do
not possess the same level of authority as [U.S. Customs and Border Protection]-many of
them are not designated competent authorities to make determinations on IPR infringe-
ments. This substantially increases the risk that the sweeping powers will be misused.");
Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1092-95 (2011) (criti-
cizing the United States' use of the WTO dispute settlement process to push for greater
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comfortable going through the bureaucratic or judicial processes in some
of these countries, not to mention the fact that some of these processes
may not offer the same safeguards or share the same values as found on
U.S. soil.
Even in the United States, one may still remember the confusion on
the part of U.S. customs officials over the legality of importation of yel-
low beans from Mexican farmers. Of concern were naturally grown vari-
eties that have been native to Mexico "at least since the time of the
Aztecs.' ' 44 6 Such confusion, which was caused by the issuance of a patent
and plant variety protection certificate to the Enola variety,447 eventually
resulted in significantly reduced bean exports from Mexico to the United
States. 448 Adding insult to the injury, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office later invalidated the Enola patent with no compensation to af-
fected Mexican farmers. 449
Many infringement issues, indeed, are rather difficult to adjudicate. As
Timothy Trainer and Vicki Allums pointed out in their treatise on cross-
border protection of intellectual property rights, "[g]iven the technical
nature of the works protected by patents, a determination that a patent
has been infringed frequently requires an analysis based upon scientific,
engineering, or other technological concepts rather than an observation
of the infringing article as in the case of trademarks and copyrights. ' '450
discretionary power within Chinese customs authorities without taking serious considera-
tion of the corruption and local protectionism problems confronting American businesses);
see also NAIM, supra note 179, at 192 (discussing the corruption problems with a new drug
squad in Russia and the elite federales in Mexico).
Within the ACTA negotiating parties, for example, Mexico and Morocco have rather
disappointing records of corruption and transparency. See Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA
as a New Kind of International IP Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 839, 855 (2011)
("Two ACTA negotiating countries, Mexico and Morocco, for example, are 98th and 85th
(out of 178), respectively, on Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions
Index.").
446. J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE:
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 23-24 (J. Michael
Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004). See generally Gillian N. Rattray, The Enola Bean
Patent Controversy: Biopiracy, Novelty and Fish-and-Chips, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
8, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2002DLTROOO8.pdf (discussing Enola
bean controversy).
447. U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079 (filed Nov. 15, 1996).
448. See Rattray, supra note 446, at 11.
449. The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office struck down the Enola bean patent on April
29, 2008. Press Release, ETC Grp., Hollow Victory: Enola Bean Patent Smashed at Last
(Maybe) (Apr. 29, 2008), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.
html?pubid=683; see also In re POD-NERS, No. 2008-1492, 2009 WL 2029976 (Fed. Cir.
July 10, 2009) (affirming the determination of obviousness by the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office).
450. TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 5:1 n.3, at 540. Likewise, Carlos Correa
noted:
Whereas trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy may be easily estab-
lished through visual inspection, it is extremely difficult to determine
whether an infringement of a product or process patent, even if literal, has
taken place without appropriate testing or producing other evidence, and
without technical and legal expertise. For instance, without proper research
or experimentation custom authorities cannot possibly establish whether an
imported pharmaceutical active ingredient infringes a patent covering a par-
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Indeed, "[c]ustoms IPR branch attorneys and field officers typically lack
technical and scientific backgrounds." '451 Given the problems in main-
taining patent quality in both developed and less-developed countries,
there is also a strong likelihood that the patents involved may be later
invalidated-similar to the patent in Enola beans.452
Similar challenges can be found in the copyright field. As an Austra-
lian judge recently noted in Roadshow Films v. iiNet Ltd.,453 a case in-
volving ISP liability:
[C]opyright infringement is not a straight 'yes' or 'no' question. The
Court has had to examine a very significant quantity of technical and
legal detail over dozens of pages in [a legal] judgment in order to
determine whether [internet] users, and how often [these] users, in-
fringe copyright by use of the BitTorrent system.
454
If judges find it difficult and time-consuming to decide infringement
cases, one could only imagine how challenging it would be for customs
officials to decide the issues based on prima facie evidence. One also has
to wonder how high the costs of administrative errors will be.
B. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
ACTA may undermine the longstanding interests of the United States
in promoting human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law throughout
the world. Unless explicit safeguards are included in the agreement to
protect free speech, free press, and privacy, there is a very good chance
that ACTA would provide a pretext for other countries to tighten control
on information.
It is beyond dispute that intellectual property rights, as a means of con-
trol, have strong implications for the protection of free speech, free press,
and privacy. Consider copyright protection, for example. Commentators
ticular process for manufacturing it, or whether a patent covering a gene con-
struct used in plants is violated by the importation of grains or a derivative
product from such plants.
Correa, supra note 321, at 49 (footnote omitted); accord Li, supra note 321, at 38 ("Deter-
mination of [patent] infringement requires a construction of the meaning of the claim lan-
guage and then application of the claims so construed to the accused product or process.");
Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 321, at 52 ("Border control by customs should be limited to
prima facie detectable infringing goods-which generally excludes the determination of
patent and utility model infringements where infringement cannot be assessed without spe-
cific legal and technical expertise.").
451. TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 5:1 n.3, at 540-41.
452. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (noting that 46% of the 300 final validity
decisions examined in the article have found the patent invalid); Correa, supra note 321, at
42-43 ("Often patents are found invalid or revoked when scrutinized by courts, due to the
lack of patentability requirements, insufficient disclosure, or other reasons."); id. at 67 n.84
("In the US, for instance, patent owner's likelihood of success in patent validity challenges
is only 51 per cent if the trial is heard before a judge alone. If the trial is heard before a
judge and jury: 68 per cent. Overall chances of success for the patent owner if the trial is
held in Massachusetts and Northern California, respectively: 30 per cent, 68 per cent.").
453. Roadshow Films v. iNet Ltd., (2010) F.C.A. 24 (Austl.).
454. Id. $ 430.
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have widely discussed the tension between intellectual property protec-
tion and the protection of free speech and free press.455 In a recent book,
Neil Netanel described this copyright-free speech conflict as the "copy-
right's paradox. ' 456 Although the U.S. Supreme Court described copy-
right as the "engine of free expression" 457 and pointed out that the U.S.
copyright scheme "incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and
safeguards," 458 significant tension exists between the protection of copy-
right and that of free speech and free press in many less-developed
countries. 459
This tension is particularly acute in countries where information flows
are heavily regulated. Censored materials-whether they are deemed
politically sensitive, culturally insensitive, or generally indecent or inap-
propriate-are often not created by the one disseminating the informa-
tion. As a result, the dissemination of censored materials often involves
unauthorized reproduction and distribution.
Moreover, in countries with strict information control, the reuse of
materials that have previously satisfied content review may sometimes be
badly needed to enable internet users to create their intended message.
As Rebecca MacKinnon observed in the blogging context, "In order to
evade the [blog service provider's] internal censors, Chinese bloggers fre-
quently deploy satire, euphemisms, literary allusions, vague or coded
phrases, and even graphics to convey critical messages. '460 The more
pre-existing texts they use, the more successful they will be in avoiding
censorship. Drawing on literature on democratic culture, some commen-
tators have also noted how the creative reuse of pre-existing materials
would help develop a participatory culture in China that in turn would
help promote democratic transition. 461 To a great extent, creative reuse
can amount to liberative reuse.
If that is not complicated enough, it is often difficult to pinpoint the
usefulness of the materials that can be used to promote democratic transi-
tion and the development of civil society. While many entertainment
455. For a recent treatment of the tension between intellectual property protection and
the protection of free speech, see generally NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S
PARADOX (2008). See other sources cited in Yu, supra note 184, at 927 n.145.
456. NETANEL, supra note 455; see also Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1181
(1970) (describing the conflict as "a largely ignored paradox").
457. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
458. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
459. See Michael D. Birnhack, Global Copyright, Local Speech, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 491, 544-46 (2006).
460. Rebecca MacKinnon, China's Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor Bloggers,
FIRST MONDAY (Feb. 2, 2009), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrapfbin/ojs/index.php/fm/
article/view/2378/2089; see also Ashley Esarey & Xiao Qiang, Below the Radar: Political
Expression in the Chinese Blogosphere, 48 ASIAN SURVEY 752 (2008) (discussing the use of
parodies, satires, coded words, euphemisms, and allusions to popular culture in communi-
cation in repressive societies).
461. See Robert S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case that Started from a
Parody: American Intellectual Property Policy and the Pursuit of Democratic Ideals in
Modern China, 16 UCLA ENTf. L. REV. 237, 254-59 (2009).
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products are uncontroversial, highly commercial, and seemingly frivolous,
they may create unintended spillover effects in promoting democratic
transition in repressive countries. It is not uncommon to find Hollywood
movies or American television programs filled with discussions of the
American government, the need for checks and balances or the separa-
tion of powers, and the protection of constitutional rights and civil liber-
ties.462 Even the latest installments of Star Wars are filled with issues
concerning corruption, slavery, federalism, democracy, racial tension, and
the American government. 463 Although I would not go so far to claim
that the broadcast of the television series Dallas in East Germany led to
the collapse of the Berlin Wall, as some have suggested, 464 I also hesitate
to claim that Western entertainment products played no role at all. After
all, trade protectionism is not the only reason why countries ban
Hollywood movies from their domestic markets.
Indeed, commentators have suggested how the lack of copyright pro-
tection may result in greater democratic reforms. As Professor Netanel
explained:
[I]mposing copyright protection for foreign works in the authorita-
rian state could drastically diminish the supply of such works in that
country. Such protection may well put many foreign works beyond
the price range of that country's consumer public. It would also give
dictatorial authorities an internationally acceptable justification for
suppressing the works' dissemination .... Since the vast majority of
those works would continue to be created even without copyright
protection in the authoritarian state, the result, at least in static
462. See, e.g., ABSOLUTE POWER (Columbia Pictures 1997); Law & Order (NBC televi-
sion broadcast 1990-2010); THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT (Columbia Pictures 1996); The
West Wing (NBC television broadcast 1999-2006). As Neil Netanel explained:
The same is true with regard to works of popular culture. Our public dis-
course comprises a rambunctious, effervescent brew of spectacle, prurient
appeal, social commentary, and political punditry. It is part entertainment,
but as it entertains, it often reveals contested issues and deep fissures within
our society, just as it may reinforce widely held beliefs and values. To be
understood by their audiences, films, songs, and television programs must
deal in the currency of prevailing practices, ideologies, and stereotypes, and
in so doing must either reinforce or challenge them. Even seemingly innocu-
ous cartoon characters, like Bart Simpson and Mickey Mouse, may be used
to subvert (or reinforce) prevailing cultural values and assumptions-and
with greater social impact than the most carefully considered Habermasian
dialogue. The words, images, and sounds of commercial entertainment have
a profound influence on our social mores and collective sense of reality. As
such, the realm of popular culture serves, to a considerable extent, as both a
resource and a playing field for the exercise of democratic culture and civic
association.
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 350-51
(1996).
463. STAR WARS: EPISODE I-THE PHANTOM MENACE (20th Century Fox 1999); STAR
WARS: EPISODE II-ArrACK OF THE CLONES (20th Century Fox 2002); STAR WARS: EPi-
SODE III-REVENGE OF THE SITH (20th Century Fox 2005).
464. Cf. Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Over-
protective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614 (1996) ("After the Berlin Wall fell, some
said that East Germany fell because the East Germans were enthralled with the ethos and
consumer goods viewed every Friday night on the U.S. television show 'Dallas."').
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terms, would be a significant welfare loss. As far as the availability
of foreign democracy-inducing expression is concerned, the imposi-
tion of copyright protection for that expression in authoritarian
states would seem to have a detrimental, not positive, effect on dem-
ocratic transition. 465
When internet distribution is involved, the tension between copyright
protection and free dissemination of ideas becomes even more acute.
Thanks to the high speeds and low costs of reproduction and distribution,
the anonymous architecture, and the many-to-many communication capa-
bilities, the internet has become a particularly effective means of commu-
nication.466 As the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania recognized in ACLU v. Reno, the internet is "the most par-
ticipatory form of mass speech yet developed,"467 and the content on this
medium is "as diverse as human thought."468
In fact, if one still questions the full democratic potential of the in-
ternet, he or she just needs to look at the spirited and important public
debate on ACTA that has been generated through websites, blogs, social
networking tools, online publications, and other media platforms on the
internet. With only a few clicks, one can obtain both the official and
leaked versions of the ACTA draft text.469 With a few more clicks, one
can obtain access to authoritative academic commentaries along with
blog posts from commentators on both sides of the debate. 470 These
types of discussions on intellectual property were unheard of when the
TRIPS Agreement was negotiated more than twenty years ago. In fact,
the internet has now made possible the webcasting of meetings at the
WTO, WIPO and other fora that would further open up the debate to
those outside Geneva or other negotiating venues.471
465. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global
Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 255-57 (1998).
466. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRA-
STR uCURE 129, 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (contending that "the
more a nation pursues a restrictive Internet policy, the less value it will derive from the
network and the more it risks being left out of the information revolution"); Peter K. Yu,
Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (noting that the information revolution has created a tremendous amount
of political, social, economic, educational, and career opportunities).
467. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afJ'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
468. Id. at 842; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2006) ("The Internet and other interac-
tive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique op-
portunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity."); Jessica
Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 50 (2004) (stating that
"the idiosyncratic interests of large numbers of individuals who want to share is directly
responsible for the wealth and incredible variety of information we can find when we go
looking for it").
469. See, e.g., Consolidated Draft, supra note 18; Leaked Draft, supra note 19.
470. See, e.g., Geist, supra note 62; Hinze, supra note 358; Kim Weatherall, ACTA: New
(Leaked) Text, New Issues, FORTNIOHTLY REV. (July 15th, 2010, 5:22 PM), http://fort
nightlyreview.info/2010/07/15/acta-new-leaked-text-new-issues%E2%80%A6/.
471. Cf. HOEKMAN & MAVROIDIS, supra note 99, at 116 ("Given the internet and the
low cost of telecom services, every regular WTO meeting could be taped and web cast.").
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In January 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared
before a crowd at the Newseum in Washington: "The private sector has a
shared responsibility to help safeguard free expression. And when their
business dealings threaten to undermine this freedom, they need to con-
sider what's right, not simply the prospect of quick profits. ' 472 While
Secretary Clinton was speaking about internet freedom, referring to com-
panies collaborating with repressive governments, one could not help but
notice how equally relevant her speech is regarding ACTA's democracy-
reducing potential.473
If ACTA entered into effect, it could be used to silence the vibrant
discussion that has been developed so far regarding the agreement's un-
desirability and the non-transparent process. 474 Thus, if intellectual prop-
erty rights holders do care about promoting internet freedom, they,
according to Secretary Clinton, may "need to consider what's right, not
simply the prospect of quick profits. ' 475 After all, as she rightly noted:
"Those who use the internet to recruit terrorists or distribute stolen intel-
lectual property cannot divorce their online actions from their real world
identities. But these challenges must not become an excuse for govern-
ments to systematically violate the rights and privacy of those who use the
internet for peaceful political purposes. 476
One of the areas in ACTA of great concern to free speech advocates
involves the unintended consequences of anti-circumvention protection.
Although such protection was intended to protect copyrighted works, it is
likely to provide a pretext for local authorities to remove important tools
that can be used to circumvent censorship control. Through legislation,
diplomatic measures, export controls, trade policy, the provision and de-
velopment of technological tools, and other covert efforts, the United
States has actively promoted the free flow of information and ideas in
472. Clinton, supra note 433.
473. This analogy is pointed out by a New Zealand parliament member. See Clare Cur-
ran, We Need Greater Transparency and Freedom, RED ALERT (Jan. 26, 2010), http://blog.
labour.org.nz/index.php/2010/01/26/we-need-greater-transparency-and-freedom/. Other
commentators share this concern. See, e.g., Rebecca MacKinnon, Are China's Demands
for Internet 'Self-Discipline' Spreading to the West?, MCCLATCHY (Jan. 18, 2010), http://
www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/01/18/82469/commentary-are-chinas-demands.html (expres-
sing concern that the ACTA negotiations may push the world in a direction that fails to
"consider[ ] the full global context of free expression and censorship"); Mike Masnick, The
Similarity Between ACTA and Chinese Internet Censorship, TECHDIR" (Jan. 20, 2010, 11:46
AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100120/0216537828.shtml (noting the "worrisome
parallels between what is being pushed via ACTA and other methods and ongoing internet
censorship in China").
474. See Kaitlin Mara, UK Passes Internet Access-Limiting Bill for Alleged IP Infring-
ers, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 8, 2010, 12:11 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/
04/08/uk-isps-required-to-limit-internet-access-for-ip-infringers/ (reporting the fear that the
new U.K. digital economy bill "could be used to block access to whistleblower websites
such as Wikileaks, which publishes confidential (and possibly copyrighted) government
material").
475. Clinton, supra note 433.
476. Id. (emphasis added).
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repressive countries. 477 Problematically, the ban on circumvention and
the use of other tinkering tools, as demanded by the anti-circumvention
provisions of ACTA,478 would work in the opposite direction to reduce
the effectiveness of these efforts. In fact, as Ronald Deibert and Rafal
Rohozinski observed, "China, Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Oman, and
Saudi Arabia [have] all block[ed] access to a high amount of URLs in the
... 'anonymizers and circumvention' category. ' 479 China, for example,
"blocks access not only to known circumvention sites, but sites that are
known to provide information and tutorials about censorship
circumvention. 480
Moreover, the insistence on greater monitoring, filtering, and data re-
tention on the part of ISPs could create significant challenges for internet
users in the free speech context. If ISPs retain data about subscribers and
their activities to facilitate copyright protection, they may be required to
turn over such information to government authorities. Because govern-
ment authorities could use the information to reconstruct the users' activ-
ities, users are likely to become more reluctant to freely discuss matters
(especially political ones) on the internet. Even worse, the retention and
subsequent disclosure of information may lead to arrests and imprison-
ments: the heavily criticized imprisonment of a Chinese journalist follow-
ing Yahoo's disclosure of his identity to the Chinese authorities
immediately comes to mind. 481
Had ACTA required the introduction of the so-called graduated re-
sponse system-or what commentators and policymakers have called the
"three strikes" rule or the "notice and termination" procedure-the im-
pact of ACTA on free speech and free press would have been even more
significant.482 Such a system would require ISPs to suspend or terminate
477. See id. ("We are also supporting the development of new tools that enable citizens
to exercise their right of free expression by circumventing politically motivated censorship.
We are working globally to make sure that those tools get to the people who need them, in
local languages, and with the training they need to access the internet safely. The United
States has been assisting in these efforts for some time."); see also Yu, supra note 332, at
424-32 (discussing the United States' efforts to promote free flow of information and ideas
in China).
478. See Consolidated Draft, supra note 18, arts. 27.5-.6.
479. Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Good for Liberty, Bad for Security? Global
Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet, in ACCESS DENIED, supra note 436, at
123, 134.
480. Id.
481. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, China's Cyberdissidents and the Yahoos at Yahoo,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at C13; Clive Thompson, Google's China Problem (and China's
Google Problem), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, at F64; Tom Zeller Jr., Internet Lions Turn
Paper Tiger in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at C3.
482. See Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1401-02 (2010)
(discussing how the graduated response system would undermine the protection of free
speech, free press, and privacy). For a recent study identifying the incompatibilities be-
tween ACTA and fundamental European human rights instruments and standards, see
generally DouwE KoRFF & IAN BROWN, OPINION ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) WITH THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON




the service of internet users or take other measures-such as capping
bandwidth or blocking sites, portals, or protocols-after they have pro-
vided users with two warnings about their potentially illegal online
activities. 4 83
In its final form, ACTA does not require the introduction of such a
system, 484 due in part to the widespread concern among legislators and
the public and in part to the significant disagreement among the ACTA
negotiating parties over the treaty language used to introduce such an
obligation.485 While the United States seems to favor an approach that
allows for private ordering and non-legislative measures, the European
Union and Japan prefer legislative mandates.486
Nevertheless, ACTA does not prevent the introduction of the
graduated response system. The consolidated draft, in fact, includes
different options that could facilitate the development of a graduated
response system.487  Given the adoption of the system in Chile,
483. See id.
484. Compare ACTA, supra note 5, art. 27.3 ("Each Party shall endeavour to promote
cooperative efforts within the business community to effectively address trademark and
copyright or related rights infringement while preserving legitimate competition and ...
preserving fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and pri-
vacy."), with Leaked Draft, supra note 19, art. 2.17(3)(b)(i) (conditioning the ISP safe har-
bor on the adoption and reasonable implementation of "a policy to address the
unauthorized storage or transmission of materials protected by copyright or related rights"
(footnote omitted)), and id. n.29 ("An example of such a policy is providing for the termi-
nation in appropriate circumstances of subscriptions [and/or] accounts on the service pro-
vider's system or network of repeat infringers."). See also Press Release, USTR, The
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Releases Statement of ACTA Negotiating Part-
ners on Recent ACTA Negotiations (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/2010/aprilloffice-us-trade-representative-releases-statement-ac
("While the participants recognise the importance of responding effectively to the chal-
lenge of Internet piracy, they confirmed that no participant is proposing to require govern-
ments to mandate a 'graduated response' or 'three strikes' approach to copyright
infringement on the Internet.").
485. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Or-
dering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81 (2010) (discussing the U.S.
copyright industries' increasing use of approaches based on private ordering to strengthen
intellectual property enforcement in the digital environment).
486. See id.
487. Option 1 of the provision in the consolidated draft, for example, conditions the ISP
safe harbor on "an online service provider adopting and reasonably implementing a policy
to address the unauthorized storage or transmission of materials protected by copyright or
related rights." See Consolidated Draft, supra note 18, art. 2.18(3)(b) (option 1). Mean-
while, option 2, which is more aggressive, states that the provision "shall not affect the
possibility for a judicial or administrative authority, in accordance with the Parties [sic]
legal system, requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor
does it affect the possibility of the parties establishing procedures governing the removal or
disabling of access to information." Id. art. 2.18(3)(b) (option 2). Article 2.18 (3quater)
states further: "Each Party shall promote the development of mutually supportive relation-
ships between online service providers and right holders to deal effectively with patent,
industrial design, trademark and copyright or related rights infringement which takes place
by means of the Internet, including the encouragement of establishing guidelines for the
actions which should be taken." Id. art. 2.18 (3quater). For discussions of the different
paths that a graduated response system can still be introduced through ACTA, see gener-
ally Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the Specter of Graduated Response, 26 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 559 (2011); Hinze, supra note 263.
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France, 488 Taiwan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom,489 the exis-
tence of a repeat infringer provision in the DMCA, 490 and the increased
cooperation between intellectual property rights holders and ISPs, many
countries are likely to include some version of the graduated response
system or repeat infringer provision in their implementation effort should
ACTA come into effect.
Finally, the need to strengthen intellectual property protection in the
image of ACTA is likely to prevent human rights and civil liberties groups
from criticizing governments for their repressive actions. As William Al-
ford noted about China more than a decade ago:
[I]t is no wonder that stories are now circulating among well-in-
formed observers in China that some of the more staunchly authori-
tarian of the PRC's leaders were only too happy to satisfy
Washington's latest demands to crack down on printing houses and
producers of films and CDs, as it provided a convenient legitimiza-
tion for repressive measures they intended to take in any event while
simultaneously constraining America's capacity to complain about
such actions. 491
Professor Netanel also observed that "imposing copyright protection for
foreign works in the authoritarian state ... would also give dictatorial
authorities an internationally acceptable justification for suppressing the
works' dissemination. '492
It is important to remember that copyright was introduced as a re-
sponse to the printing press-a modern reprographic technology. 493 In a
little more than two centuries following the invention of the Gutenberg
488. See Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la cr6a-
tion sur internet (Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 on Favouring the Diffusion and Protec-
tion of Creation on the Internet), JOURNAL OFFII1EL DE LA RIPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 13, 2009, p. 9666, available at http://
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid-69C250441CO4AFAED3A3EC46276A39BD.
tpdjol4v 1?cidTexte=JORFEXT000020735432&categorieLien=id. The law is usually re-
ferred to as the HADOPI Law. See Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for
Copyright Law Makers-Is the "Graduated Response" a Good Reply?, 1 WIPO J. 75, 79
n.12 (2009). ("'HADOPI' stands for the 'High Authority' for the Diffusion of Works
('Oeuvres' in French) and the Protection of Rights on the Internet.").
489. See INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011, at
3, 19 (2011); Mara, supra note 474.
490. Section 512(i) of the U.S. Copyright Act provides:
(1) Accommodation of Technology.-The limitations on liability established
by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider
. .. has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that
provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat
infringers ....
17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006).
491. William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property Rights,
Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29
N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. & POL. 135, 144-45 (1997).
492. Netanel, supra note 465, at 255.




press, both the Church and the Crown used printers' privileges to sup-
press heresy and dissent.494 Although the origin of the modern notion of
copyright is often linked to the English statute of Anne,495 which recently
celebrated its tricentennial, 496 historians have traced the notion back to
the Star Chamber and the Stationers' Company in England. 497 A strong
interrelationship between copyright and censorship has existed since the
inception of copyright.
Even in those countries that the United States considered allies during
the ACTA negotiations, the laws could limit the freedom of American
internet users. One might still remember the highly controversial case
against Yahoo! concerning the sale of Nazi memorabilia in the early days
of the internet.498 Most recently, in Italy, three Google executives were
found criminally liable for their failure to quickly remove a widely-
viewed video showing an autistic boy being harassed by a group of teen-
agers, notwithstanding the fact that Google's subsequent assistance re-
sulted in the arrest of the perpetrators. 499 As a group of internet
companies and industry associations wrote to the USTR after the second
round of the ACTA negotiations:
[T]here is a very real possibility that an agreement that would re-
quire signatories to increase penalties for "counterfeiting" and
"piracy" could be used to challenge American companies engaging
in online practices that are entirely legal in the U.S., that bring enor-
mous benefit to U.S. consumers, and that increase U.S. exports.500
494. See id. at 17.
495. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed
Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned,
8 Ann., c. 19 (1709) (Eng.).
496. For recent symposia celebrating the tricentennial of the Statute of Anne, see Sym-
posium, Copyright © 300, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145 (2010); Symposium, The @©©
Conference: Celebrating Copyright's Tri-Centennial, 47 Hous. L. REV. 779 (2010).
497. For comprehensive discussions of the Star Chamber and the Stationers' Company,
see generally AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COP-
YRIGHT IN BOOKS (1899); CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS' COMPANY: A HISTORY,
1403-1959 (1960); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
28-77 (1968).
498. Union des Etudiants Juifs de France & Ligue Contre le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme v. Yahoo! Inc. & Yahoo France, Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [or-
dinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000 (Fr.), translated at http://www.
lapres.net/yahen.html. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the
Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261 (2002) (discussing the Yahoo! case in France).
499. See Rachel Donadio, Italy Convicts 3 Google Officials in Privacy Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at Al (reporting that a judge in Milan "sentenced (three] Google
executives in absentia to six-month suspended sentences for violation of privacy"); see also
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD
WORRY) 47-48 (2011) (discussing the criminal conviction of Google executives in Italy).
500. Letter from Amazon.com et al. to Susan Schwab, USTR (Aug. 7, 2008), available
at http://www.ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/ACYA-ltr-US-Tech-Co-aug-7-2008.pdf.
In addition to Amazon.com, the signatories to this letter included AT&T; Computer &
Communications Industry Association; Consumer Electronics Association; eBay Inc.; In-
formation Technology Association of America; Internet Commerce Coalition; NetCoali-
tion; U.S. Internet Service Provider Association; USTelecom Association; Verizon
Communications; and Yahoo! Inc.
1058 [Vol. 64
Six Secret Fears of ACTA
Even worse, ACTA could make it difficult for the United States to
complain about those highly intrusive foreign laws that are introduced in
the name of implementing ACTA or complying with its higher enforce-
ment standards. Such introduction, to some extent, can be analogized to
the Russian authorities' recent confiscation of the computers of an out-
spoken Siberian environmental activist group (as well as those of other
advocacy groups and opposition newspapers) in the name of protecting
Microsoft's copyrighted software.50' Reported first in The New York
Times and covered widely throughout the Internet,502 the incident not
only reminds us of the challenges in enforcing intellectual property rights
in countries with strong information control, but also confirms Professor
Alford's earlier observation about how the United States' push for
greater intellectual property protection could undermine its human rights
agenda.50 3 After all, it would be hypocritical to demand that other coun-
tries increase intellectual property enforcement while complaining when
such increased enforcement does not serve the demandeur's interests.
C. LOCKED-IN PROTECTIVE STANDARDS WITHOUT
CORRESPONDING SAFEGUARDS
While ACTA is likely to entrench the present protective standards both
at home and abroad, it fails to ensure the continued existence of corre-
sponding safeguards. As shown in the final text, ACTA offers very few
limitations and exceptions; all of them are either permissive or included
as safeguard provisions.504 The view of the negotiators is indeed short-
sighted, and it narrowly focuses on only half of the enforcement issues.
As Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan noted:
IP users often benefit from certain exceptions to IP protection and,
therefore, have a specific interest that these exceptions can be given
effect. IP enforcement here may require offering remedies against a
contractual curtailment of these exceptions or against the use of
501. See Clifford J. Levy, Using Microsoft, Russia Suppresses Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2010, at Al.
502. See id.
503. See Alford, supra note 491, at 144-45.
504. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 27.2 (requiring enforcement procedures related to
obligations in the digital enforcement section "be implemented in a manner that avoids the
creation of barriers to legitimate activity, including electronic commerce, and ... preserves
fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy"); id. art.
27.3 ("Each Party shall endeavour to promote cooperative efforts within the business com-
munity to effectively address trademark and copyright or related rights infringement while
preserving legitimate competition and ... preserving fundamental principles such as free-
dom of expression, fair process, and privacy."); id. art. 27.4 (requiring the procedures for
the disclosure of subscriber information, if available, "be implemented in a manner that
avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate activity, including electronic commerce, and...
preserves fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and pri-
vacy"); id. art. 27.8 ("In providing adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies
[related to anti-circumvention protection and copyright management information], a Party
may adopt or maintain appropriate limitations or exceptions to measures implementing the
provisions .... The obligations set forth. .. are without prejudice to the rights, limitations,
exceptions, or defences to copyright or related rights infringement .... ).
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technological protection measures that frustrate the exercise of ex-
ceptions in copyright.505
More disturbing, the ACTA negotiators seemed to have assumed that
the safeguards under existing U.S. law, such as fair use, the first sale doc-
trine, or the Bolar exception, will always stay in place under domestic
law. Such assumptions, however, are questionable, especially in light of
the increasing scrutiny of domestic legislation under the WTO process
and the constantly evolving technological environment.
Consider, for example, the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, which ex-
panded the unauthorized use of music by restaurants, bars, retail stores,
and other small business establishments.50 6 Although that particular pro-
vision was enacted as a means to balance the extension of the copyright
term in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,50 7 the WTO dis-
pute settlement panel found the provision inconsistent with the United
States' TRIPS obligations.508 Had the United States sought to comply
with the panel decision by amending the Copyright Act-as compared to
ignoring it509-the balance in the U.S. copyright system would tilt further
toward rights holders.
Indeed, the WTO process has raised questions about the expediency
and sustainability of the development of package legislation that includes
strengthened protection and public interest offsets. As Graeme
Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss explained:
Th[e] 'discrete' approach to adjudication (by which we mean that
discrete parts of legislative compromises are broken out for individ-
ual assessment) can produce perverse consequences. Not only does
it unravel carefully negotiated legislative deals, it does so in a sys-
tematic way. Because TRIPS sets only minimum standards, WTO
dispute resolution operates as a one-way ratchet: complaints can lead
to the invalidation of measures that reduce the level of intellectual
property protection, but they never reach measures that increase
protection. Thus, compromises will always unravel in the same di-
rection, requiring nations to change those features of their legislation
that benefit user groups while protection-enhancing provisions stay
in place.5 10
505. Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 321, at 44.
506. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2006).
507. Id. at § 304.
508. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 99 (2004).
509. In lieu of amending its TRIPS-non-compliant law, the United States paid the Eu-
ropean Union a one-time sum of $3.3 million. See Florian Koempel, Fair Play?, Copy-
RIGHT WORLD, July-Aug. 2004, at 23, 24 ("As part of the Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act, signed into law on 16 April 2003, the US Congress approved the $3.3
million appropriation for European music right holders; the sum was subsequently paid to
the representative body of European right holders (GESAC)."). Although the WTO arbi-
tration panel determined the penalty amount to be _1,219,900 per year, see Recourse to
Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU, Award of the Arbitrators, United States-Sec-
tion 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 5.1, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001), the United
States had not paid ever since.
510. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 508, at 99-100.
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Thus, according to Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, the discrete ap-
proach taken by the WTO dispute settlement panels would have the per-
verse effect of encouraging intellectual property rights holders and their
supportive governments "to agree to provisions that reduce the level of
protection in exchange for the protection-enhancing legislation that they
want, knowing that the reductions will be successfully challenged at the
international level."'511
Likewise, technological measures have altered the protections offered
by limitations and exceptions under existing law. Commentators, for ex-
ample, have widely discussed the adverse impact of digital rights manage-
ment tools and the gradual erosion of the first sale doctrine in the digital
environment. 512 It is also worth remembering that the current technolog-
ical environment remains highly dynamic, and there is wide uncertainty
over its evolution. Recent research, indeed, has questioned whether the
existing system tends to favor the intellectual property industries at the
expense of other economic sectors that contribute to the U.S. econ-
omy.513 As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in a re-
cent report, although piracy and counterfeiting may affect a selected
group of industries, such as the music, movie, software, and game indus-
tries, these industries as well as other economic sectors may obtain offset-
ting benefits:
There are .. .certain instances when IP rights holders in some
industries might experience potentially positive effects from the
knowing consumption of pirated or counterfeit goods. For example,
consumers may use pirated goods to 'sample' music, movies,
software, or electronic games before purchasing legitimate copies,
which may lead to increased sales of legitimate goods. In addition,
industries with products that are characterized by large 'switching
costs,' may also benefit from piracy due to lock-in effects. For exam-
ple, some experts we spoke with and literature we reviewed dis-
cussed how consumers after being introduced to the pirated version
might get locked into new legitimate software because of large
switching costs, such as a steep learning curve, reluctance to switch to
new products, and search costs incurred by consumers to identify a
new product to use.
Some authors have argued that companies that experience revenue
losses in one line of business-such as movies-may also increase reve-
nues in related or complementary businesses due to increased brand
awareness. For instance, companies may experience increased revenues
due to the sales of merchandise that are based on movie characters whose
511. Id. at 100.
512. See Yu, supra note 268, at 34-37 (discussing how the DMCA and the deployment
of digital rights management tools have made it difficult for users and future creators to
exercise legitimate rights under existing copyright law).
513. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY: OBSERVATION ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTER-
FEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 9-15 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10423.
pdf [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
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popularity is enhanced by sales of pirated movies. One expert also ob-
served that some industries may experience an increase in demand for
their products because of piracy in other industries. This expert identi-
fied Internet infrastructure manufacturers (e.g., companies that make
routers) as possible beneficiaries of digital piracy, because of the
bandwidth demands related to the transfer of pirated digital content.
While competitive pressure to keep one step ahead of counterfeiters may
spur innovation in some cases, some of this innovation may be oriented
toward anticounterfeiting and antipiracy efforts, rather than enhancing
the product for consumers. 514
Although the GAO report did not go further, one could question
whether these benefits would indeed cancel out some of the losses suf-
fered by the intellectual property industries, assuming the reported losses
are accurate-and have not been misstated by a factor of three (as re-
vealed in a recent study conducted by the motion picture industry) 515 or
even more (as in the case when the count of seizure of single cigarettes
was confused with figures that count packets of twenty). 516 If the bene-
fits, in fact, outweigh the losses suffered by these industries, the country
arguably would have received a net economic gain. The only questions
then remain: (1) why should intellectual property industries have to subsi-
dize others for those gains? and (2) how should gains and losses be prop-
erly allocated through the legislative process?
Similarly, the Computer and Communications Industry Association
(CCIA) released three reports documenting the gains made by the fair
use industries,517 examples of which include "manufacturers of consumer
devices that allow individual copying of copyrighted programming; edu-
cational institutions; software developers; and Internet search and web
hosting providers. ' '518 Using the methodological guidelines established
514. Id. at 15; see also Fink, supra note 322, at 2 ("[D]ifferent types of [intellectual
property] infringements have different welfare effects, depending on underlying market
failures and market characteristics.").
515. See Mike Nizza, Movie Industry Admits It Overstated Piracy on Campus, THE
LEDE (Jan. 23, 2008, 9:38 AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/movie-indus-
try-admits-it-overstated-piracy-on-campus/ (reporting the MPAA's admission that its sta-
tistics were "wrong by a factor of three" and that the new estimate for illegal movie
downloading committed by college students is now reduced from 44% to 15%).
516. See Li, supra note 321, at 41 n.4 (describing the European Commission's need to
correct misreported figures due to the fact that some figures reflected single cigarettes, as
opposed to the agreed standard of packets of twenty).
517. THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, CAPITAL TRADE, INC., FAIR USE IN
THE U.S. ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE
(2007), available at http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFilesFilename/0000000000
85/FairUseStudy-Sep12.pdf; THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, CAPITAL
TRADE, INC., FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES
RELYING ON FAIR USE (2010) [hereinafter 2010 CCIA STUDY], available at http://www.
ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000354/fair-use-study-fina.pdf;
THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, CAPITAL TRADE, INC., FAIR USE IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (2011),
available at http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000526/
CCIA-FairUseintheUSEconomy-2011.pdf.
518. 2010 CCIA STUDY, supra note 517, at 7.
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by WIPO for surveying the economic contribution of copyright-based in-
dustries, 519 the latest report pointed out that the U.S. fair use industries
generated $4.7 trillion in revenue in 2007 and have "accounted for 23
percent of U.S. real economic growth" from 2002 to 2007.520 This new
report provided a timely update on its pioneering study on the economic
contribution of U.S. fair use industries.52 1
Although one could always question the data supplied by these eco-
nomic surveys, both the GAO and CCIA studies successfully challenged
the many assumptions policymakers have made in developing intellectual
property laws and policies-including the negotiation of ACTA. As
noted in the European Commission's 2008 fact sheet, "The OECD esti-
mates that infringements of intellectual property traded internationally
(excluding domestic production and consumption) account for more than
150 billion per year (higher than the GDP of more than 150 coun-
tries). '522 Although the OECD figures have been included to support
ACTA, they were questioned by Carsten Fink in a paper written before
he joined WIPO:
Close inspection of the methodology applied to arrive at this figure
reveals that it is more an 'educated guess' than a true estimate. Es-
sentially, OECD staff made use of seizure rates across different
product categories and exporting nations to extrapolate what a given
share of IPRs-infringing trade in one individual product category
means for the overall share of trade in counterfeit and pirated goods.
However, the share in the relevant 'fix-point' product categories-
wearing apparel, leather articles, and tobacco products-underlying
the 200 USD billion estimate is not based on any hard data, but
rather reflects the best guess of OECD staff.523
As Dr. Fink noted further regarding industry-supplied figures that the
USTR and other government officials have often used:52 4
Industry associations representing copyright-holders regularly pub-
lish estimates of lost revenues due to piracy. However, such esti-
mates often rely on questionable assumptions about market demand.
For example, BSA ... simply assumes that, in the absence of piracy,
all consumers of pirated software would switch to legitimate copies
at their current prices. This outcome is unrealistic-especially in de-
veloping countries where low incomes would likely imply that many
consumers would not demand any legitimate software at all. Ac-
519. See WIPO, GUIDE ON SURVEYING THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE
COPYRIGHT-BASED INDUSTRIES (2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/
publications/pdf/copyright-pub_893.pdf (laying out the methodological guidelines for sur-
veying the economic contribution of copyright-based industries).
520. 2010 CCIA STUDY, supra note 517, at 8.
521. See id.
522. EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 162, at 5.
523. Fink, supra note 322, at 13.
524. See GAO STUDY, supra note 513, at 16 ("Commerce and FBI officials told us they
rely on industry statistics on counterfeit and pirated goods and do not conduct any original
data gathering to assess the economic impact of counterfeit and pirated goods on the U.S.
economy or domestic industries.").
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cordingly, estimated revenue losses by software producers are bound
to be overestimated. 52 5
Because it is hard to imagine how sales would be lost when consumers
could not afford the products, these figures are more correctly described
as the retail value of pirated or counterfeit goods based on foreign prices
or whatever prices the researchers have set.526 While the figures may still
show the existence of a major problem, they fail to accurately state the
extent of the problem and the existence of other offsetting welfare
benefits.
Finally, there have been widespread calls for greater reforms of the
intellectual property systems in the developed world. In the United
States, for example, commentators have repeatedly questioned the ap-
propriateness, effectiveness, and relevance of the copyright regime since
the early days of Napster. 527 Technology developers, consumer advo-
cates, and academic commentators have also called into question the ex-
pediency and sustainability of the DMCA, 528 which Jessica Litman has
described as "long, internally inconsistent, difficult even for copyright ex-
perts to parse and harder still to explain."5 2 9 Because ACTA has the po-
tential to "cement the DMCA's status at home, making it harder to fix its
user-hostile provisions," 530 commentators are understandably very con-
cerned about the incorporation of the DMCA into the agreement.
As shown in the recent debate about the Google Book Search and web
2.0, many new issues, such as the protection of orphan works, the treat-
ment of user-generated content, and the need to develop publicly accessi-
525. Fink, supra note 322, at 13.
526. As Li Xuan noted:
[Elven the author of the BSA report, John Gantz, Director of Research for
International Data Corporation admitted that perhaps only one out of ten
unauthorized copies might be a loss sale as many users in developing coun-
tries cannot afford software imported from the West. Instead of describing
the USD 29 billion as sales lost to piracy, he suggested that 'I would have
preferred to call it the retail value of pirated software'.
Li, supra note 321, at 25; see also id. (noting that a draft Australian government report
described these statistics "as a 'self-serving hyperbole' [that is] 'unverified and epistemo-
logically unreliable"'); I.P.L. Png, On the Reliability of Software Piracy Statistics, 9 ELEC-
TRONIC COM. RESOL. & APPLICATIONS 365, 365-66 (2010) (contending that the Business
Software Alliance's change of consultant from International Planning and Research Cor-
poration to International Data Corporation led to a change in methodology for measure-
ment of software piracy that, in turn, had systematic effects on published piracy rates).
527. For criticisms of the existing copyright regime, see generally JAMES BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG,
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001);
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREA-
TIVITY (2001). For discussions of the peer-to-peer file-sharing debate, see generally Yu,
supra note 184; Yu, supra note 251.
528. For criticisms of the DMCA, see generally TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT:
COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE (2007); LITMAN, supra note 527, at
122-45; Ian R. Kerr et al., Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright's Windmill,
34 OTrAWA L. REV. 7 (2002); Yu, supra note 268.
529. LITMAN, supra note 527, at 145.
530. Pegoraro, supra note 279.
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ble digital libraries, have also emerged. 531 While lawmakers in different
countries are working hard to address these new issues, it is quite clear
that no international consensus has emerged yet. ACTA, therefore, will
likely short-circuit the policymaking process by forcing its signatories, in-
cluding the United States, to develop a common policy before each coun-
try has the opportunity to explore policy options based on its own needs,
interests, conditions, and priorities as well as information about the fu-
ture development of the technological environment.
Like their concerns about an unbalanced copyright system, commenta-
tors have also widely criticized the existing patent system.532 As John
Thomas explained a few years ago, "[bludgetary limitations, an exploding
filing rate, and the increasing range of patentable subject matter are
among the reasons that U.S. patent quality appears to be on the de-
cline. ' '5 33 Indeed, the problems in the U.S. system are so widespread and
notorious that Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman have called for a
"moratorium on stronger international intellectual property standards" to
prevent the transplant of U.S. problems abroad.534 As they lamented:
[T]he drive to further harmonize the international minimum stan-
dards of patent protection.., has occurred at the very time when the
domestic standards of the United States and the operations of its
patent system are under critical assault .... How, under such cir-
cumstances, could it be timely to harmonize and elevate interna-
tional standards of patent protection-even if that were
demonstrably beneficial-when there is so little agreement in the US
itself on how to rectify a dysfunctional apparatus that often seems
out of control? ... Further harmonization efforts in this climate thus
amount to a gamble from which bad decisions and bad laws are far
more likely to emerge than good laws that appropriately balance
public and private interests.535
Similar concerns were registered across the Atlantic. In the United
Kingdom, for example, the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property was
commissioned to explore possible reforms in the intellectual property
field, including both the copyright and patent areas. 536 The Commission
531. See Yu, supra note 312.
532. For discussions of problems within the U.S. patent system, see generally JAMES
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL
PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.,
2004); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COM-
PETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNO-
VATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004).
533. John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to
Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 728 (2002).
534. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 415, at 36-39.
535. Id. at 24-26.




on Intellectual Property Rights was also formed in the early 2000s to ex-
amine ways to integrate development into the intellectual property sys-
tem.537 Its final report touched on a wide variety of topics, including
intellectual property and development, health, agriculture and genetic re-
sources, traditional knowledge and geographical indications, computer
software and the internet, patent reform, institutional capacity, and the
international architecture. 538
In light of these reform proposals on both sides of the Atlantic, it is
highly ill-advised to lock in current intellectual property standards, espe-
cially when there is no indication that the ACTA-induced reforms would
not roll back some of these protections. It is even worse when these stan-
dards were locked in without giving equal protection to corresponding
safeguards, limitations, and exceptions.
D. FORECLOSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
By locking in the existing high standards, ACTA may foreclose the op-
portunity for Congress to revise laws in the near future-a direct by-
product of the lock-in effects described in the previous section. While
Congress can always ratchet up the intellectual property standards, using
ACTA as the floor, the agreement may prevent Congress from ratcheting
down those standards. As Senator Ron Wyden wrote to the USTR: "I
understand that the office of the USTR has indicated that no agreement
would be made that would require a statutory change to U.S. law. How-
ever, are you also reviewing negotiating proposals to ensure that no
agreement would constrain the ability of the Congress to reform our IP
laws?"' 539 To this question, Ambassador Kirk responded: "We do not
view the ACTA as a vehicle for changing U.S. law. We are also cognizant
of the desire in Congress for flexibility in certain areas, and have worked
to shape relevant U.S. proposals to provide appropriate flexibility. '540
When pressed further about whether ACTA would lock the United
States into the existing DMCA model, the USTR, however, was more
hesitant. As he wrote: "We envision that the provisions of the DMCA
would be relevant to U.S. compliance with future ACTA obligations.
However, we are aware of concerns about retaining flexibility to legislate
in the future in this field, and have written our proposals with those con-
cerns in mind."'541 This response, therefore, reveals clearly the potential
challenges in locking all the ACTA negotiating parties into the current
high standards for intellectual property protection and enforcement while
at the same time retaining flexibility and autonomy to allow each country
to undertake future legislative reform that may lower the protection or
537. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 377, at i.
538. See generally id.
539. Letter from U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden to Ron Kirk, USTR (Jan. 6, 2010), available at
http//keionline.org/sites/default/files/Wyden-Letter-toUSTR-onActa Jan_2010.pdf.
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create additional limitations and exceptions. Countries will always have
flexibility and autonomy to increase protection even with ACTA, but the
agreement, if entered into effect, could take away the flexibility and au-
tonomy to reduce the protection levels.
In fact, this concern is not only limited to ACTA. It has been raised
during the negotiation of other bilateral and regional FAs.542 As Sena-
tors Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter reminded the USTR, "ACTA, if
not drafted with sufficient flexibility, could limit Congress's ability to
make appropriate refinements to intellectual property law in the fu-
ture" 543-an institutional concern raised by the Senators earlier in rela-
tion to the implementation of the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement.
544
Although the United States has actively exported its high protective stan-
dards, many of its existing limitations and exceptions have been ques-
tioned by its trading partners-in part due to different legislative
approaches. While the United States takes the inside-out approach by
drafting legislation broadly with flexible limitations and exceptions, other
countries, such as those in continental Europe, take the opposite route by
introducing narrowly-drafted legislation with clearly-defined limitations
and exceptions. 545
Consider, for example, section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, which
codified the fair use privilege. 546 To determine whether a use is consid-
ered acceptable under the copyright law, American courts will consider
the following four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
542. See Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 359 (criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade
Agreement); Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 953, 961-86
(2011) (critically examining the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and plurilateral trade
agreements).
543. Letter from Senators Leahy and Specter, supra note 168; see also GROSS, supra
note 158, at 8 ("Given the nature of digital technology and the rapid social change it can
create, policymakers need to be free to respond in unanticipated ways to the needs of the
public. But ACTA will not provide local or national policymakers with the freedom or
flexibility to respond and alter the information policy choices set by Hollywood and Basel
via ACTA.").
544. See id.; accord Janice T. Pilch, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 3 (Library
Copyright Alliance, Issue Brief 2009), http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/bm-doc/
issuebriefactafinalrev102609.pdf ("Intellectual property law is dynamic, constantly being
shaped by social and economic needs and technological advances. A rigid plurilateral sys-
tem of enforcement could hinder the flexibility of the U.S., as well as other nations, to
adapt their intellectual property laws to future needs and scenarios."); Katz & Hinze, supra
note 142, at 34 ("[U]sing an international agreement to lock in a particular interpretation
of issues that are in dispute in U.S. courts precludes future policy options by creating for-
eign obligation barriers to domestic legislative reform.").
545. See JOHN CROSS ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 148
(2010).
546. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.547
Although these nonexhaustive factors have since been incorporated into
the Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance, 548 the Singapore Copyright Act,549
and most recently the Israel Copyright Law,550 many countries remain
troubled by the incongruence between the U.S. fair use provision and the
limitations permissible under the three-step test as enunciated in the
Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and the WIPO Internet Trea-
ties.55' In fact, during the TRIPS Council's review of enforcement legis-
lation in 1997, "several trading partners requested clarification of the fair
use doctrine" from the United States. 552
In her article, Ruth Okediji explained in detail why the U.S. fair use
provision would meet the three-step test, and would have been
grandfathered into the TRIPS Agreement in any event.553 However, the
disagreement over the provision suggests the strong likelihood that ex-
isting limitations and exceptions in the U.S. intellectual property system
could be challenged in a multilateral process by the country's trading
partners. By discouraging other countries from introducing new limita-
tions and exceptions, ACTA may therefore make the United States an
"odd country out" within the international community. Eventually, such
an outcome would raise the country's burden to justify its limitations and
exceptions in front of the international community.
Even worse, if other ACTA negotiating parties misinterpret the agree-
ment as a treaty that constricts existing limitations and exceptions, the
treaty may lead to practices that will eventually form part of customary
international law. To be clear, customary international law would not
come into existence unless two conditions are met: (1) when a sufficient
number of countries have made such interpretation and consequently
adopted provisions that follow such an interpretive approach; and (2)
when these countries have expressly and consistently recognized these
provisions as legal norms governing their state conduct. In addition, Con-
gress may override customary norms through legislation. As a key nego-
tiating party, the United States could also push for a clarification or
modification of the treaty language.
Nevertheless, the potential influence of these customary norms on the
domestic legislative and judicial processes and their ability to shape inter-
national discussions are not to be ignored. ACTA could also affect the
country's international obligations by "form[ing] the context for" the in-
547. Id.
548. Copyright Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 528, 22, § 38(3) (H.K.).
549. Copyright Act § 35 (Sing.).
550. Copyright Law § 19 (2007) (Isr.), translated at Orit Fischman Afori, An Open Stan-
dard "Fair Use" Doctrine: A Welcome Israeli Initiative, 30 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 85, 86
(2008).
551. See Berne Convention, supra note 380, art. 9(2); TRIPS Agreement arts. 13; WCT,
supra note 309, art. 10; WPPT, supra note 309, art. 16(2).
552. Okediji, supra note 399, at 115.
553. See id. at 115-23.
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terpretation of treaties that the United States has ratified.554 Because of
the growing overlap between intellectual property and other policy are-
nas, such as international trade, human rights, public health, biological
diversity, food and agriculture, and information and communications,
governments and international organizations have increasingly looked to
these agreements as part of a larger overall framework. 555 In United
States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, for example, the WTO
dispute settlement panel noted the need "to seek contextual guidance...
when developing interpretations that avoid conflicts within this overall
framework, except where these treaties explicitly contain different
obligations.' 556
Although commentators rightly point out that the WIPO Development
Agenda may provide "an important platform for checking the ACTA
proposal against the societal interests to foster sustainable development
and to promote technological innovation and transfer of technology," 557
the power asymmetry in the international system unfortunately may
mean that ACTA could have greater influence in international intellec-
tual property negotiations than pro-development instruments in other
fora. After all, ACTA involves thirty-seven countries that are eager to set
a high benchmark for intellectual property protection and enforcement
outside the WTO and WIPO. Together, these countries "represent about
half of all global trade. '558
Finally, as Anupam Chander reminded us in the context of the anti-
circumvention protection under the U.S. FTAs:
FFA obligations, it must be remembered, generally apply equally to
the United States. Thus, it is possible that the United States could
run afoul of its own FrAs. The FTAs are not term-limited, though
they do permit withdrawal. Should we conclude in the future that
the DMCA anti-circumvention rules are too constricting, we will
have to renegotiate the FTA, flout the FTA, or conform to an uncon-
genial rule. Our FTA partners may often lack the internal economic
incentive to seek to enforce the FTA's strict anti-circumvention
terms (though they may take it as a license to reduce their own anti-
circumvention excess), yet they may seek to enforce the FTA once
554. Ruth Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International) Copy-
right Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 585, 602-04 (2001).
555. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MIcH. ST. L. REV. 1, 13-21 (discussing the increasing com-
plexity of the international intellectual property regime). For a recent symposium on the
growing complexity of the interplay between intellectual property and related policy areas,
see Symposium, The International Intellectual Property Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1.
556. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 6.70, WT/
DS160/R (June 15, 2000).
557. IQsensato, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Global
Policy Implications, IN Focus, June 2, 2008, at 5, available at http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-
content/uploads/InFocus% 20-ACTA% 20- % 2OVol % 202 % 20-Issue% 208.pdf.
558. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement-Fact Sheet (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http:/
/www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/fo/IP-factsheet-fiche.as
px?lang=en (last modified Apr. 1, 2010).
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partnered with interested multinational corporations engaged in
rent-seeking. 559
Professor Chander's observation is equally applicable to the ACTA
context. There is no doubt that the treaty would make it difficult and
costly for its signatories to reduce protection later when it finds excessive
the level of protection under ACTA-either because the built-in safe-
guards have been struck down by the WTO or because the technological
environment has changed to the point that greater limitations and excep-
tions are now needed. Even if the United States is able to convince its
trading partners to adjust the protection in ACTA in the future, the costs
of such adjustments are likely to be quite substantial. The time it takes to
agree on and implement such adjustments might also lead to the loss of
innovative products and services both at home and abroad. If Congress
failed to make the needed adjustments, the consequences could be even
direr.
VI. FEAR #5: A NEW INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
RATCHETING UP PROTECTION
A. A SELF-REINFORCING ARCHITECTURE
As shown in Chapter Five of ACTA, the second-lengthiest part, the
agreement seeks to create a new infrastructure that can be used to facili-
tate the future ratcheting up of international intellectual property protec-
tion. Although this chapter has been ignored by most commentators, 560
it is likely to be the most far-reaching and dangerous of all the chapters in
the agreement.
The ACTA provisions serve the institution-building objective in two
different ways. First, ACTA provides a free-standing, self-reinforcing
agreement that can be incorporated by reference into other international
agreements. Indeed, it will be no surprise if future international agree-
ments include a reference to ACTA, similar to how the TRIPS Agree-
ment incorporates by reference selected provisions of the Paris and
Berne Conventions and the Washington Treaty on the Protection of Intel-
lectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.561 Many U.S. FTAs
already require signatories to ratify the PatentCooperation Treaty 562 and
559. Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 207
(2006).
560. Some of the exceptions are Michael Geist, Toward an ACTA Super-Structure:
How ACTA May Replace WIPO, MICHAEL GEIS-r's BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.
michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4910/125/; Sara Bannerman, WIPO and the ACTA Threat
(Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, American University, Re-
search Paper Series No. 4 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/
research/4/.
561. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 2, 9, 35.
562. See, e.g., Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement art.
15.1.3(a), May 28, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text [hereinafter
CAFTA-DR]; Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.1.2(a),
May 18, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
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the WIPO Internet Treaties.563 Although an earlier discussion paper that
was leaked online, presumably from the United States, included among
other provisions "[s]pecial measures for developing countries in the initial
phase, '564 those provisions do not exist in either the consolidated draft or
the final text.
To be certain, countries are free to join this plurilateral agreement on a
voluntary basis. As the discussion paper described:
In the initial phase, it is important to join a number of interested
trading partners in setting out the parameters for an enforcement
system that will function effectively in today's environment. As a
second phase, other countries will have the option to join the agree-
ment as part of an emerging consensus in favor of a strong IPR en-
forcement standard.565
The optional nature of this two-step process is true only in theory, how-
ever. In reality, "few countries will have the muscle to refuse an 'invita-
tion' to join, '566 especially if the carrot of trade benefits or development
aid is dangling in front of them. As noted in the IP Justice White Paper:
ACTA takes a remarkably imperialistic worldview in that it at-
tempts to regulate global IPR enforcement from the perspective of
the world's wealthiest and to the detriment of the needs of develop-
ing nations and the global public interest. Developing countries are
not permitted to participate in the negotiation of ACTA's terms, al-
though they will be expected to abide by them.
Through trade agreements like ACTA, IPR-exporting countries
are able to impose their favorable policies onto the domestic legisla-
tion of IPR-importing countries. A clear example of neo-colonial-
ism, ACTA will, at best, benefit a few private interests at the expense
of the many.567
Indeed, many of these countries would fear being left out.568 There may
australian-fta/final-text [hereinafter AUSFTA]; Singapore-United States Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.1.2(a)(v), May 6, 2003, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset-upload file708_4036.pdf [hereinafter
SUSFTA]; see also DRAHOS, supra note 27, at 184 (discussing the obligations in the U.S.
FTAs to ratify the Patent Cooperation Treaty).
563. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 562, art. 15.1.2; AUSFTA, supra note 562, art.
17.1.4; SUSFTA, supra note 562, art. 16.1.2(a)(iii)-(iv).
564. Discussion Paper on a Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 1, 4 (2007)
[hereinafter Discussion Paper], available at http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/
ACTA-discussion-paper-l.pdf.
565. Id. at 1.
566. GRoss, supra note 158, at 2.
567. See id. at 8-9; accord IQsensato, supra note 557, at 4 ("What appears as pluri-
lateral in the beginning [referring to ACTA] will quickly become a global standard through
FrAs and EPAs and through political and economic pressure."); Li, supra note 29, at 74
("[I]t has been a pattern for developed countries to promote new international regulations
first on a voluntary basis before transforming them into compulsory regulations.").
568. As Michael Moore, former director-general of the WTO, noted: "Despite all I've
written about the perils of unilateralism and bilateralism, I'd be doing it if I were in gov-
ernment. There's a terrible cost to being left out." Michael Moore, Preferential, Not Free
Trade Deals, GULF NEws, Apr. 23, 2007, quoted in Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Prisoners'
Dilemma and FTAs: Applying Game Theory to Trade Liberalization Strategy, in CHAL-
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also be other tangible benefits (and therefore incentives) for strengthen-
ing intellectual property protection and enforcement, which range from
technical assistance to conference and travel support and from the provi-
sion of latest equipment and technology569 to the ability to make internal
demands for more personnel and a larger institutional budget.570
Second, through the creation of the ACTA Committee 57' and the em-
powerment of this committee to further establish ad hoc committees, 572
ACTA introduces a new architecture that would help facilitate the future
evolution and reinforcement of the agreement. While commentators
have widely focused on the present text, the agreement, once adopted,
will likely continue to evolve following its own revision process. 573 Such
revision would enable countries to develop protections in excess of what
is laid out in the final text.
From the standpoint of the ACTA negotiating parties and intellectual
property rights holders, the development of a self-evolving infrastructure
is highly efficient. It will help strengthen intellectual property protection
without the procedural constraints in existing multilateral processes. By
bringing together like-minded countries, such a process will provide a
more satisfying outcome. By creating a new freestanding forum, coun-
tries could also discuss issues that are likely to face significant resistance
at the multilateral level. To some extent, ACTA provides a "safe space"
for negotiating new enforcement norms and strengthened protections
LENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND RE-
GIONAL AGREEMENTS 21, 31 (Ross Buckley et. al., eds., 2008); see also Lewis, supra, at
21-22 (discussing how the WTO member states "are experiencing a prisoner's dilemma, in
which their dominant strategy is to pursue FTAs even though their payoff would improve
by pursuing a more focused multilateral strategy").
569. See DRAHOS, supra note 27, at 136 (recounting his trip to Laos where the local
patent office was waiting for the arrival of some new personal computers from WIPO); see
also DEERE, supra note 210, at 200 ("The high degree to which IP offices relied on external
support rendered them vulnerable to financial influence from donors. The constant supply
of training, advice, and capacity-building from international donors bolstered the domi-
nance of IP offices in national IP decision-making, and thereby reinforced a compliance-
plus approach to TRIPS implementation.").
570. See ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 16 (2005) ("Side payments provided [in China] by ... foreign
companies and the investigative firms on their behalf can take many forms, including solic-
ited 'case fees,' the allocation of legitimate expenses for enforcement actions, the provision
of banquets and other entertainment for local cadres charged with anticounterfeiting en-
forcement, or even the construction of recreation facilities for individual local government
offices."); Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 30-31 (2000) ("Some local enforcement officials ask for payments, case fees, or
gifts such as mobile phones from trademark owners in exchange for conducting enforce-
ment actions.").
571. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 36. Before the negotiating parties settled on its final
name, they disagreed over how the committee was to be named. While Canada proposed
the establishment of an "oversight committee" (which is also indicated as the "ACTA
Oversight Council" in the general definitions), Mexico preferred the term "steering com-
mittee." See Leaked Draft, supra note 19, art. 5.1.
572. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 36.3(a) (empowering the ACTA Committee to "es-
tablish ad hoc committees or working groups to assist the Committee in carrying out its
responsibilities").
573. See id. arts. 36, 42.
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without reopening the TRIPS Agreement and other international trea-
ties.574 Such a safe space is important to those countries that consider the
TRIPS Agreement inadequate and badly outdated.575 Adopted in 1994
with protection levels locked at those set around 1991, 5 7 6 the TRIPS
Agreement failed to anticipate the latest developments in the digital envi-
ronment 577 as well as the increasingly sophisticated network of piracy and
counterfeiting. 578
From the standpoint of less-developed countries and consumers in de-
veloped countries, however, the absence of constraints can be quite prob-
lematic. After all, many of these constraints-whether procedural or
substantive-are important safeguards that ensure not only the balance
in the international intellectual property system but also congruence be-
tween such protection and local needs, interests, and conditions. By go-
ing outside the multilateral process, ACTA ignores many of the
important safeguards that the negotiators put into the TRIPS Agreement
to promote the public interest 579 and to ensure that the agreement meets
the objectives laid out in Article 7.580
574. Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynam-
ics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 58 (2004) (dis-
cussing how regime shifting helps generate "a 'safe space' in which [governments] analyze
and critique those aspects of [the international agreements] that they find to be
problematic").
575. See, e.g., EU IPR Enforcement Strategy, supra note 11, at 3 ("Violations of intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) continue to increase, having reached, in recent years, industrial
proportions. This happens despite the fact that, by now, most of the WTO members have
adopted legislation implementing minimum standards of IPR enforcement."); TRAINER &
ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 1:1, at 4 (noting that "it has become apparent to some national
governments and regional organizations that the 'aggressive' enforcement provisions of
TRIPS, particularly the border measures, have fallen short of expectations of providing an
effective system of thwarting international movement of infringing goods"); Trainer, supra
note 322, at 47 (discussing the inadequacies of the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement and explaining the need for TRIPS-plus bilateral and regional FfAs in the
area of border enforcement).
576. See Gervais, supra note 395, at 43 ("TRIPS adjusted the level of intellectual prop-
erty protection to what was the highest common denominator among major industrialized
countries as of 1991."); see also id. at 29 ("The 1992 text was not extensively modified and
became the basis for the TRIPS Agreement adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.").
577. See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 923, 933-34 (2008).
578. See McCoy Declaration, supra note 47, at 4 (considering "the growing sophistica-
tion and resources of international counterfeiters" as a new challenge to enforcing intellec-
tual property rights); TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 164, § 6:3, at 618 (stating that
"greater enforcement efforts are needed given the increasing sophistication of counterfeit-
ers and pirates").
579. See Letter from James Love, Knowledge Ecology Int'l, and Gigi Sohn, Public
Knowledge, to U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.keionline.
org/node/684 [hereinafter Letter from James Love et al.] (expressing concern that the un-
disclosed ACTA might not include the safeguards embodied in Articles 1, 6, 7, 8, 40 and
44.2 of the TRIPS Agreement).
580. Article 7 states:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should con-
tribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and eco-
nomic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
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To some extent, ACTA endorses a "pick and choose" approach where
developed country members of the WTO and a few emerging countries
get together to select the best part of the TRIPS Agreement while aban-
doning those provisions they adopted reluctantly out of compromise.
ACTA, in short, is a revision of the TRIPS Agreement without going
through the carefully-designed multilateral amendment process.5 81 It
throws away the many hard-earned bargains less-developed countries
have won through the TRIPS negotiation process.
B. THF ACTA "COUNTRY CLUB"
1. Forum Proliferation
At the macro-level, the "country club" approach58 2 that has been used
to negotiate the agreement has created great resentment among less-de-
veloped countries. Although countries that had been put on the Special
301 Watch List-such as Canada, South Korea, and a few EU member
states-were invited to join the negotiations, 58 3 the four biggest middle-
income developing countries-Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the so-
called BRIC countries)-were all left out. When the ACTA negotiations
began in 2008, Brazil was on the Watch List, like some of the ACTA
negotiating parties. Meanwhile, China, India, and Russia were on the
Priority Watch List.584 Within the G8, Russia is a current member, and
China is a strong candidate for membership if the group expands to form
G9.58 5 The G8 members have also actively engaged Brazil and India
TRIPS Agreement art. 7. See generally Yu, supra note 203 (providing an in-depth discus-
sion of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement).
581. See TRIPS Agreement art. 71.2 (laying out the amendment process).
582. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforce-
ment of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 549, 555 (2009) ("The approach
[used in negotiating ACTA] is neither regional nor truly multilateral; it is a 'club approach'
in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement 'membership' rules and then invite
other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements."); IQsensato, supra note
557, at 4 ("ACTA... constitutes an exclusive club solution developed through questiona-
ble plurilateral processes involving narrow economic interests."); Heba M. Shams, "Club
Multilateralism" and Global Supranationalism: The Case of FA TF, in MULTILATERALISM V
UNILATERALISM: POLICY CHOICES IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY 459 (J.B. Attanasio & J.J. Nor-
ton eds., 2004) (advancing the concept of club multilateralism); Gabriel J. Michael, ACTA,
Fool: Explaining the Irrational Support for a New Institution, IP ENFORCEMENT RESEARCH
DATABASE 4-7 (June 16, 2010, 6:54 PM), http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta-
papers-for-wcl-meeting-june-16-18-2010/Michael-ACTA%2CFool-Explainingthelrrational
ResorttoaNewlnstitution.pdf (discussing how ACTA fits within the category of a "club
standard" laid out by Daniel Drezner). See generally DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS
Is GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 119-48 (2008) (discuss-
ing club standards in relation to the governance of the international financial system).
583. As the USTR explained in a fact sheet: "Some of the ACTA participants are still
working toward important and necessary IPR reforms, which we hope to see completed as
soon as possible. Participation in the ACTA may help these countries to carry out their
goals of enhancing IPR enforcement." USTR, supra note 162, at 3.
584. See USTR, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19-36, 38-39 (2010).
585. See HuGo DOBSON, THE GROUP OF 7/8, at 98 (2007) (discussing China's potential
to become a G9 member).
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through the Heiligendamm Process.586
In addition to these four major developing countries that are omitted
from the negotiations, virtually all of the ACTA negotiating parties are
from the OECD. Out of the thirty-nine countries that have been in-
volved thus far, the non-OECD participants include only Jordan, Mexico,
Morocco, Singapore (which is rather developed), the United Arab Emir-
ates, and non-OECD members of the European Union. Jordan and the
United Arab Emirates left the negotiations after the first round.587
Meanwhile, Mexico and Morocco, which stayed behind despite their less-
developed economic conditions, were rewarded handsomely with the
chance to host the fifth and seventh negotiating rounds.588
To some extent, the effort to create ACTA resembles the earlier effort
to shift the intellectual property standard-setting forum from WIPO to
GAT/WTO.589 Such a shift plays into what commentators have widely
described as "forum proliferation, '590 "forum shifting, '5 91 or "multiple
forum capture. ' 592 As Susan Sell noted, ACTA "would create an addi-
tional international intellectual property governance layer atop an al-
ready remarkably complex and increasingly incoherent intellectual
property regime. ' 593 More importantly, this agreement would lead to
what Kal Raustiala has described as "strategic inconsistencies," which
"occur[ ] when actors deliberately seek to create inconsistency via a new
rule crafted in another forum in an effort to alter or put pressure on an
586. The Heiligendamm Process institutionalized a high-level dialogue between G8 and
five highly important emerging economies-Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South
Africa.
587. An article in Inside U.S. Trade suggested that Uruguay might have also been in-
volved in the pre-negotiation discussions. EU ACTA Negotiator Confirms EU Wants Pat-
ent Provisions in ACTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 8, 2009, at 11.
588. Charles McManis suggested that these two countries may have additional reasons
to join ACTA:
[E]ach border on one of the world's two largest economic markets, and have
become conduits for smuggling of all sorts from less developed parts of the
world, with all of the attendant adverse consequences thereof, and thus
might have their own autonomous reasons for wanting to combat interna-
tional trade in counterfeit and pirated goods.
Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two
Tales of a Treaty, 46 Hous. L. REV. 1235, 1245-46 (2009) (footnote omitted).
589. See Yu, supra note 144, at 357-66.
590. See generally CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OR-
GANIZATION: RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 66 (2007) (discussing forum
proliferation).
591. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULA-
TION 564-71 (2000) (discussing the use of forum shifting); Heifer, supra note 574 (discuss-
ing the use of regime shifting).
592. Viviana Mufioz Tellez, The Changing Global Governance of Intellectual Property
Enforcement: A New Challenge for Developing Countries, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 3, 9.
593. Sell, supra note 158, at 9; Shaw, supra note 292, at 3 ("Instead of merely shifting
the debate from one forum to another, the ACTA supporters.., seek to create an entirely
new layer of global governance."). For discussions of the enforcement agenda in various
international fora, see generally MA-TrHEWS, supra note 87; Biadgleng & Mufloz Tellez,




In so doing, ACTA would successfully "pave the way for future rule or
regime changes. '595 For example, the agreement is inconsistent with
Recommendation 45 of the adopted WIPO Development Agenda, which
calls for the WIPO "[t]o approach intellectual property enforcement in
the context of broader societal interests and especially development-ori-
ented concerns. '596 The negotiation process behind ACTA is also incon-
sistent with the intention of the World Summit on Information Society,
and later the Internet Governance Forum, to promote a "multilateral,
multi-stakeholder, democratic and transparent" policy dialogue on in-
ternet governance.5 97
Even worse, despite the negotiating parties' lip service to the Doha
Declaration,598 ACTA, under close inspection, threatens the much-
needed access to essential medicines in less-developed countries. As it
stands, the agreement is somewhat inconsistent with the Doha Declara-
tion599 and the proposed Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.6° ° It is
therefore no surprise that civil society organizations, like Essential Ac-
tion, Knowledge Ecology International, Oxfam, and M~decins Sans
Frontihres, have all expressed grave concern about the agreement's im-
pact on access to essential medicines in less-developed countries. 60 1
2. Coalition of the Willing
While the above forum-manipulative activities have raised important
questions about the impact of ACTA on the growing fragmentation of the
594. Kal Raustiala, Density & Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40
U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1021, 1027-28 (2007); see also Helfer, supra note 574, at 1027 (discuss-
ing the legal inconsistencies generated by the development of counter-regime norms).
595. Yu, supra note 555, at 17.
596. 45 Adopted Recommendations, supra note 116, recommendation 45.
597. World Summit on the Information Society, Nov. 16-18, 2005, Tunis Agenda for the
Information Society, 72-73, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6revl.html; see also Monika Ermert, Internet
Governance Forum: ACTA a Possible Show-Stopper for IP Progress, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, Dec. 14, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/12/14/internet-governance-fo-
rum-acta-a-possible-show-stopper-for-ip-progress/ (stating that ACTA indicates "a pattern
of behaviour of some governments which openly defend multi-stakeholderism, democracy
and inclusion, but prefer to follow restricted, behind-doors, exclusive arrangements to ne-
gotiate new legal instruments" (quoting Everton Lucero, a Brazilian diplomat)).
598. See USTR, supra note 180, at 2 (stating that ACTA "will respect the Declaration
on TRIPS and Public Health").
599. See KAMPERMAN SANDERS ET AL., supra note 261, at 66 ("In the international
arena, especially with respect to access to medicines, ACTA itself is not incompatible with
EU member states obligations under or support for the Doha Declaration .... However,
the manner in which member states implement the ACTA may pose problems.").
600. TRIPS Amendment, supra note 82.
601. See, e.g., Letter from James Love et al., supra note 579; Essential Action Com-
ment, supra note 156; Secret Plans to Criminalize Generic Medicines Could Hurt Poor
Countries and People, OXFAM (July 15, 2009), http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/press
release/2009-07-15/criminalize-generic-medicines-hurt-poor-countries; Emi McLean,
M~decins Sans Frontihres, Remarks at the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue Meeting on
"ACTA and Consumers," U.S. Department of Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 28,
2010).
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international system,602 the "country club" approach adopted by ACTA
negotiators raises additional issues.
From the standpoint of the negotiating parties, the "country club" ap-
proach is important because it will lead to the development of a "coali-
tion of the willing."' 6° 3 Because of the members' like-mindedness, the
rules developed from this coalition will not be watered down to meet the
lowest common denominator of less-developed countries, which is often
found in multilateral negotiations. 60 4 As Eric Smith of the International
Intellectual Property Alliance noted: "The ACTA's objective should be
an ambitious agreement that addresses today's challenges, including
strengthened legal regimes and strengthened and effective copyright en-
forcement in both the hard goods and online environments. ' 60 5 Indeed,
by crafting what the negotiating parties now call a "state-of-the-art agree-
ment, '606 the rules may set an example for other countries that aspire to
strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement (or to earn
the privilege to become a country club member).60 7
However, such an approach has also raised serious questions about
self-selection and legitimacy. To some extent, these questions resemble
those confronting the now-failed Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment,60 8 which began in the OECD with the hope of being extended to
other non-OECD countries.609 There are also strong resemblances to
602. See generally Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes:
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595,
596-600 (2007) (discussing growing "proliferation of international regulatory institutions
with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries"); Yu, supra note 555, at 13-21
(discussing development of "international intellectual property regime complex").
603. Nate Anderson, Your Life Will Some Day End; ACTA Will Live on, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 19, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/03/your-life-will-
some-day-end-acta-will-live-on.ars.
604. See Yu, supra note 144, at 394-95 (discussing the differences between bilateral and
multilateral agreements).
605. Letter from Eric H. Smith, International Intellectual Property Alliance, to Rachel
Bae, Director for Intellectual Property & Innovation, USTR (Mar. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPAACTAlettertoUSTRfina03212008.pdf.
606. Press Release, USTR, The Office of U.S. Trade Representative Releases Summary
of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) Negotiations (Apr. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Document Library/Press-Releases/2009/April/The-Office-of_
US.TradeRepresentative ReleasesSummary_ooLAnti-CounterfeitingjTradeAgreement
_(ACTA)_Negotiations.html (stating that ACTA is "a new, state-of-the art agreement to
combat counterfeiting and piracy").
607. See Nate Anderson, EU Wants New International Agreement Targeted at Pirates,
Counterfeiters, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 23, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/10/
no-wipo-for-us-eu-us-japan-to-beef-up-intellectual-property-rights-with-agreement.ars.
608. For discussions of the origin and failure of the OECD-driven Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment, see generally Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34 tNT'L LAW. 1033 (2000); James Salzman,
Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 804-31 (2000).
609. As Professor Salzman noted:
The OECD is, first and foremost, an exclusive club whose members produce
two-thirds of the world's goods and services. The OECD provides a closed
setting for wealthy industrialized governments to share experiences, identify
issues of common concern, and coordinate domestic and international poli-
cies. In simple terms, the OECD's various standing intergovernmental com-
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such G8 initiatives610 as the Financial Action Task Force that was created
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.611
In addition, by developing intellectual property protection outside the
traditional fora, like WIPO and the WTO, the negotiation of ACTA un-
dermined the stability of the international trading system and the prefer-
ence for the multilateral process. 612 It also alienated the trading partners
of the ACTA negotiating parties, making it more difficult to undertake
future multilateral discussions.
To some extent, it reminds us of a major shortcoming of the unilateral
approach embodied in the Section 301 process. As Helen Milner wrote
two decades ago of Special 301 and Super 301:
Aggressive, bilateral reciprocity violates central tenets of the postwar
international trading system. GATT upholds the principles of multi-
lateralism, nondiscrimination, and neutral dispute settlement ....
Violations of international law by leading powers will induce other
states to violate those laws as respect for them declines. Disregard-
ing GATT norms will bring the entire system into question and may
lead to its breakdown, as U.S. actions did to the Bretton Woods
monetary regime in the early 1970s. Since GATT has helped provide
a stable, prosperous trading environment for forty years, ending it
should not be done lightly. Moving from a system of multilateral
negotiation and dispute settlement to a bilateral one will increase the
costs of negotiating trade liberalization and will greatly politicize the
process. Undermining the GATT system in exchange for marginal
improvements in the U.S. trade balance does not seem to be a ra-
mittees serve as useful talking shops for countries to share experiences and
learn from one another's successes and challenges.
Salzman, supra note 608, at 776 (footnote omitted).
610. Commentators have been widely divided about the desirability of the G8 forum.
Michael Hodges, for example, has noted that G8 "is useful as a closed international club of
capitalist governments trying to raise consciousness, set an agenda, create networks, prod
other institutions to do things that they should be doing, and, in some cases, to help create
institutions that are suited to a particular task." Michael R. Hodges, The G8 and the New
Political Economy, in THE G8's ROLE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 69, 69 (Michael R.
Hodges et al. eds., 1999), quoted in DOBSON, supra note 585, at xv. By contrast, others
hold the perception that G8 "is little more than a cabal-an unelected and self-appointed
gathering constructed to further a narrow set of economic and political interests." Thomas
G. Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson, Foreword to DOBSON, supra note 585, at ix, x.
611. Information about the Financial Action Task Force is available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en 32250379_322357201 111 ,00.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
For criticisms of the supranational governance structure of this taskforce and its operations
vis-A-vis non-members, see generally Shams, supra note 582.
612. See Jeffery Atik, ACTA and the Destabilization of TRIPS, in SUSTAINABLE TECH-
NOLOGY TRANSFER (Hans Henrik Lidgard et al. eds., forthcoming 2011), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1856285 ("ACTA is a critique of TRIPS-its very core signals a diagno-
sis that TRIPS inadequately addressed the problem of IP enforcement."); Catherine Saez,
ACTA a Sign of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO Head Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-
weakness-in-multilateral-system-wipo-head-says/ (reporting the concern of WIPO Director
General Francis Gurry that countries are "taking matters into their own hands to seek
solutions outside of the multilateral system to the detriment of inclusiveness of the present
system").
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tional strategy.613
Likewise, Assafa Endeshaw expressed concern within the TRIPS context:
[The] United States approach will work towards overthrowing any
measure of success that the United States has achieved in placing
intellectual property on an arguably 'international' pedestal (the
TRIPs) after passing through long periods of bilateral arrangements.
Consequently, the quiet overhaul that the international IP system
has been subjected to through the TRIPS may now be in danger of
collapse by the American insistence that it will interpret IP treaties
and take any measures it deems appropriate, unilaterally and from
its own national perspective. Each move of the United States to take
IP matters throughout the world in its own hands will increasingly
reduce the global significance of the TRIPs formula to a national
system that has been outdated for quite some time.614
Although both Professors Milner and Assafa made their observations
on the ill-advised Section 301 sanctions, which have been found to be
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement if taken before all remedies per-
missible under the WTO rules have been exhausted, these observations
are highly relevant to the discussion of ACTA today and remind us of the
high costs of the "pick and choose" approach. It took the European
Union, Japan, and the United States a tremendous amount of time, effort,
and energy to create the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement.615 Such crea-
tion entailed a considerable amount of coordination, negotiation, and
compromise between and among developed and less-developed coun-
tries. 616 Although the WTO remains far from satisfactory, and the
TRIPS Agreement has yet to provide up-to-date protection to meet the
needs of many developed countries and their intellectual property rights
holders, the costs of undermining such a well-built system is not to be
ignored.
613. Helen Milner, The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super
301 Provision, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 163, 177 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990); see
also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLI-
ANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 100 (1995) ("The central lessons
the drafters [of GATT] took from interwar history was that unilateral action on trade ques-
tions and disputes led ultimately to the collapse of the international trading system.");
Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 297 (1991) (arguing that the bilateral trade-based
approach "run[s] counter to U.S. long-term interests for a healthy, stable trade environ-
ment" and "tend[s] to fragment the world trading system ... [by creating] resentment,
particularly among Third World countries who view imposed bilateral agreements as a spe-
cies of colonialism").
614. Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on Intellectual
Property, 6 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 295, 337-38 (1996); see also A. Samuel Oddi, The Inter-
national Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J.
831, 874 (arguing that the United States' unilateral actions and its approach toward protec-
tion of patents and mask works have "raised a significant question of its continued commit-
ment to the principle of national treatment").




To be certain, the European Union and the United States have com-
plained about the unwillingness of less-developed countries to play
ball.617 As stated in Part I.B, the former has tried hard to advance discus-
sion of enforcement issues at both the TRIPS Council and the ACE, at
least in the image of its own laws. 618 The frustrations of these countries
and their government officials are understandable. However, if countries
always negotiate outside the forum when others refuse to play ball, the
international trading system is unlikely to be developed the way it is to-
day. In fact, the system owes much of its success to those great statesmen
who work hard to create a diplomatic dialogue and to strike compromises
among the parties. Diplomacy and statesmanship, after all, are as impor-
tant as, if not more important than, bargaining.
It is also ironic that developed countries are now complaining about
WIPO's limited ability to set international intellectual property enforce-
ment norms when they are the ones who pushed such norm-setting dis-
cussions away from this particular organization to the GATT/WTO in the
mid-1980s. 619 To those who are familiar with the TRIPS negotiating his-
tory, the developed countries' criticism of WIPO for its failure to take on
a bigger role in enforcement seems rather disingenuous.
Moreover, by creating a new forum for intellectual property enforce-
ment, ACTA would take away the opportunity to strengthen enforcement
norms in the current regimes-whether under the WTO or WIPO. In
fact, the creation of multiple fora with overlapping jurisdictions has cre-
ated serious challenges for national governments. As Kimberlee
Weatherall reminded us:
There is a risk of confusion and fragmentation in this process, partic-
ularly, one would think, for government departments and enforce-
ment bodies subject to multiple overlapping requirements found in
multiple overlapping agreements. In a context where we want gov-
ernment to be more efficient, subjecting them to multiple sources of
regulation is not likely to lead to happy results. What would we
rather government be doing-actually encouraging innovation, or
box ticking on their customs processes to check compliance with the
multiple different obligations in different treaties? What should
money be spent on-grants for artists or yet forms and bodies and
meetings about counterfeiting? 620
It is important to remember, given the limited resources, not every coun-
try will have the ability to undertake discussions in multiple fora. The
more fora there are, the more difficult it will be for less-developed coun-




619. See Yu, supra note 144, at 357-66.
620. Weatherall, supra note 224, at 4.
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Finally, the "country club" approach that was developed to facilitate
the creation of an agreement among like-minded countries would raise a
new set of issues. To begin with, such an approach is not unheard of at
the international level. For example, like-minded countries have joined
together to form coalitions. A lot of times, such coalitions are formed at
the regional level, such as the African Group, ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Forum), the Andean Community, CARICOM (Caribbean Community),
CARIFORUM (Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific
States), COMESA (Common Market for East and Southern Africa),
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), the European
Union, GRULAC (Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries),
the Gulf Cooperation Council, and MERCOSUR or MERCOSUL
(Southern Cone Common Market). At other times, however, such coali-
tions are formed based on mutual interests, such as the Group of N (G8,
G9, G10, G20, G24, G48, and G77), the Friends of X (Friends of Devel-
opment, Friends of Fish, Friends of Geographical Indications, and Friends
of Services), the Caf6 au Lait Group, the CAIRNS Group, the Like-
Minded Group, the Group of Small and Vulnerable Economies, NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and OPEC (Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries).
Coalition-building strategies are not bad per se.621 By bringing to-
gether countries, especially those in the less-developed world, coalitions
can achieve leverage that does not exist for each less-developed country
on its own. If used strategically, coalitions will enable countries to shape
the negotiating agenda, articulate more coherent positions, or establish a
united negotiating front. The coalitions will also help less-powerful coun-
tries establish a louder voice in the international debates on public health,
intellectual property, and international trade. They will even help them
combat the external pressure each country will face on a one-to-one ba-
sis. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, there is a strong need for less-
developed countries and sympathetic policymakers, NGOs, academics,
and media in developed countries to join together to establish what I
called "IPC4D"-an acronym for "intellectual property coalitions for
development." 622
Nevertheless, given the ability by key ACTA negotiating parties to go it
alone-for example, through the Section 301 process-and the fact that
they are strong enough even without building coalitions, it remains highly
621. See Sisule F. Musungu et al., Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health Protec-
tion Through South-South Regional Frameworks (S. Ctr. South Perspectives, Apr. 2004),
available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=72
&Itemid=67 (advocating a regional approach to using TRIPS flexibilities in the public
health area); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34
AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 358-70 (2008) (discussing the need for and benefits of coalition
building among the BRICS countries).
622. See generally Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for Develop-
ment, in IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 79 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009)
(discussing the establishment of "intellectual property coalitions for development").
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troubling that they now seek to undermine the multilateral process
through the creation of a new and untested alternative forum in the form
of ACTA. To some extent, this forum reflects the ill-advised "can do,
won't do" mentality laid out by the Second Bush Administration. As
then-USTR Robert Zoellick wrote in the Financial Times, the United
States will separate the "can do" countries from the "won't do," and it
"will move towards free trade with [only] can-do countries. '62 3 Such an
approach has led to the proliferation of bilateral and regional FTAs, such
as those with Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain,
Oman, Peru, Colombia, South Korea, Panama, and the Central
America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFITA-DR).624
Although intellectual property protection remains a key national inter-
est of the United States-regardless of whether the administration is Re-
publican or Democrat-it remains troubling that the current
administration would continue the "can do, won't do" mentality laid out
by the previous administration. Such continuation is particularly troub-
ling when the present administration has worked so hard to mend its rela-
tionship with its trading partners and restore the credibility and integrity
of the multilateral regulatory system.
At the multilateral level, ACTA may also threaten WIPO, 62 5 an organi-
zation that has recently been rejuvenated by a number of important ini-
tiatives and the establishment of the new Development Agenda. 626 As
Professor Geist pointed out:
ACTA is far more than a simple trade agreement. Rather, it envi-
sions the establishment of a super-structure that replicates many of
the responsibilities currently assumed by the World Intellectual
Property Organization. Given the public acknowledgement by nego-
tiating countries that ACTA is a direct response to perceived
gridlock at WIPO, some might wonder whether ACTA is ultimately
designed to replace WIPO as the primary source of international IP
law and policy making.627
Likewise, the Wellington Declaration, which was drafted by the partici-
pants of the PublicACTA Conference in New Zealand, proclaimed:
We note that the World Intellectual Property Organisation has pub-
lic, inclusive and transparent processes for negotiating multilateral
agreements on (and a committee dedicated to the enforcement of)
copyright, trademark and patent rights, and thus we affirm that
WIPO is a preferable forum for the negotiation of substantive provi-
sions affecting these matters. 628
623. Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-do Countries, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
624. See Yu, supra note 144, at 392-400 (discussing the growing use of bilateral, pluri-
lateral, and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual property standards).
625. See Geist, supra note 560.
626. See MAY, supra note 590, at 104; Yu, supra note 29, at 521.
627. Geist, supra note 560.
628. Wellington Declaration (Apr. 10, 2010), available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/
PO1004/S00107.htm.
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The points raised by Professor Geist and the Wellington Declaration are
interesting. To a great extent, they show how much the public perception
of WIPO has changed. Only a few years ago, commentators widely criti-
cized the organization for being captured by rights holders and having too
narrow an interpretation of its own mandate.
62 9
VII. FEAR #6: CREATION OF AN INEFFECTIVE,
SUPERFLUOUS TREATY
Despite ACTA's new provisions, heightened standards, and its rather
unpleasant potential side effects, there is no guarantee that the agree-
ment would provide rights holders with meaningful protection of intellec-
tual property rights. It is important to remember that the United States,
with strong support from Levi Strauss, pushed unsuccessfully for the de-
velopment of a new anti-counterfeiting code toward the end of the Tokyo
Round of Trade Negotiations (Tokyo Round). 630 To some extent, the
current negotiations represent the continuation of this early failed
attempt.
Although the United States' proposal for this new code was introduced
too late in the Tokyo Round to lead to a new intellectual property agree-
ment within the GATT framework,63 1 the TRIPS Agreement did, for the
first time, include comprehensive multilateral norms on the enforcement
of intellectual property rights.632 Articles 41 to 61, for example, spell out
629. See, e.g., MAY, supra note 590, at 4 ("At the center of the Development Agenda is
a critique of the WIPO that suggests it represents a narrowly focused set of political eco-
nomic interests that seek to expand the realm of commodified knowledge and information
for their own commercial advantage."); Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilat-
eral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organisation
(WIPO) 4 (Quaker United Nations Office, TRIPS Issues Paper No. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-
English.pdf ("There are perceptions that the Bureau is acting not as the servant of the
whole international community but as an institution with its own agenda. That agenda
seems more closely attuned to the interests and demands of some Member States than to
others, and more to pro-strong intellectual property protection interest groups and practi-
tioner associations, which are ostensibly observers but sometimes behave and are treated
like Member States, than to the interest of developing countries."); Maskus & Reichman,
supra note 415, at 18 (criticizing WIPO for "interpret[ing] its legislative mandate as one of
progressively elevating intellectual property rights throughout the world").
630. The draft code was circulated in 1982 as the draft Agreement on Measures to Dis-
courage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods (document L/5382). See Negotiating Grp.
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods, Meeting of 25 March 1987: Note by the Secretariat, 15, MTN.GNG/NG11/1 (Apr.
10, 1987).
631. For brief discussions of the push for an anti-counterfeiting code during the Tokyo
Round, see generally DUNCAN MATIHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 9 (2002); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC
LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 40-41 (2003).
632. See GERVAIS, supra note 201, at 440 (stating that the TRIPS Agreement "is a first
true multilateral instrument on domestic enforcement of intellectual property rights");
Correa, supra note 321, at 27, 34 ("The TRIPS Agreement is the first international treaty
on IPRs that has included specific norms on the enforcement of IPRs." (footnote omit-
ted)); Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 403 (1996) ("[The enforcement] rules constitute the first
time in any area of international law that such rules on domestic enforcement procedures
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important standards for intellectual property enforcement. It is under
Article 59 (and by extension Article 46) that the United States success-
fully challenged the Chinese customs regulations, 633 which failed to result
in the proper disposal of confiscated infringing products outside the chan-
nels of commerce. 634
Nevertheless, because the international enforcement provisions re-
present the first time intellectual property enforcement norms are being
included at the multilateral level, they are rather primitive, and their ef-
fectiveness and clarity can hardly be compared to those of similar provi-
sions in the Paris and Berne Conventions, many of which have existed for
more than a century. As Jerome Reichman and David Lange noted, the
enforcement procedures "on closer inspection appear to constitute a set
of truly minimum standards of due process on which future legislation
will have to build. '635 To some extent, the major strength of the TRIPS
Agreement 636-that is, the provision of enforcement at the multilateral
and remedies have been negotiated."); Yu, supra note 144, at 366 ("Part III of the TRIPS
Agreement delineated international standards for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights for the first time, including civil, administrative, and criminal procedures and reme-
dies and measures related to border control.").
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the pre-TRIPS international intellectual property
conventions contain some isolated enforcement provisions. As Professor Correa noted in
the UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource Book on the TRIPS Agreement:
[T]he Paris Convention includes Article 9 (seizure upon importation of
goods bearing infringing trademarks and trade names), Article 10 (false des-
ignation of source or geographic origin), Article lObis (protection against un-
fair competition), and Article l0ter (general requirement for "appropriate
legal remedies effectively to repress" acts prohibited under Articles 9, 10,
and lObis).
The Berne Convention also contains some provisions on enforcement (Ar-
ticles 13(3) and 15), while they are absent in other important treaties such as
the Rome Convention, the Geneva Phonograms Convention, the Universal
Copyright Protection and the Washington Treaty.
UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 334, at 629-30.
633. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 46, 59.
634. See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, Annex B-4, 7.193-.395, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009).
635. J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The
Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 34 (1998).
636. See Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, T 8.97, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) ("The inclusion of this Part on enforcement in
the TRIPS Agreement was one of the major accomplishments of the Uruguay Round ne-
gotiations as it expanded the scope of enforcement aspect of intellectual property rights.
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, provisions related to enforcement were limited to general
obligations to provide legal remedies and seizure of infringing goods."); GERVAIS, supra
note 201, at 440 ("The enforcement section of the TRIPS Agreement is clearly one of the
major achievements of the negotiation."); UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 334, at 629 ("The
introduction of a detailed set of enforcement rules as part of TRIPS has been ... one of the
major innovations of this Agreement."); William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement
System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INr'L ECON. L. 17, 32 (2005) ("Dispute settlement is one
of the great successes of the WTO."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997) (noting that the two achievements of the Uruguay Round are,
as the title suggests, "Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together"); Okediji, supra
note 399, at 149-50 ("One of the most celebrated accomplishments of the WTO system is
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level-is, oxymoronically, also its major weakness. It is no wonder that
Professors Reichman and Lange have described Part III of the TRIPS
Agreement as its "Achilles' heel. '637
Even more problematic, because the TRIPS negotiators focused prima-
rily on the comparatively easy task of negotiation or standard-setting, the
WTO members now have to address the much more difficult tasks of
both implementation and enforcement. As Professor Okediji noted:
Having accomplished the primary goal of binding developing coun-
tries to high standards of intellectual property protection, developed
countries must now deal with the costs of "winning" the first stage
game. These include constraints on sovereign discretion in the area
of policy development, and battles over extant policy differences be-
tween the member states. 638
Because the development of protection under the TRIPS Agreement is a
multistage game that involves negotiation, implementation, and enforce-
ment, the strategies employed to complete the first-stage game in the late
1980s and early 1990s-effective as they might have been-have now left
developed countries with a much harder game to play-both among
themselves and vis-a-vis less-developed countries.
Given the limited effectiveness of the TRIPS Agreement in setting in-
ternational intellectual property enforcement norms, one, therefore, logi-
cally would question whether ACTA will, in fact, do a much better job.
The answer, unfortunately, is mostly negative.
First, like the TRIPS Agreement, ACTA focuses so much on creating
new standards for intellectual property protection that it has largely for-
gotten its original mission, or its initially publicly announced mission 639-
the dispute resolution mechanism which adds legitimacy to the overall design of the new
trading system." (footnote omitted)).
637. Reichman & Lange, supra note 635, at 34-40 (explaining why the enforcement
provision are the "Achilles' heel of the TRIPS Agreement"); accord Yu, supra note 33, at
483-504 (explaining why the TRIPS Agreement fails to provide effective global enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights). As Professors Reichman and Lange observed
further:
[T]he enforcement provisions are crafted as broad legal standards, rather
than as narrow rules, and their inherent ambiguity will make it harder for
mediators or dispute-settlement panels to pin down clear-cut violations of
international law .... [W]e predict that the level of enforcement under the
TRIPS Agreement will greatly disappoint rightsholders in the developed
countries, and that recourse to coercive measures will not appreciably im-
prove the situation in the short and medium terms.
Reichman & Lange, supra note 635, at 35, 39.
638. Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the
TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 823 (2003).
639. As Professor Geist pointed out, "according to a document [he] recently obtained
under the Access to Information Act, Canadian Heritage officials [initially] referred to
[ACTA] as a Trade Agreement on Copyright Infringement." Michael Geist, DFAIT
Launches Consultation on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade, MICHAEL GEIST's BLOG (Apr. 6,
2008), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/2815/125/. While counterfeiting no doubt
refers to trademarked products, copyright infringement is technically in the piracy realm.
By calling the agreement ACTA, as compared to Anti-Piracy Trade Agreement (or
APTA), the treaty's proponents sought to frame the negotiations in a way that would help
earn support from both policymakers and the public at large. After all, as one commenta-
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that is, to target commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy while pro-
moting public health and safety. As the U.S. administration stated during
the negotiations, "ACTA would focus on border measures and enforce-
ment practices, rather than creating new regulation standards. '640 As the
final text reveals, however, the agreement has veered off its original path.
Instead of focusing on setting enforcement norms for a narrow category
of intellectual property violations-such as counterfeiting and piracy-
ACTA now has the potential of covering virtually every category of intel-
lectual property rights, in part to meet the European Union's expectation
that all intellectual property rights are treated as equal.641
Article 5(h) of ACTA now provides: "[I]intellectual property refers to
all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1
through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement. '642 In addition to copy-
rights and trademarks, these categories include geographical indications,
industrial designs, patents, plant variety protection, layout designs of inte-
grated circuits, and the protection for undisclosed information-and per-
haps utility models, trade names, and other forms of unfair competition,
as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by reference to the Paris
Convention. 643
Even worse, while ACTA was initially created with an arguably lauda-
ble goal of targeting criminal counterfeiters, it has now been captured by
intellectual property industries to target ordinary consumers. In its cur-
rent form, ACTA is as much "a regime for global Internet regulation" as
tor noted: "It is hard to argue against increased enforcement against terrorist financing and
deadly drugs. It is significantly easier, however, to argue that teenagers downloading music
should not be subject to similarly increased sanctions." Kaminski, supra note 161, at 250.
Footnote 14 of the TRIPS Agreement made explicit the distinction between "counterfeit
trademark goods" and "pirated copyright goods":
(a) "counterfeit trademark goods" shall mean any goods, including packag-
ing, bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the
trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be
distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which
thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under
the law of the country of importation;
(b) "pirated copyright goods" shall mean any goods which are copies made
without the consent of the right holder or person duly authorized by the right
holder in the country of production and which are made directly or indirectly
from an article where the making of that copy would have constituted an
infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of the country of
importation.
TRIPS Agreement art. 51 n.14. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the European Union,
through the 2003 EU Border Control Regulation, has broadened the scope of these defini-
tions. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, Concerning Customs Actions Against Goods
Suspected of Infringing Certain Intellectual Property Rights, art. 2(1), 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7;
see also Kevin Outterson & Ryan Smith, Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, the Bad and the
Ugly, 16 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 525, 531 (2006) (lamenting how the pharmaceutical indus-
try has defined "counterfeit" drugs broadly to include not only fake or counterfeit products
but also "safe and effective drugs from Canada").
640. Condon, supra note 264.
641. See Ermert, supra note 296 (noting the European Union's all-inclusive position).
642. ACTA, supra note 5, art. 5(h).
643. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property arts. 8, l0bis, 11,
Mar. 20, 1883, revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
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it is an international intellectual property agreement.644 Disturbingly, the
ACTA negotiating parties insisted through the negotiations that the
agreement "does not focus on private, non-commercial activities of indi-
viduals, nor will it result in the monitoring of individuals or intrude in
their private sphere. ' 645 Without the usual hair-splitting nuances, this
statement seems to be rather incompatible with the final text. If the par-
ties were telling the truth, the agreement was indeed so badly drafted that
it did not even reflect the intent of its negotiators.
Second, like the TRIPS Agreement, ACTA fails to target the crux of
the enforcement problems. It largely ignores the need to create what I
have described as an "enabling environment for effective intellectual
property protection. '646 Many of the key preconditions for successful in-
tellectual property law reforms are not found in the TRIPS Agreement or
the TRIPS-plus bilateral and regional trade agreements. Nor are the re-
forms directly related to intellectual property protection. Examples of
these preconditions include a consciousness of legal rights, a respect for
the rule of law, an effective and independent judiciary, a well-functioning
innovation and competition system, a sufficiently developed basic infra-
structure, a critical mass of local stakeholders, and established business
practices.
As Robert Sherwood reminded us in an aptly titled article, Some
Things Cannot Be Legislated, "until judicial systems in developing and
transition countries are upgraded, it will matter little what intellectual
property laws and treaties provide. '647 Likewise, Keith Maskus, Sean
Dougherty, and Andrew Mertha wrote:
Upgrading protection for IPRs alone is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the purpose [of maximizing the competitive gains from
additional innovation and technology acquisition over time, with par-
ticular emphasis on raising innovative activity by domestic entrepre-
neurs and enterprises]. Rather, the system needs to be strengthened
within a comprehensive and coherent set of policy initiatives that op-
timize the effectiveness of IPRs. Among such initiatives are further
structural reform of enterprises, trade and investment liberalization,
promotion of financial and innovation systems to commercialize new
technologies, expansion of educational opportunities to build human
capital for absorbing and developing technology, and specification of
644. Eddan Katz, Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/stopping-acta-juggernaut.
645. Comm'n of the European Communities, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA): Fact Sheet 2 (Mar. 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/march/tradoc
145958.pdf. But see Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 283,
at 2 (stating that "even if the intended objective of ACTA is to pursue only large-scale
infringements of IPR, it cannot be excluded that activities of ordinary citizens might be
captured under ACTA, especially as enforcement measures take place in the digital
environment").
646. See Yu, supra note 411, at 213-16 (discussing the importance of an "enabling envi-
ronment" for effective intellectual property protection).
647. Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 37, 42 (2002).
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rules for maintaining effective competition in Chinese markets.648
To some extent, enforcement facilitation-that is, to provide for mea-
sures that help facilitate enforcement-is just as important as enforce-
ment. While countries have explored the need for greater trade
facilitation to support trade, they have yet to fully understand the impor-
tance of enforcement facilitation. Nor have they the political will to push
for measures to make such facilitation possible. 649
The idea of the need for such an "enabling environment" was recently
explored in the fifth session of the ACE, which sought to "[i]dentify[ ]
elements for creating an enabling environment for promoting respect for
intellectual property in a sustainable manner and future work. '650 As
noted in Pakistan's submission to the ACE, which was entitled "Creating
an Enabling Environment to Build Respect for IP":
[A] very limited approach to combating infringement of IP rights, in
which, in essence, stricter laws and capacity building of enforcement
agencies is seen as the primary means to ensure enforcement... can
temporarily reduce IPR infringements levels, but cannot address the
challenge in a sustainable manner. A broader strategy is urgently
needed to allow the establishment of conditions in which all coun-
tries would have shared understanding of the socio-economic impli-
cations of enforcement measures, and direct economic interest in
taking such measures. In such an environment, countries' choice to
enforce IPRs will be derived from their internal rather than external
factors. 65'
Likewise, Brazil pointed out in its paper: "Violations of intellectual prop-
erty rights do not take place in the void. They are not disconnected from
concrete political and social variables. ' 652 That paper also heavily criti-
cizes the one-size-fits-all model of intellectual property enforcement
while at the same time calling for a change in the committee's focus from
enforcement to respect for intellectual property.653 Sadly, despite all the
interests and analytical support, ACTA does not even touch on efforts to
create this enabling environment. Instead, it pays only lip service by in-
cluding provisions on raising consumer awareness, 654 building capacity,
648. Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in
China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 410, at 295, 297.
649. See NAIM, supra note 179, at 257-58; Yu, supra note 332.
650. ACE, Draft Agenda, item 7, WIPO/ACE/5/1 Prov. Rev (Sept. 28, 2009).
651. Creating an Enabling Environment to Build Respect for IP: Concept Paper by Paki-
stan, 2, in ACE, Conclusions by the Chair, Annex 1, WIPO/ACE/5/11 (Nov. 4, 2009).
652. Future Work Proposal by Brazil, pt. C, in ACE, Conclusions by the Chair, Annex
2, WIPO/ACE/5/11 (Nov. 4, 2009).
653. See id.
654. See AC'A, supra note 5, art. 31 ("Each Party shall, as appropriate, promote the
adoption of measures to enhance public awareness of the importance of respecting intellec-
tual property rights and the detrimental effects of intellectual property rights infringe-
ment."). A key question regarding efforts to promote public awareness of intellectual
property rights concerns whether these efforts would accurately reflect the current intellec-
tual property system, in which the rights are just as important as the limitations and excep-
tions. As David Lange rightly noted, it is "fundamentally wrong to insist that children
internalize the proprietary and moral values of the copyright system." David Lange, The
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and facilitating technical assistance. 655
Third, as an enforcement-inducing treaty, ACTA is structurally inferior
to the TRIPS Agreement. Because it does not include a dispute settle-
ment process, countries are likely to have to fall back on the enforcement
standards provided by the TRIPS Agreement, thus raising serious ques-
tions about the need and effectiveness of the new agreement in the first
place. Although Canada advanced proposals in the area, other ACTA
negotiating parties, notably New Zealand, were somewhat reluctant to
develop such a mechanism. 656 In the end, the negotiating parties merely
settled on a consultation process.657
Fourth, by using a "country club" approach, ACTA fails to include
countries that are the major sources of piracy and counterfeiting. Conse-
quently, the agreement fails to target the crux of the problems that the
negotiators identified at the beginning of the negotiations.658 Given the
lack of participation by major developing countries, like Brazil, China,
and India, in the negotiation process, it would also be rather difficult for
ACTA to be extended to other WTO members that are not participants
in the current negotiations (although the original intention was to have
the treaty agreed first and then gradually extended to other non-ACTA
negotiating parties in "a second phase" 659).
To be certain, the plurilateral discussions that are being used to create
ACTA are rather similar to those trilateral discussions between the Euro-
pean Communities, Japan, and the United States during the early stages
Public Domain: Reimagining the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2003, at 463, 471. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
331, 428-31 (2003) (discussing education and public awareness programs).
655. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 35. See generally MAY, supra note 590, at 61-66
(discussing WIPO's technical assistance and capacity-building efforts); Duncan Matthews
& Viviana Mufioz-Tellez, Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The United States, Ja-
pan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
629 (2006) (discussing bilateral technical assistance efforts).
656. See Geist, supra note 560.
657. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 38. Even if the negotiating parties were able to agree
to develop a dispute resolution mechanism, this newly established mechanism would not
earn as much legitimacy as the decade-and-a-half-old WTO dispute settlement process.
Nor is it likely that the mechanism would have the same amount of experience and exper-
tise among those involved in resolving disputes.
658. See Geist, supra note 43 (quoting a confidential U.S. government cable disclosed
through WikiLeaks as saying that "[Hisamitsu] Arai stressed that we should move as fast as
possible and keep in mind that the intent of the agreement is to address the IPR problems
of third-nations such as China, Russia, and Brazil, not to negotiate the different interests of
like-minded countries").
659. Discussion Paper, supra note 564, at 1. It remains unclear which countries the
original drafters intended to target at the second phase. As revealed in a confidential U.S.
government cable recently disclosed through WikiLeaks:
The GOJ [Government of Japan] sees the most likely candidates for the first
tranche including France, UK, Germany, Australia, New Zealand and Singa-
pore. The GOJ sees Italy and Canada as countries which should be ap-
proached in the second group, but DAS Moore explained potential
difficulties with Canada, and pushed for the inclusion of developing countries
such as Jordan and Morocco in the first tranche, too. These countries had
accepted high IPR standards in their FTA's with the U.S.
Geist, supra note 43.
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of the TRIPS negotiations. 660 Through the TRIPS Agreement, a global
intellectual property regime has now been created to replace the patch-
work quilt of international intellectual property conventions used in the
pre-TRIPS days. 661
Nevertheless, it remains difficult to understand how ACTA could in-
duce other countries that are not current parties to the U.S. FTAs or the
EU EPAs, especially those that are emerging and quite powerful, to take
up new obligations under this agreement. Consider, for example, China,
whose piracy and counterfeiting problems have provided a major impetus
for the negotiation of new international enforcement norms.662 Oft-criti-
cized for its inadequate protection and enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights, the country was recently involved in a WTO dispute on
intellectual property enforcement with the United States.663 While China
has ample incentives to join the WTO, and in fact considered WTO acces-
sion a matter of national pride,664 it is hard to imagine China feeling the
same toward ACTA.665
Moreover, countries tend to adhere to norms they helped to shape.666
As Senator Sam Nunn noted in his address to the American Assembly in
the late 1990s, "China will be more likely to adhere to international
660. For discussion of the trilateral discussions among the United States, the European
Union, and Japan, see generally SELL, supra note 631, at 96-120.
661. See Yu, supra note 82, at 901-06.
662. For earlier discussions on piracy and counterfeiting problems in China, see gener-
ally Yu, supra note 398; Yu, supra note 273; Yu, supra note 411.
663. See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009); see also Yu, supra note 445 (ex-
amining the WTO panel decision and its ramifications).
664. See Yu, supra note 411, at 192 (describing how Chinese leaders "longed for China's
regaining its rightful place following centuries of humiliation and semi-colonial rule"); Sa-
muel S. Kim, China in World Politics, in DOES CHINA MATFER? A REASSESSMENT: ESSAYS
IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 37, 49 (Barry Buzan & Rosemary Foot eds., 2004) (noting
China's willingness "to gain WTO entry at almost any price").
665. The same is true for other big developing countries, such as India and Brazil. As
Anand Sharma, the Indian commerce and industry minister, noted: "If [the TRIPS Agree-
ment] has to be revisited in any stage in future, it will be only in multilateral forum-the
WTO, it cannot be done outside." India Will Not Accept Any Intellectual Property Talks
Outside WTO: Anand Sharma, ECON. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2011, 4:01 AM), http://articles.
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-04-09/news/29400634 1 intellectual-property-trips-
agreement-anand-sharm; see also Michael Geist, Brazil, india Speak Out Against ACTA,
MICHAEL GEIST'S BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5362/196/
("Brazilian officials say they do not recognize the legitimacy of the treaty, while Indian
officials say they have other priorities and do not see what they would gain from ACTA.").
666. See Kaitlin Mara & Monika Ermert, ACTA Risks Long-Term Damage to Demo-
cratic Public Policymaking, NGOs Say, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010, 11:02 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-risks-long-term-damage-to-democratic-
public-policymaking-ngos-say/ ("At the 'end of the day, ACTA is about Brazil, India' and
other emerging economies, [Michael] Geist said. If those countries 'who are the targets
[and] who have for too long sat on the sidelines and said they weren't part of the process
... are willing to stand up and be more aggressive,' then ACTA could be turned into
something that would not risk upsetting a balanced IP regime."); see also Yu, supra note
398, at 200-01 (discussing the need to "encourage Chinese membership and active partici-
pation in international organizations").
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norms that it has helped to shape. '667 Indeed, during the debate about
China's accession to the WTO, commentators repeatedly noted, "[T]he
international trading system can ill afford to have a player as major as
China not playing by the rules of the game. Involving China in the WTO
and obtaining deadlines for compliance therefore is preferable to having
China outside the organization with no deadlines whatsoever." 668 The
same is true not only for ACTA and China but also for all the other major
less-developed countries that have been left out intentionally.
In today's age, increasingly powerful developing countries are unlikely
to buy into a system that they did not help to shape. With the greater
leverage and economic power these countries have amassed over the past
decade, those days where a system can be created in developed countries
and then shoved down the throats of less-developed countries are long
gone. In fact, if the goal is to facilitate greater cooperation between de-
veloped and less-developed countries in an effort to combat piracy and
counterfeiting, it is ill-advised to ignore these crucial partners in the nego-
tiations in the first place. 669 It is simply short-sighted to consider coun-
tries unclubbable by virtue of their lack of like-mindedness.
Even if the ACTA negotiations have not alienated these countries-
and some countries, like Brazil, indeed expressed interest in joining the
negotiations67 0-ACTA could make discussion of future international in-
tellectual property norms more difficult. The current negotiations, in
fact, have betrayed the futility, or even danger, of giving in to demands of
the United States, the European Union, Japan, and other ACTA negoti-
ating parties at the multilateral level. ACTA could also provide the
highly unwanted guidelines on what items these countries need to think
hard about before they begin to accept greater future international intel-
lectual property obligations.
Even worse, the agreement could create unintended consequences that
result in a major setback for some of the poorest countries in the world-
especially in the areas of public health, sustainable agriculture, and food
667. SAM NUNN, Address to the American Assembly, in LIVING WITH CHINA:
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 277, 285 (Ezra F. Vogel ed.,
1997).
668. Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 1, 2 (2003) (remarks of the author).
669. Accord Weatherall, supra note 224, at 4-5 ("To the extent that it is cooperation
with these countries which is most likely to achieve the long-term goal of countering coun-
terfeiting, it makes little sense to draft a treaty that will never include these crucial part-
ners."); see also IQsensato, supra note 557, at 3 (stating that ACTA "seeks confrontation,
particularly with developing countries as opposed to cooperation and ignores the efforts by
the latter group of countries to implement TRIPS in resource-poor settings").
670. See Michael Geist, ACTA Update: New Meetings, New Partners, New Issues,
MICHAEL GEIST'S BLOG (June 30, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4092/
125/ (reporting that "Canadian officials confirmed that Brazil has approached one ACTA
participant about the prospect of joining"). By contrast, India was not invited. See Monika
Ermert, Indian Official: ACTA Out of Sync with TRIPS and Public Health, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (May 5, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/05/05/indian-official-acta-out-
of-sync-with-trips-and-public-health/ (reporting that an adviser from the Indian embassy to
the EU "said that according to his information India had not been asked to join").
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security. Consider public health, for example. During the fourth WTO
ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, the Doha Declaration was
adopted to underscore the importance of less-developed countries' access
to essential medicines. 671 The first two paragraphs of the Declaration ex-
plicitly "recognize[d] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting
many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting
from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics ... [and] the
need for the [TRIPS Agreement] to be part of the wider national and
international action to address these problems. '672
With TRIPS-plus terms, ACTA is likely to greatly restrict the flexibili-
ties in the TRIPS Agreement that are explicitly recognized by paragraph
5 of the Doha Declaration. 673 As Frederick Abbott pointed out, despite
the entering into force of the TRIPS Agreement, less-developed coun-
tries still have the following flexibilities in the public health area:
The TRIPS Agreement . . . does not .. .restrict the authority of
governments to regulate prices. It ... permits [compulsory or gov-
ernment use licenses] to be granted. It permits governments to au-
thorize parallel importation. The TRIPS Agreement does not
specify that new-use patents must be granted. It allows patents to be
used for regulatory approval purposes, and it does not require the
extension of patent terms to offset regulatory approval periods. The
TRIPS Agreement provides a limited form of protection for submis-
sions of regulatory data; but this protection does not prevent a ge-
neric producer from making use of publicly available information to
generate bioequivalence test data. The TRIPS Agreement provides
substantial discretion for the application of competition laws. 674
The entering into effect of ACTA unfortunately would greatly restrict
many of these flexibilities. It might even help facilitate strategic litigation
that harasses the legitimate trade in generic drugs.
Even more disturbing, ACTA might lead to provisions that would
make it difficult for generic pharmaceuticals to be delivered to these
countries, despite the agreement's recognition of the principles set forth
in the Doha Declaration 675 and the objectives and principles laid out in
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. 676 In the past few months,
there have already been serious discussions about how the seizure of ge-
neric drugs by the Dutch customs authorities is in violation of the WTO
Agreement. 677 As Professor Abbott reminded us:
671. Doha Declaration, supra note 81.
672. Id. 1 1-2.
673. Id. 1 5.
674. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle ofAction and Reaction: Developments and Trends
in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 30 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) (citations omitted).
675. See ACTA, supra note 5, pmbl.
676. See id. art. 2.3.
677. See generally Abbott, supra note 206 (discussing the seizure of in-transit generic
drugs in Europe).
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The Doha Declaration is an agreement among WTO members on
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement and provides that the
Agreement does not and should not interfere with the right of mem-
bers to protect public health. It further recognises the objective of
promoting "access to medicines for all". Seizure of generic drugs
moving legitimately in transit is a frontal assault by the European
Union on the object and purpose of the Doha Declaration. It is an
effort to prevent developing countries from relying on the security of
supply from Indian generic manufacturers, and to put them out of
business (or force them into mergers with major originator compa-
nies). This cannot be justified as a means to control counterfeiting.
If legitimate generic drugs are treated as counterfeit drugs the entire
global public will suffer. Regrettably, the international patent sys-
tem will again suffer a blow to its legitimacy.678
To make a point, India and Brazil recently filed complaints against the
European Union and the Netherlands over the repeated seizure of in-
transit generic drugs. 679
Although ACTA does not require the seizure of "in transit" goods, it
authorizes such seizure 68 0 and includes other provisions that could have
serious ramifications for access to essential medicines in the less-devel-
oped world, such as those concerning border measures and civil and crim-
inal enforcement.68 1  While the ACTA negotiating parties have
repeatedly emphasized the need for great international cooperation to
deal with counterfeit drugs, the greatest challenge seems not to be "IP
infringement, but the health risks created for patients by adulterated
products. ' 682 From the standpoint of public health and consumer safety,
much better will be a policy that focuses on substandard drugs as opposed
to one that relies on such imperfect proxies as counterfeiting or intellec-
tual property infringement.
678. Id. at 50.
679. Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State-
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010); Request for Consulta-
tions by Brazil, European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit,
WT[DS409/1 (May 19, 2010). Most recently, India and the European Union reached an
interim settlement. See India, EU Ink Deal to End Drug Seizure for Now, TIMES OF INDIA
(July 29, 2011, 1:21 AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-29/india-
business/29828750-1-generic-drugs-consignments-of-generic-medicines-eu-pariament. It
remains to be seen whether India will withdraw its complaint from the WTO and whether
Brazil will follow suit.
680. See ACTA, supra note 5, art. 16.2 ("A Party may adopt or maintain procedures
with respect to suspect in-transit goods .... ).
681. See Brook K. Baker, ACTA-Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to
Medicines, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 579 (2011) (discussing ACTA's impact on access to
medicines); SEAN FLYNN, ACTA AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 3 (2011), available at http://
en.act-on-acta.eu/images/e/eb/ACTAandAccesstoMedicines-20110902.pdf ("ACTA in-
creases the risks and consequences of wrongful searches, seizures, lawsuits and other en-
forcement actions against legitimate suppliers of generic medicines"); James Love, Michdle
Rivasi Asks Question About ACTA and Access to Medicine, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L
(Oct. 26, 2010, 8:15 AM), http://keionline.org/node/994 (noting the concerns of Michele
Rivasi, a Member of the European Parliament, about ACTA's impact on access to essential
medicines).
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CONCLUSION
The development of ACTA was announced shortly after the adoption
of the recommendations for the WIPO Development Agenda. Although
the origin of this agreement can be traced back to much earlier days of
cooperation among developed countries and other like-minded countries
in their efforts to combat commercial piracy and counterfeiting, the
agreement and its negotiations have posed serious challenges to the mul-
tilateral trading system. ACTA also militates against domestic legislative
reforms and the development of future intellectual property laws and pol-
icies. While the lack of transparency has instilled, and sometimes even
exaggerated, fears among consumer advocates, civil liberties groups, aca-
demic commentators, as well as policymakers in less-developed countries,
the fears of this ill-advised agreement are both rational and highly justi-
fied. Whether it is within the developed world or without, ACTA will
alter the balance in the existing intellectual property system. And for
most people, especially consumers, ACTA will provide more harm than
good. The agreement should be completely revamped.
